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Article
Form and Function in the National Security
Constitution
DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN
Since Alexander Hamilton first wrote of the functional virtues of the presidency in
matters of foreign affairs, his claim that a unitary executive is specially blessed with
advantages of “[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” has been invoked regularly to
argue for a limited role for Congress in national security decision-making, and even more
rigorous deference to executive preferences by the courts. The Hamiltonian virtues have
proven particularly compelling to a modern set of functionalist scholars, from Bruce
Ackerman to John Yoo, who rely on the same metrics of institutional competence to defend
executive-heavy security detention programs (and other initiatives) against separation-ofpowers arguments that the Constitution requires greater multi-branch engagement.
While embracing the relevance of functional considerations in separation-of-powers
disputes, this Article rejects the notion that unitary executive power is the structural
arrangement most functionally advantageous for combating terrorism and associated
threats. Although some terrorist-related events are “emergencies” that may implicate the
Hamiltonian virtues, the new functionalist tendency to view counterterrorism only through
the lens of emergency power exaggerates the importance of high-speed rights-security
trade-offs, and obscures the range of trade-offs any security decision-making structure must
confront—including regular trade-offs between strategy and tactics. Moreover, as
organization theory helps demonstrate, while flexibility, unity, and speed can have
advantages in the management of high-consequence risk, they also carry significant
disadvantages that traditional separation-of-powers interpretation ignores, and that bear
directly on the efficacy of executive-only decision structures. In the end, the alternative
approach to evaluating comparative institutional competence proposed here leads to a far
more favorable view of the functional desirability of multi-branch participation in
programs geared to addressing the terrorist threat.
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Form and Function in the National Security
Constitution
DEBORAH N. PEARLSTEIN ∗
I. INTRODUCTION
While scholarly and judicial debate about the constitutional power of
the American executive is broad and deep, constitutional understanding of
the functional virtues of the executive branch in matters of national
security policy is remarkably little changed since Alexander Hamilton
wrote of them more than two hundred years ago. Those who advocate
broad executive power in national security have long invoked Hamilton’s
belief that a unitary executive is specially blessed with advantages of
“[d]ecision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch” to argue in favor of a limited
role for Congress in national security decision-making, and even more
rigorous deference to executive preferences by the courts.1 Recent claims
of executive functional supremacy in matters of national security are much
the same. Since 9/11, an ideologically diverse array of scholars, from
Bruce Ackerman to John Yoo, have argued that the most pressing modern
threats to national security—particularly terrorism and the threat of
“weapons of mass destruction”—demand more than ever the flexibility to
act with secrecy and dispatch, qualities unique to the unitary executive and
essential to the preservation of national security.2 Accordingly, these new
∗
Visiting Scholar and Lecturer in Public and International Affairs, Woodrow Wilson School of
Public & International Affairs, Princeton University. The Author wishes to thank Anne-Marie
Slaughter, Kim Lane Scheppele, and the Program in Law and Public Affairs at Princeton University for
their support during the preparation of this Article. Thanks also to Robert Ahdieh, Paul Berman,
Christopher Borgen, Christopher F. Chyba, Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Lynn Eden, Martin Flaherty,
Carol Heimer, Stanley Katz, Peter Lindseth, Martha Minow, Charles Perrow, and Scott D. Sagan for
helpful discussions. Special thanks to Wendy Liu for research assistance.
1
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
Hamiltonian arguments in favor of executive functional supremacy are addressed in Part II.
2
See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN, BEFORE THE NEXT ATTACK: PRESERVING CIVIL LIBERTIES IN AN
AGE OF TERRORISM 3–4, 13–14 (2006) (arguing for “emergency constitution” in face of growing
terrorist threats); ERIC A. POSNER & ADRIAN VERMEULE, TERROR IN THE BALANCE: SECURITY,
LIBERTY, AND THE COURTS 56 (2007) (“Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak
presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current
conditions.”); John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 813–22
(2004) (arguing that post–September 11th world poses threats that require affording President greater
flexibility in decisions involving the use of force); see also PHILIP B. HEYMANN & JULIETTE N.
KAYYEM, LONG-TERM LEGAL STRATEGY PROJECT FOR PRESERVING SECURITY AND DEMOCRATIC
FREEDOMS IN THE WAR ON TERRORISM 9 (2004), available at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/
ltls_final_5_3_05.pdf (“The ability of the United States to successfully fight the war on terrorism
requires giving the President the power and flexibility to respond quickly and effectively to terrorist
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functionalists tend to favor national security decision-making structures
with loose (if any) emergency-driven congressional engagement, and
deferential (if any) judicial review.3
The staying power of the Hamiltonian virtues in constitutional analyses
of executive power is striking in light of the radical changes that have
occurred in the nature of executive branch decision-making since the
Constitution’s founding—changes driven in no small part by the advent of
the administrative state and by the two-hundred-plus years of postHamilton study of organizational decision-making. Indeed, the new
functionalist commitment to this vision of executive competence is
particularly puzzling. In a world where the security threats are, it is often
argued, so different from those posed by “traditional war” (one nation-state
against another), why would Hamilton’s vision of a competent executive,
forged in precisely that state-against-state world, remain salient?
Part of the puzzling stasis in separation-of-powers thinking in the
national security context might be explained by lines drawn in the
centuries-old debate over formal and functional approaches to resolving
separation-of-powers disputes. Formalists, broadly speaking, look to the
Constitution’s text, structure, and history in an attempt to discern which
powers are “executive,” which are “legislative,” and which are “judicial”
in nature.
Functionalists, a more diverse group, look more to
considerations of actual effectiveness (what works in a given policy
context?) or constitutional purpose (why separate powers in the first
place?) in resolving such disputes.4 When it comes to matters of national
security, those advocating broad executive power have made some mostly
unsuccessful attempts at formal support for their position, but they have
been uniform in embracing the importance of functionalist concerns.5 At
the same time, those seeking limits on executive power have fiercely
defended the formal textual, structural and historical arguments for
allocating to Congress an equal or greater role in national security affairs.
But they have not much challenged the idea that the executive wins the
functional battle of the branches, either as to which has key functional
competences in dealing with matters of national security (the executive) or
why that is the case (unity, secrecy and dispatch).6
The result of these traditional battle lines has been to ensure that when
it comes to national security, the separation-of-powers debate about the
executive’s functional strengths has yet to be joined. This Article is an
threats.”); RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL
EMERGENCY (2006) (advocating allowing greater executive flexibility to respond to modern security
threats).
3
See infra Part II.B.
4
The contours of the formalist v. functionalist interpretive debate are sketched in Part II.A.
5
See infra text accompanying note 28.
6
See infra text accompanying note 38.
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attempt to do so. It engages the new functionalist approach to separation
of powers in two ways.
First, it considers whether functional
considerations should matter at all in interpreting the structural provisions
of the Constitution, and if so, what guidance the Constitution offers as to
what those considerations should be. While the Article embraces the
conclusion that functional considerations must play a role in resolving
separation-of-powers disputes, it urges against the new functionalists’
scattershot approach to deciding which functions rise to the level of
mattering in constitutional law.
Second, and more to the heart of the new functionalist project, this
Article considers what kinds of structural arrangements might be most
functionally advantageous for a government tasked with, among other
things, protecting its population from terrorist attack. It is in answering
this latter question that some of the most critical errors in the new
functionalist project emerge.
Perhaps most significant, the new
functionalist inclination to understand vast swaths of government
counterterrorism efforts as principally the subject of “emergency” powers
is not only empirically problematic, it falsely elevates the importance of
individual rights trade-offs in the policy program of counterterrorism
security, obscuring the variety of trade-off decisions (beyond just
considerations of individual liberty) that any security decision-making
structure must make. Here, the presumed importance of rights in
relationship to effective security policy only compounds the deeply
rooted—but false—expectation that executive branch security decisionmaking is categorically different from any other kind of executive
function.
It is in highlighting the effects of this expectation that an additional
key error becomes apparent: the new functionalists’ attention to the
structural benefits of flexibility, unity, and speed grossly discounts the
burdens such organizational characteristics impose on the executive branch
security structures tasked with carrying out counterterrorism operations.
Drawing on insights from organization theory, one can begin to identify
why and how such burdens emerge day-to-day. Organization analysis can
teach, for example, how competitive organizational structures inside
today’s complex executive branch (unitary in theory only) can make actors
more likely to shirk core responsibilities. The focus on organizational
incentives makes it possible to see, for instance, why deferential review in
some contexts may be worse than no review at all. To be clear, this Article
does not claim that there are no circumstances in which judicial deference
may be appropriate. Rather, the claim is that, given a fair weighing of the
costs and benefits of review, these circumstances are likely far fewer than
common understandings of executive branch competence would allow. In
the end, the alternative approach to evaluating the branches’ comparative
institutional competences proposed here leads to a far more favorable view
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of multi-branch participation in programs geared to addressing the terrorist
threat.
This Article proceeds as follows. Part II begins by situating current
functionalist claims for broad executive power in the context of classic
formal versus functional interpretive debates past. It concludes by
embracing a core functionalist position: while formal interpretation can
shed critical light upon, and sometimes resolve, key disputes about the
scope of executive power, functional analysis is often unavoidable and
sometimes required when it comes to understanding the structural
provisions of the Constitution.
Part II then considers the new
functionalists’ interpretive approach in particular, exploring whether their
model is consistent with the functional concerns that animate the
Constitution’s separation of powers. After identifying a series of flaws in
their interpretive approach, the remainder of Part II proposes a different
model of analysis that more fairly reflects the Constitution’s functional
interests. In this context, this Article distinguishes between interpretations
based on familiar purposive interests (the separation-of-powers purpose of,
for example, promoting political accountability), and more complex
effectiveness considerations (applied questions of what works), both of
which, this Article argues, must play a role in functional interpretation.
Part III then delves more directly into the national security
effectiveness considerations at the heart of the new functionalist project,
evaluating core new functionalist claims that the more effective national
security decision-making structure is one with expansive, flexible
executive power and modified (if any) judicial review. After highlighting
key deficiencies in the new functionalist approach, Part III suggests instead
that effectiveness assessments in the national security context have much
to gain from the insights of organization theory. A field that has grown up
to inform the structure of both private firms and public administration,
organization theory has engaged the methodologies of economics,
sociology, political science, anthropology, and psychology to understand
how organizations reach decisions and why.7 By identifying common
decision-making pathologies, and by applying decision-making models to
real-world examples of security problems, organization theorists have
taken our understanding of executive functionality far beyond Hamilton’s
analysis. Political scientists, in particular, offer a growing body of
empirical work exploring how executive branch organizations have
responded to national security challenges, and how structural
characteristics of those organizations have helped (or hurt) in crafting an
effective response. To the extent the functional demands on executive
power play a role in constitutional reasoning, such insights offer a more
7
See generally CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY (3d ed. 1986)
(giving developmental overview and examination of recent approaches to organizational theory).
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realistic set of expectations of institutional competence.
Indeed, as applied in Part IV to one of the new functionalists’ most
important policy interests—a security detention regime—organization
analysis appears to favor functional characteristics that yield a very
different kind of decision-making structure from one whose core features
are unity, secrecy, and dispatch. Instead, the more effective detention
system is one that is designed to handle principally non-emergency cases,
to incorporate planning incentives and other mechanisms that help avoid
emergency decision-making, and to use monitoring and review to correct
for certain known pathologies—like excessive secrecy—of the institutions
engaged in security operations. In closing, Part V returns briefly to the full
set of formal and functional factors relevant to separation-of-powers
questions to put in context the significance of its findings on
effectiveness—namely, that separation-of-powers concerns in security
detention lean vigorously against a unitary executive with deferential
outside review.
II. THE PERSISTENT FORMAL–FUNCTIONAL DIVIDE
A. The Age-Old Debate
When constitutional scholars talk about the debate between formalists
and functionalists, they are most often engaging in a discussion about what
method of interpretation should govern disputes over powers among
government branches under the Constitution. Though the general debate is
familiar, the terms formal and functional have been used less than precisely
to encompass a range of approaches to resolving separation-of-powers
disputes.8 In most conceptions, “formalist” interpretation relies on the
Constitution’s text, structure, and, to an extent, on the framers’ asserted
intent.9 Most would add to this that formalist methodology prefers blackletter rules to flexible standards, and, perhaps relatedly, that formalism
prioritizes “rule of law” interests like openness, predictability, and
8
See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Relationships Between Formalism and Functionalism in
Separation of Powers Cases, 22 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 21, 21–22 (1998) (contrasting formal and
functional approaches to separation-of-powers interpretation). Compare, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Formal
and Functional Approaches to Separation-of-Powers Questions—A Foolish Inconsistency?, 72
CORNELL L. REV. 488, 489–92 (1987) (using term “functionalist” to refer to essential executive,
legislative, and judicial functions of three branches of government), with Martin S. Flaherty, The Most
Dangerous Branch, 105 YALE L.J. 1725, 1734 & n.34, 1740–42 (1996) (using “functionalist” to
describe interpretation based on the purposes for which the separation-of-powers doctrine was
developed).
9
See, e.g., Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1734 (“Formalist catechism posits three discrete branches,
each exercising one of three distinct powers.”); M. Elizabeth Magill, The Real Separation in Separation
of Powers Law, 86 VA. L. REV. 1127, 1138–39 (2000) (“The rules are derived from specific sources:
the text of the Constitution and, for some but not all commentators, the original understanding of that
text.”).
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reliability in law (much as stare decisis is said to do). Either way, the
formalist methodology asks whether a disputed power is essentially
legislative or executive by its nature. As one account explains it: “[T]he
constitutional validity of a particular branch action, from the perspective of
separation of powers, is to be determined not by resort to functional
balancing, but solely by the use of a definitional analysis.”11 Only the
executive branch may exercise “executive” functions; only Congress may
exercise “legislative” functions.12
In the separation-of-powers case law, formalists classically point to
support for their approach in cases such as INS v. Chadha13
and Bowsher v. Synar.14 Whether invalidating the so-called legislative
veto of executive agency action as beyond the power of one house of
Congress to exercise (Chadha), or rejecting a statute through which
Congress vested executive powers in an ‘agency’ official but reserved for
itself the power to remove him from office (Bowsher), the Court has
looked to textual and historical sources to inquire whether the challenged
allocation of power to one branch impermissibly interfered with the
essential functions of the other branch.15 The veto power, the removal
power—these are essentially executive in nature, the Court has held; for
Congress to reserve to itself such prerogatives would disrupt the
Constitution’s central scheme. While the centrality of the essential
function inquiry might lead one to call this brand of interpretation
“functionalist,” the formalist courts have been at pains to clarify what their
inquiry was not:
[T]he fact that a given law or procedure is efficient,
convenient, and useful in facilitating functions of
government, standing alone, will not save it if it is contrary to
the Constitution. Convenience and efficiency are not the
primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of democratic
government. . . .16
In contrast, the label “functionalist” has most helpfully been used to
describe those who would embrace such pragmatic concerns, typically of
one of two varieties. A first species of functionalist looks to the purposes
10

Eskridge, supra note 8, at 21–22; Magill, supra note 9, at 1138–39.
Martin H. Redish & Elizabeth J. Cisar, “If Angels Were to Govern”: The Need for Pragmatic
Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory, 41 DUKE L.J. 449, 454 (1991).
12
Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 989, 997
(2006); see also Rebecca L. Brown, Separated Powers and Ordered Liberty, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 1513,
1523–26 (1991) (noting formalists’ commitment to “strong substantive separations between the
branches of government”).
13
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983).
14
Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
15
Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 732–33; Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951.
16
Chadha, 462 U.S. at 944.
11
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underlying the idea of separated powers to resolve disputes among the
branches; they ask what works to achieve a broader constitutional goal.
Without discounting traditional interpretive methodologies, these
purposive functionalists find incomplete or otherwise unsatisfying answers
in the Constitution’s text and history—and the reality of a vast and
entrenched administrative state in which any given executive branch
agency may simultaneously be rule-making, adjudicating, and ruleenforcing on any given day.17 Looking beyond strictly textual cues,
purposive functionalists ask whether an allocation of power serves the
purpose of separating powers in the first place—for example, to constrain
the exercise of tyrannical government powers, to ensure that government
accurately reflects democratic preferences, or to allocate power according
to the institutional capacity of each branch (a purposive interest this Article
refers to as “role effectiveness” hereinafter).18
A second species of functionalist is drawn to more immediate issues of
effectiveness, efficiency, and the circumstantial needs of modern
government.
Effectiveness functionalists ask, for example, which
allocation of power produces a better raw policy outcome than another; or
slightly more abstractly, which branch or branches of government can offer
the best decision-making process to meet a particular kind of policy need.
Such approaches find some of their greatest ammunition in decisions
evaluating (and generally upholding) the constitutionality of administrative
agency action. A standard example is Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor, in which the Supreme Court upheld the
Commission’s power to adjudicate customer claims about whether a broker
had violated provisions of the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA), along
17
See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 21 (noting that functionalist reasoning “might be understood as
induction from constitutional policy and practice,” as opposed to “constitutional text, structure, [and]
original intent”); Magill, supra note 9, at 1142 (noting that if the formalist approach were “consistently
followed in the courts,” it would “require dramatic alteration of contemporary institutional
arrangements and prevent experimentation along similar lines in the future”); Strauss, supra note 8, at
492–93 (noting that “[v]irtually every [one of these agencies] exercises all three of the governmental
functions”); see also Barkow, supra note 12, at 999 (noting that the “Court’s acceptance of modern
administrative agencies poses the greatest challenge to the formalist approach to separation of
powers”); Brown, supra note 12, at 1528–40 (offering alternatives to formalism and functionalism).
18
See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 12, at 1034–40 (urging formal approach to separation-of-powers
questions in criminal law for “functional” reasons related to purpose of separation-of-powers doctrine);
Brown, supra note 12, at 1531 (proposing an “ordered liberty” analysis that would settle separation-ofpowers disputes depending on “the degree to which they may tend to detract from fairness and
accountability in the process of government”); Redish & Cisar, supra note 11, at 489 (identifying
functional purposes to be protected in separation-of-powers analysis as fostering political values of
“diversity, [popular] accountability, and checking”). Such an approach may be seen in Supreme Court
separation-of-powers decisions across a range of cases. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120
(1976) (pointing to framers’ purposes in establishing separation of powers); see also Mistretta v. United
States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the
central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”) (citing
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–96 (1988); Bowsher, 478 U.S. at 725.
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with brokers’ state law counterclaims involving the same transaction.19
While recognizing that applying a formalist analysis to the dispute—which
would identify adjudications as essentially judicial functions under Article
III of the Constitution—would be more consistent with one line of
separation-of-powers cases, the Schor Court was nonetheless avowedly
pragmatic in its approach, blending purposive interests and effectiveness
interests in its functional assessment.
[T]he constitutionality of a given congressional delegation of
adjudicative functions to a non-Article III body must be
assessed by reference to the purposes underlying the
requirements of Article III. This inquiry, in turn, is guided by
the principle that ‘practical attention to substance rather than
doctrinaire reliance on formal categories should inform
application of Article III.’20
The Court did hint later at the limits of efficacy’s relevance:
It was only to ensure the effectiveness of [the regulatory]
scheme that Congress authorized the [Commodity Futures
Trading Commission (CFTC)] to assert jurisdiction over
common law counterclaims. Indeed, . . . absent the CFTC’s
exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations
procedure would have been confounded. . . . [The assertion of
CFTC] jurisdiction is limited to that which is necessary to
make the reparations procedure workable.21
By this view, the essential function of Article III courts was a factor to be
considered, but the effectiveness concerns that led Congress to enact the
CEA scheme could trump.22
As a number of scholars have by now pointed out, each version of
formalism and functionalism is plagued with problems. Formalists’
19
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986); see also Mistretta, 488
U.S. 361 at 382 (“Madison recognized that our constitutional system imposes upon the Branches a
degree of overlapping responsibility, a duty of interdependence as well as independence the absence of
which ‘would preclude the establishment of a Nation capable of governing itself effectively.’”)
(quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 121).
20
Schor, 478 U.S. at 847–48 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
21
Id. at 856.
22
See id. at 851–56 (“The CFTC adjudication of common law counterclaims is incidental to, and
completely dependent upon, adjudication of reparations claims created by federal law, and in actual
fact is limited to claims arising out of the same transaction or occurrence as the reparations claim. In
such circumstances, the magnitude of any intrusion on the Judicial Branch can only be termed de
minimis. Conversely, were we to hold that the Legislative Branch may not permit such limited
cognizance of common law counterclaims at the election of the parties, it is clear that we would defeat
the obvious purpose of the legislation to furnish a prompt, continuous, expert and inexpensive method
for dealing with a class of questions of fact which are peculiarly suited to examination and
determination by an administrative agency specially assigned to that task. We do not think Article III
compels this degree of prophylaxis.”) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
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inquiry into the identification of which functions are quintessentially
“executive” or “legislative” in nature problematically implies the existence
of Platonic governmental ideals of power that may or may not line up with
the universe of possible forms of state action. Formalists must face the
reality of life in the modern administrative state, where strict adherence to
formalist power divisions would likely result in the dismantling of much of
the executive agency apparatus—today daily engaged in both rule-making
(i.e., legislative) and adjudicative (i.e., judicial) functions.23 At the same
time, effectiveness functionalists struggle both with how to align interests
of efficiency and effectiveness for a given branch, and with the
overarching separation-of-powers principle that no one branch should be
able to exercise unlimited or tyrannical powers.24 Even purposive
functionalists face the charge that allowing room for such broad
considerations leaves the structural boundaries of our government open to
a degree of indeterminacy inconsistent with the idea of law in a
constitutional democracy.25 More than one scholar has noted how the
black-and-white terms of the formal versus functional debate simply serve
to obscure the issues underlying why we draw lines between the branches
at all.26
Yet to the extent formal and functional lines can be drawn in the
jurisprudence and scholarship of administrative law, scholars have drawn
them, noting that formalist analysis has been deployed to support powerful
executive and functionalist arguments tend to favor shared power among
the branches.27 The line-drawing exercise in the national security context,
however, reveals the opposite divide. As discussions of the scope of
executive power have recurred during periods of security crisis in the
United States, those favoring expansive executive power have been
uniform in embracing the tools of functional analysis. From Hamilton
forward, the urgency of modern threats, the advent of new technological
23

Strauss, supra note 8, at 492–96.
See, e.g., Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Improprieties: Reflections on Mistretta, Morrison,
and Administrative Government, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 357, 375–76 (1990) (“I recognize that the will of
the Founders always has about it a somewhat musty, antiquated, even shabby air, like a quaintly
decorated table that is old enough to be a valuable antique but not sufficiently well preserved. And yet
the single most pertinent fact about an old table is that it has survived . . . .”).
25
See, e.g., MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 100–02 (1995)
(arguing functional interpretation “inherently guts the prophylactic nature of the separation-of-powers
protections”); Larry Alexander, “With Me, It’s All er Nuthin’”: Formalism in Law and Morality, 66 U.
CHI. L. REV. 530, 534–36 (1999) (favoring formalism as reducing error and decision-making costs in
separation-of-powers disputes); Carter, supra note 24, at 375–76 (criticizing indeterminacy of
functional approaches).
26
Barkow, supra note 12, at 992–93; Magill, supra note 9, at 1129.
27
See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1740 (describing functionalist scholars as tending to favor greater
congressional and judicial supervision of executive power). Note, however, that Flaherty’s bifurcation
was based on the assumption that functionalists were concerned about purposive effectiveness
(constraining power, protecting liberty), not raw effectiveness (developing good agricultural policy).
Id. at 1734–37.
24
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challenges, and assertedly pragmatic assessments of presidential
competencies required to meet them have all been staples of arguments
made by those favoring broad executive power.28 As Richard Neustadt put
it in his landmark 1964 book, Presidential Power: “[W]hen it comes to
action risking war, technology has modified the Constitution: the President
perforce becomes the only such man in the system capable of exercising
judgment under the extraordinary limits now imposed by secrecy,
complexity, and time.”29 Indeed, the Supreme Court has, from time to
time, given such functionalist claims at least passing cause to warrant their
perennial invocation.30
In contrast, the most vigorous advocates against the “imperial
presidency’s” tendencies have generally embraced some form of the

28

Hamilton believed that it was impossible to set precise limits on the federal executive power
“because it is impossible to foresee or to define the extent and variety of national exigencies.” THE
FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 184 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis omitted).
Because “[t]he circumstances that endanger the safety of nations are infinite,” Hamilton explained, “no
constitutional shackles can wisely be imposed on the power to which the care of it is committed.” Id. at
184–85. The federal government, therefore, had to have all power necessary to “insure domestic
Tranquility” and “provide for the common defence.” U.S. CONST. pmbl. In the twentieth century,
scholars continued to invoke Hamilton to support claims of broad executive power in times of security
threat. See, e.g., Robert H. Bork, Foreword to THE FETTERED PRESIDENCY: LEGAL CONSTRAINTS ON
THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH, at ix, x (L. Gordon Crovitz & Jeremy A. Rabkin eds., 1989) (“The respective
roles of Congress and the President developed according to their structural capacities and limitations.
Congress, consisting of 535 members assisted by huge staffs, is obviously incapable of swift, decisive,
and flexible action in the employment of armed force.”); Robert Bork, Erosion of the President’s
Power in Foreign Affairs, 68 WASH. U. L.Q. 693, 698 (1990) (“The need for Presidents to have that
power [to use force abroad without waiting for congressional authorization], particularly in the modern
age, should be obvious to almost anyone.”); J. William Fulbright, American Foreign Policy in the 20th
Century Under an 18th-Century Constitution, 47 CORNELL L.Q. 1, 1–2, 7 (1961) (asking “whether in
the face of the harsh necessities of the 1960’s we can afford the luxury of 18th century procedures of
measured deliberation”); John O. McGinnis, Constitutional Review by the Executive in Foreign Affairs
and War Powers: A Consequence of Rational Choice in the Separation of Powers, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Autumn 1993, at 293, 305–07 (noting that “the structure of the presidency as a single office
possessed by one person also gives the executive unique capabilities of acting with ‘secrecy and
dispatch’”); John O. McGinnis, The Spontaneous Order of War Powers, 47 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
1317, 1320–21 (1997) (“The Framers understood that the conduct of war must be entrusted to
executive.”); Eugene V. Rostow, Great Cases Make Bad Law: The War Powers Act, 50 TEX. L. REV.
833, 871 (1972) (“The circumstances of modern world politics, however, require Presidents to act
quickly, and often alone.”).
29
RICHARD E. NEUSTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER 187–88 (1964). For a thoughtful historical
account of Neustadt’s and others’ influence on the case for an “imperial” presidency, see Louis Fisher,
The Law: Scholarly Support for Presidential Wars, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUD. Q. 590 (2005).
30
See, e.g., United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936) (“The President
. . . manages our concerns with foreign nations and must necessarily be most competent to determine
when, how, and upon what subjects negotiation may be urged with the greatest prospect of success. . . .
The nature of transactions with foreign nations, moreover, requires caution and unity of design, and
their success frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.”) (quoting U.S. Senate, Reports, Committee
on Foreign Relations, vol. 8, at 24 (Feb. 15, 1816)); see also Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654,
683 (1981) (“The continued mutual amity between the nation and other powers again and again
depends upon a satisfactory compromise of mutual claims; the necessary power to make such
compromises has existed from the earliest times and been exercised by the foreign offices of all
civilized nations.”) (quoting Ozanic v. United States, 188 F.2d 228, 231 (2d Cir. 1951)).
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formalism defined above.
In the 1980s and 1990s, the approach was
crystallized in the writings of scholars like Harold Koh and John Hart
Ely.32 Writing largely in response to perceived executive excesses during
Vietnam and the Iran-Contra affair, Ely, for example, rejected arguments
that modern threats and longstanding practice had made the Constitution’s
initial allocation of war powers to Congress obsolete. Except for the
presidential power to “repel sudden attacks,” and the President’s power as
Commander-in-Chief to assume tactical control of a war once declared, the
government’s so-called war powers (in particular, the power to deploy
military force) were vested in Congress by the Constitution’s text and
intent.33
Koh’s interpretive sources were broader than Ely’s. In addition to
constitutional text, structure and history, Koh looked to “framework”
national security statutes and “quasi-constitutional custom” (the last only
as persuasive, not controlling authority) for insight into the separation of
national security powers.34 But his conclusion was formal in nature: the
Constitution establishes a system of “balanced institutional participation,”
with the core war powers, and their allocation among the branches, visible
first and foremost in the text. 35 While Koh was deeply critical of the
formalist approach taken by the Supreme Court in Chadha, the alternative
interpretive mode he embraced was not functionalist in an effectiveness
31
Peter Spiro is a notable exception to this, though his brand of functionalism would essentially
extend the classically formal interpretive sources (text, history, case law) to include the historical
practice of presidential power. Peter J. Spiro, War Powers and the Sirens of Formalism, 68 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1338, 1341 (1993) (reviewing JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL
LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS AFTERMATH (1993)) (“[T]extual instruments cannot meaningfully alter
an historically developed balance of interbranch powers, and . . . where the attempt is made such
instruments will not reflect actual norms governing institutional behavior among the branches. The
resulting cleft between text and practice promotes the perception that war powers is a matter of politics,
not law; this perception in turn undermines the efficacy of norms established by history and important
to our constitutional order.”); see also Peter J. Spiro, Globalization and the (Foreign Affairs)
Constitution, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 649, 650, 652–53 (2002) (arguing that globalization has changed
makeup of “international decision-making” and that historical constitutional rules need to be
reexamined).
32
JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 6 (1993) (asserting that “the constitutional requirement that Congress express its formal
approval before the president [sic] leads the nation into war is not remotely obsolete”); HAROLD
HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA
AFFAIR 122–23 (1990); see also THOMAS M. FRANCK, POLITICAL QUESTIONS/JUDICIAL ANSWERS 91
(1992) (noting that Constitution does not assign “absolute discretion” to executive with respect to
national security but instead delegates separate authority to both executive and legislative branches);
LOUIS HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALISM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS 17 (1990) (challenging
President’s constitutional authority to send forth troops); Louis Fisher, Unchecked Presidential Wars,
148 U. PA. L. REV. 1637, 1637 (2000) (reasserting clear intent of Constitution to divide war power
between executive branch and Congress); J. Gregory Sidak, To Declare War, 41 DUKE L.J. 27, 30
(1991) (arguing that President Bush’s order to commence military action against Iraq in 1990 violated
Constitution in that “Congress alone has the power to declare ‘war’”).
33
ELY, supra note 32, at 3–10.
34
KOH, supra note 32, at 69–70.
35
Id. at 67–72.
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sense, but rather an inquiry favored by some members of the Court that
appeared only to beg the formalist question: whether the allocation of
power to one branch infringes on the “central . . . functioning” of another
branch.36 Thus, even as the Court looked to increasingly pragmatic
considerations to resolve separation-of-powers disputes,37 the predominant
functional perspectives on security largely favored broad executive power,
or were viewed as relevant, at most, in rebuttal to the broad-executivepower account.38
B. The New National Security Functionalists
In the years since September 11th, formalist interpretation has retained
its central place in the arguments of those advocating the protection of
individual liberty,39 while functionalist arguments respecting national
security matters have proliferated. Scholars from Bruce Ackerman to Eric
Posner, Adrian Vermeule, and John Yoo, among others, have seized upon
functional claims in the service of advocating adjusted constitutional
structures—enhanced executive power and limited judicial review—to
accommodate the threat, perceived as newly acute, of terrorism and socalled weapons of mass destruction.40 While the new functionalists
36

Id. at 143–44 (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988)).
See cases cited supra note 19.
38
See LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 185–90 (1995) (responding to arguments that
the post World War II world “is far more dangerous and much more in need of decisive presidential
action”); KOH, supra note 32, at 118–23, 212–18 (1990) (“Given the president’s superior institutional
capacity to initiate governmental action, the burden of generating reactive responses to external
challenges has almost invariably fallen on him.”).
39
See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, Guantánamo, 42 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 263, 292 (2004)
(noting that Constitution “allot[s] war powers to Congress and to the President”); David J. Barron &
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb: Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and
Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) (arguing constitutional text and history
supports active congressional engagement in presidential conduct of war); Curtis A. Bradley & Martin
S. Flaherty, Executive Power Essentialism and Foreign Affairs, 102 MICH. L. REV. 545 (2004)
(rejecting textual and historical arguments that Vesting Clause provides broad source of inherent
executive authority); Neal K. Katyal & Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the
Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 1266 (2002) (“[I]n the absence of an emergency that threatens
truly irreparable damage to the nation or its Constitution, that Constitution’s text, structure, and logic
demand approval by Congress if life, liberty, or property are to be significantly curtailed or abridged.”);
Stephen I. Vladeck, Note, The Detention Power, 22 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 153, 154–55 (2004)
(arguing that “inherent, constitutional executive detention power, particularly as invoked against U.S.
citizens, simply does not exist”) (footnote omitted). But cf. Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of
Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2319–22 (2006)
(arguing formal separation-of-powers structures provided inadequate check on executive authority
post-September 11).
40
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4, 13; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 56; Yoo, supra
note 2, at 816–21; see also HEYMANN & KAYYEM, supra note 2, at 9 (“It is the President who has the
information and expertise necessary to detect and infiltrate terrorist networks and incapacitate terrorists.
Having outsiders second-guessing these steps would inevitably lead to undue executive branch caution.
In addition, trying to exercise oversight without knowing facts that must be kept secret would be
ineffective at best. Courts, legislatures and even Inspectors General undermine confidence, move much
too slowly and need information that they cannot safely be given. Oversight of executive actions,
37
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disagree about some things, they share at least two core premises in
common: (1) modern security threats, especially international terrorism
and “weapons of mass destruction,” are different in kind from past threats,
and the separation of powers of the eighteenth century Constitution is
unlikely adequate to meet them;41 and (2) these threats put a premium on
competencies—namely speed, secrecy, and/or unity of decision-making—
that the executive uniquely holds.42 It is in large part this new functionalist
vision that has informed the structural constitutional interpretation invoked
to support presidential power to torture detainees, engage in warrantless
domestic surveillance, and, in key respects, exclude courts from ex post
review of executive practices of interrogation, detention, and trial of
terrorism suspects.43
Among constitutional scholars, a relatively detailed account of the first
proposition comes from John Yoo. Contrasting today’s threats from those
faced by previous American generations involving “set-piece battlefield
matches between nation-states,” Yoo argues that post–Cold War national
security threats feature far different challenges, such as the proliferation of
therefore, should lie exclusively within the operating arms of the executive branch.”).
41
See, e.g., ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–4, 13–14 (arguing that modern terrorist threats are
different than historical enemies and that “proliferation of destructive technologies” has made viable
threats out of terrorist groups where previously only nation-states had such capability); POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 56 (“Our original constitutional structure, with a relatively weak
presidency, reflects the concerns of the eighteenth century and is not well adapted to current
conditions.”); Oren Gross, Chaos and Rules: Should Responses to Violent Crises Always Be
Constitutional?, 112 YALE L.J. 1011, 1027 (2003) (“The compression of time and space brought about
by technological innovation, the communications revolution, and advancements in transportation brings
new challenges and threats to states while significantly reducing the state’s available time for
response.”); Yoo, supra note 2, at 813, 816–22 (arguing that “significant changes in the international
system and the national security interests of the United States” have changed approach necessary in
dealing with threats); see also MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, THE LESSER EVIL: POLITICAL ETHICS IN AN AGE
OF TERROR 146–48, 152–53, 159, 163 (2004) (describing new challenges posed to “[o]ur constitutional
commitments” by threat of mass casualty terrorism).
42
See ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 45–48, 61, 109 (emphasizing need for speed but rejecting, in
part, unitary decision-making); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 17–18 (“There is a premium on
the executive’s capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive action”); Gross, supra note 41, at 1029,
1097 (“The government’s ability to act swiftly, secretly, and decisively against a threat . . . becomes
superior to the ordinary principles of limitation on governmental powers and individual rights.”); Jide
Nzelibe & John Yoo, Rational War and Constitutional Design, 115 YALE L.J. 2512, 2523 (2006)
(arguing that executive has access to greater information than legislative branch in regards to foreign
affairs and can make more accurate security decisions).
43
See, e.g., Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Head of Justice Department’s Office of Legal
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), at 36–37, available at http://www.washingtonpost.
com/wp-srv/nation/documents/dojinterrogationmemo20020801.pdf (“As Hamilton explained, . . .
‘there can be no limitation of that authority, which is to provide for the defence and protection of the
community, in any matter essential to its efficacy.’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 23, at 147
(Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)); U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Authorities Supporting
the Activities of the National Security Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), at 6–7, 13–
14, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/nsa/doj011906.pdf (“Because of the structural advantages of the
Executive Branch, the Founders also intended that the President would have the primary responsibility
and necessary authority as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive to protect the Nation and to
conduct the Nation’s foreign affairs.”).
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“weapons of mass destruction,” the emergence of “rogue nations,” and the
mass casualty threat posed by terrorist organizations of global reach like Al
Qaeda. 44 Bruce Ackerman’s account similarly suggests that the threat
posed by twenty-first-century terrorism is categorically different:
There have always been millions of haters in the world,
but their destructive ambitions have been checked by the
state’s monopoly over truly overwhelming force. Terrorists
might assassinate a nation’s leader or blow up a building, but
they could not devastate a great city or poison an entire
region. These are things that only states could do. With the
proliferation of destructive technologies, the state is losing
this monopoly.45
Curiously, while arguing that today’s world features fundamentally
novel security threats, most new functionalists simultaneously embrace
Hamilton’s eighteenth century assessment of the executive’s comparative
advantages in meeting those threats.
From the standpoint of institutional design, it seems that the
executive branch has critical advantages over a multimember legislature in reaching foreign policy and national
security decisions that are more accurate. As Alexander
Hamilton argued in The Federalist No. 70, the executive is
structured for speed and decisiveness in its actions and is
better able to maintain secrecy in its information gathering
and its deliberations: “Decision, activity, secrecy, and
dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one
man in a much more eminent degree than the proceedings of
any greater number; and in proportion as the number is
increased, these qualities will be diminished.”46
Characteristics of novel emergency threats have changed the policy
needs of the United States, making “flexibility” in the powers allocated to
the branches—especially flexibility for the President to act with secrecy
44
Yoo, supra note 2, at 813–20 & n.69 (citing NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA 15 (2002)).
45
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 13. Accord IGNATIEFF, supra note 41, at 147–48. While Posner
and Vermeule chronically disclaim any effort to assess the substantive merits of today’s threats, or the
relative merits of the United States’ response, POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 158, they
regularly identify favored executive programs on the merits, see, e.g., id. at 184–85 (supporting
coercive interrogation). Such an equivocal relationship with the substance of security policy leads the
authors to some troublingly tautological reasoning: wars, which include the “war on terror,” are, or at
least contain, emergencies; emergencies are, by definition, novel threats; the “war on terror” is thus, at
least in part, a novel threat. Id. at 18, 42.
46
Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2523 (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 424 (Alexander
Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)).
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and dispatch—more important than ever before.
Only a “unitary
executive can evaluate threats, consider policy choices, and mobilize
national resources with a speed and energy that is far superior to any other
branch.”48 Further, unlike “ordinary policing” or other standard protective
activities the government undertakes, “there is no general template that can
be used for evaluating the government’s response” to an emergency
threat.49 With no time for ex ante deliberation, and no metric for ex post
assessments, “the executive’s capacities for swift, vigorous, and secretive
action” are at a premium.50
To understand how the new functionalists proceed from these premises
to assess the merits of particular allocations of constitutional power—
regulating, for example, the deployment of military force, or the detention
of terrorist suspects—it is helpful to recall the different species of
functionalist approach.51 As in the administrative law context, some
functionalist claims are based on an assessment of purposive merit. Here,
the question of interest is whether a particular allocation of power serves or
disserves an asserted separation-of-powers goal—for example, ensuring
democratic accountability. Another species of claim entails security-based
assessments of raw effectiveness. Such claims ask which allocation of
power is likely to produce more good national security outcomes than bad
ones. Still a third approach is a claim of role effectiveness—asking which
branch or branches of government, in light of their given institutional
47
Yoo, supra note 2, at 813, 816–22; John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1183, 1200 (2004); John C. Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1639,
1642–43, 1676–77 (2002) [hereinafter Yoo, Constitutional Text].
48
Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 47, at 1676.
49
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 18.
50
Id.; see also ACKERMAN supra note 2, at 61 (“The realities of globalization, mass
transportation, and miniaturization of weapons of destruction suggest that bombs will go off too
frequently for the judicial cycle to manage crises effectively.”); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR
PRESIDENCY 67 (2007) (describing administration’s frustration with “vague criminal laws” designed
before advent of “the Internet, cell phones, and miniaturized weapons of mass destruction”). Exactly
what new miniaturization reality the authors have in mind here is less than clear. Conventional bombs
have fit in backpacks for decades, as have, of course, microbial biological agents. The technology
required to “miniaturize” a nuclear weapon is highly complex, intensely hard to come by, and for these
and a host of other reasons, unlikely to be a terrorist group’s weapon of choice. See Albert Narath, The
Technical Opportunities for a Subnational Group to Acquire Nuclear Weapons, in XIV
INTERNATIONAL AMALDI CONFERENCE ON PROBLEMS OF GLOBAL SECURITY 19–32 (Rome:
Accademia Nazionale Dei Lincei, 2003) (describing serious technical complexities of crafting
backpack-size nuclear weapons and challenging a passing report of a “suitcase” nuclear weapon stolen
from Soviet Union as “shaky on technical and other grounds”). The author is former director of Sandia
National Laboratories, one of the United States’ three major nuclear weapons laboratories. The United
States nuclear arsenal includes such devices, and bombs of this size may or may not have been
mastered by the Soviets. But design challenges of developing such a small device are substantial, and
pose significant hurdles even for the largest, most established state nuclear powers. Unconfirmed
reports in the 1990s suggested that the Soviets had manufactured “miniaturized” nuclear weapons, and
that one such device had been stolen. These reports were widely viewed as not credible by the U.S.
security community. See id. at 16.
51
See supra text accompanying note 41.
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competences, can offer the best security-appropriate decision-making
process to meet a particular kind of security threat.
Despite the potentially thorough set of inquiries a combination of such
considerations would allow, the new functionalists fail in different respects
to take them into account. Consider a few examples. Bruce Ackerman’s
exploration of an “emergency constitution” for dealing with security crises
is classically functionalist in approach—an approach Ackerman intends to
have both purposive and effective components.52 He takes as his purposive
interest the protection of individual liberties as a core separation-of-powers
function.53 At the same time, he intends his emergency constitution
provisions to be measured by their raw effectiveness—a system that does
“everything plausible to stop a second strike” terrorist attack.54 The system
that fits this bill, in Ackerman’s account, is one that would grant the
executive emergency powers for a set period of time, including, but not
limited to, expanded powers to detain people with less-than-usual process
or review.55
Ackerman’s purposive assessment has much to recommend it. He
recognizes, as had other purposive functionalists of pre–9/11 vintage, that
protecting liberty is a core function of separated powers.56 On the
effectiveness side, Ackerman also acknowledges, albeit in passing, the idea
that various organizational pathologies can undermine the effectiveness of
But along both purposive and
executive-alone decision-making.57
effectiveness axes, Ackerman’s analysis is incomplete. From a purposive
perspective, he accounts for the concerns of what is almost certainly only
one of the goals of separating powers; but other goals, such as promoting
democratic accountability, may also have some historical and
jurisprudential priority.58 Perhaps more problematic, Ackerman sets up
effectiveness as a measure of the validity of his scheme, but then engages
in no actual analysis of security needs or policy impact. From his very
broad position declaring that a general state of emergency will help prevent
a second terrorist strike, to his specific interest in emergency authorizations
of dragnets and administrative detention, Ackerman’s recommendations
52

ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3–9.
Id. at 3.
54
Id.
55
Id. at 80–87.
56
See Barkow, supra note 12, at 1012 (“Even before the adoption of the Bill of Rights, the
Constitution provided protection for the rights of those accused of crimes through its structural
provisions.”); Brown, supra note 12, at 1530–31 (arguing central focus of separation-of-powers
analysis should be its structural purpose of protecting “ordered liberty”); see also Bruce Ackerman, The
New Separation of Powers, 113 HARV. L. REV. 633, 640, 715–26 (2000) (discussing how “the
separation of powers protect[s] fundamental rights”).
57
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 86–87, 119–20.
58
See infra Part II.C.2 (“[E]nsuring that government functions remain adequately accountable to
the electorate has long been thought of as a proper judicial concern, in the separation-of-powers context
and out.”).
53
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rely on significant substantive policy judgments, but his constitutional
analysis leaves all effectiveness assessments assumed. To the extent he
does engage in empirical or policy analysis, his assertions face significant
but unaddressed challenges in each respect.59 Having thus invited a
sweeping revision of executive power under circumstances based centrally
on his own functional claims of raw effectiveness, the elaborate
“emergency constitution” mechanism only begs the question it asks—
would this emergency power help prevent a “second” terrorist attack?
Jide Nzelibe and John Yoo take a somewhat different approach, though
again purport to embrace both purposive and effectiveness interests in
considering the question how the branches should share authority over the
deployment of military force.60 Like Ackerman’s, Nzelibe and Yoo’s
analysis is limited to examining only some measures of purposive
functionality, albeit different measures than Ackerman’s: (1) which
allocation of power best promotes the goal of responsiveness to the
democratic preferences of the voters, and (2) which branch is best
structurally designed to carry out a specific function (the interest earlier
referred to as role effectiveness).61 As one can already discern in the
difference from Ackerman’s focus, Nzelibe and Yoo’s purposive measures
fail to take full account of the Constitution’s functional interests in
dividing powers. Indeed, their purposive assessment seems particularly
arbitrary; neither protecting individual rights nor constraining power—
likely among the framers’ central goals62—factor into their analysis.
Nzelibe and Yoo’s purposive account also highlights another potential
pitfall of functional inquiry: assuming that certain features of institutional
character are inherent to the institution, as opposed to characteristics that
may be, constitutionally, shared or bargained away. Thus, for example,
Nzelibe and Yoo discount Congress’s functional effectiveness in making
use-of-force decisions in part on the grounds that the executive is likely to
have better or more relevant information.63 But there is nothing inherent in
the structural constitutional design of Congress that prohibits it from
getting independent information, or even from sharing access to
information that the executive has; there is no constitutional barrier here,
(and many constitutional imperatives) to such information sharing. Lack
of information, then, does not provide a structural reason why Congress is
ill suited to making the decision to use force.
As for testing war-making effectiveness, Nzelibe and Yoo select one
particular measure of effectiveness, asking which allocation of power is
59
See infra Part III.A (arguing that Ackerman’s effectiveness claims are “suspicio[us] . . . when . .
. held up against even a modest review of the open security literature”).
60
Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2522–23.
61
Id. at 2522–26.
62
See infra Part II.C.1, 2.
63
Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2522–24.
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more likely to send appropriate or helpful signals of U.S. intent to potential
enemies.64 The authors contend that because signaling may have more or
less value depending on the type of enemy regime at issue—democratic
enemies are capable of using signals to bargain away from war, terrorist or
“rogue” authorities lack the internal political pressure required to make
bargaining to avoid war necessary—the President should have the option
of pursuing force without first seeking the approval of Congress (thereby
revealing, unnecessarily, our war-making intent).65
Nzelibe and Yoo deserve credit for making some effort to practice
what they preach, applying a combination of rational choice theory and
political science to evaluate the suitability of having Congress or the
executive authorize first uses of force. But even apart from the deeply
questionable merits of their conclusions on empirical and other grounds,66
their approach suffers from more fundamental flaws as a matter of
constitutional interpretation. Consider two examples. First, even within
the inherently flexible boundaries of functional separation-of-powers
analysis, an approach that makes the availability of power solely dependent
upon the nature of a particular external threat (including the quality of
other governments’ internal deliberations) makes U.S. governmental
institutions and war decision-making processes particularly unpredictable,
subject in the first instance to the happenstance of our enemy du jour. In
part for this reason, the Supreme Court’s interest in efficacy in separationof-powers cases has been circumscribed to evaluate not simply
effectiveness in an absolute sense, but effectiveness as internal to the
allocation of power among the branches, with adjustments to traditional
allocations of power “limited to that which is necessary to make” a
particular policy work.67 The Nzelibe and Yoo effectiveness criterion
embodies neither of these limits—limits the Court has recognized as
centrally entwined with the rule of law.68 Their effectiveness concern—
64
Id. at 2526–36. The authors may be criticized for neglecting to explain why they select this one
of the many potential metrics of effectiveness in dealing with a threat—for example, fewest American
lives lost, fastest route to strategic victory, etc. Arguably such other measures are much more
instructive in testing whether or not “good” policy is being made. But any one criterion, if rigorously
applied, may provide at least some helpful insight into the “most effective” allocation of power.
Selecting just this one metric might make their theory incomplete, but one must begin by attempting to
understand whether the single metric is even partially correct.
65
Id. at 2532–36.
66
See Paul F. Diehl & Tom Ginsburg, Irrational War and Constitutional Design: A Reply to
Professors Nzelibe and Yoo, 27 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1239, 1251–52 (2006) (“Though the authors claim
that ‘little or no empirical data’ supports the idea that congressional involvement leads to superior
selection of wars, in fact a wealth of empirical information addresses the effectiveness of democracies
in coercive bargaining and war.”).
67
Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1986) (emphasis
added).
68
See id. at 856–67 (“[T]his case raises no question of the aggrandizement of congressional
power at the expense of a coordinate branch.”); see also Laurence H. Tribe, Taking Text and Structure
Seriously: Reflections on Free-Form Method in Constitutional Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1221,
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how our enemies make decisions—will produce a different outcome caseby-case, but their allocation of decision-making power (to the President)
will apply even if our enemies make decisions in a way that would make
congressional involvement beneficial (by their terms).
Second, while the Supreme Court (and the framers) no doubt
recognized the relevance, at times, of functional concerns both purposive
and effective, those concerns have never been understood as the only
factors relevant to constitutional interpretation.69 As Mssrs. Yoo and
Nzelibe surely agree, effectiveness considerations are only part of any
legitimate interpretation of the separation of powers. While stand-alone
functional inquiries in the scholarly literature can be extremely helpful
(just as stand-alone historical or textual analyses), the reality that
effectiveness concerns are only part of a larger scheme of constitutional
interpretation imposes some limits on the outcomes that effectiveness may
legitimately support. Thus, for example, an effectiveness assessment that
is demonstrably at odds with the Constitution’s text cannot be sustained.70
A final new functionalist model comes from Eric Posner and Adrian
Vermeule. They purport to look exclusively to role effectiveness concerns,
particularly the question of which branch is best structurally designed to
strike the balance between security and liberty in an emergency. Unlike
Ackerman, Nzelibe and Yoo, Posner and Vermeule expressly (and
repeatedly) disclaim any interest in raw effectiveness assessments—
questions of whether or not a particular allocation of power has produced
bad policy.71 Having put all their functional eggs in the purposive basket,
Posner and Vermeule do better in some respects, by, for example,
acknowledging purposive interests in both the protection of individual
rights as well as in the allocation of power to promote role effectiveness.72
Nonetheless, their argument encounters its own set of pitfalls.73
1246 (1995) (“The central characteristic of this new school is a willingness to treat even the
architecture-defining, power-conferring provisions of the Constitution as merely suggestive—as though
they offer teasing hints about the design of any number of possible government frameworks. . . . I
emphatically reject any such treatment of our Constitution’s architectural provisions. Constitutions that
merely proclaim political aspirations, like those of the former Soviet Union and its satellites, might be
so regarded. Not so for constitutions that create an edifice of law. Ours is a constitution that calls
certain institutions into being. Thus, we must look to that Constitution to determine how these
institutions are to operate and when their products are to be regarded as law.”).
69
See infra text accompanying notes 80–84.
70
See infra text accompanying notes 78–83.
71
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 9–10.
72
Id. at 16.
73
For example, they too confuse circumstantial characteristics of one or another branch with
inherent features of institutional character that cannot be transmitted. Information is not an institutional
feature; it is a commodity that can be transferred among institutions, either by rule or by less formal
mechanisms. For other criticisms of the Posner and Vermeule approach, see, for example, Derek Jinks
& Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230 (2007); Mark
Tushnet, The Political Constitution of Emergency Powers: Some Lessons from Hamdan, 91 MINN. L.
REV. 1451, 1451 n.5 (2007).
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Perhaps most important among these is the authors’ dismissal of raw
effectiveness as relevant to the functional inquiry. The problems with this
approach become evident when one considers their given reasons for
rejecting such a metric. A first reason appears something like a sense of
modesty, coupled with an asserted interest in (role effectiveness) deference
to “the expertise of security professionals.”74
Whether the government justifiably detains al Qaeda suspects
without charging and trying them depends to a large extent
on the magnitude of the threat, the importance of secrecy, and
other factors that few people outside of government are in a
position to evaluate. . . . [W]e have no opinion about the
merits of particular security measures adopted after 9/11 . . . .
Our point is that we are not well positioned to judge the
merits of those policies, nor are the civil libertarian critics of
those policies.75
The second reason the authors disclaim an interest in raw effectiveness
is itself a raw assertion of policy reality: “[E]mergency threats vary in their
type and magnitude across jurisdictions, depending heavily on the
geopolitical position of the state in question. Thus, there is no general
template that can be used for evaluating the government’s response.”76
The problem of internal contradiction here is stark: the authors insist
they do not know enough about emergency security decisions to evaluate
whether such decisions are good or bad, but do know enough to claim,
inter alia, that good responses are necessarily “swift, vigorous, and
secretive”; that power should be concentrated in an emergency and should
“move up from the states to the federal government”; that limiting liberties
can enhance security; and that it is not possible generally to evaluate
whether decisions taken in an emergency are good or bad.77 Although their
(avowedly inexpert) opinion leads them to conclude that it is not possible
to evaluate the effectiveness of government responses to “unique” security
threats, the authors will need more than this assertion to explain the
fruitlessness of such activities to the large part of the American security
community devoted to doing just that.78
74

POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 10.
Id. at 9.
76
Id. at 18.
77
Id. at 15–16, 18. Indeed, the authors regularly offer substantive evaluations of the effectiveness
of various security decisions. See, e.g., id. at 22 (positing their “tradeoff thesis” as idea that neither
liberty nor security can be “maximized without regard to the other”); id. at 184–85 (supporting
regulated use of coercive interrogation). For a critique of this and other raw effectiveness claims made
by new functionalists’, see Part III.A.
78
Indeed, it is in part the regular engagement in after-action review for the purpose of gleaning
lessons for future action that gives the security community, military and otherwise, the expertise that
Posner and Vermeule argue is worthy of deference. See generally CHARLES PERROW, THE NEXT
75
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The impact of these various omissions in the new functionalist
approach becomes apparent when one evaluates the constitutionality of a
specific policy such as security detention. This example is considered
below.79 For present purposes, it may suffice to conclude that the new
functionalists offer a mixed bag. On one hand, they introduce important
purposive interests—including those of individual rights and role
effectiveness—into the constitutional calculation.
Where formal
methodologies produce uncertain answers to the constitutionality of
government action, such considerations may offer useful guidance. On the
other hand, each considers only some among various potentially legitimate
functional interests—and some in far greater detail than others. And there
is the overlaying puzzle of Hamilton’s prolonged sway on raw
effectiveness analyses—even in a world, the new functionalists contend, of
security interests different from those of the eighteenth century.
Understanding how and whether to fill the gaps the new functionalists
leave requires a theory of what role functional considerations should play
in the constitutional law of separation of powers.
C. Functionalism as a Factor: Purposes and Effects
The new functionalists are right on at least one score: there is often no
way to avoid functional considerations when it comes to the analysis of
separation-of-powers problems in matters of national security. While there
is considerable attractiveness in the idea that national security authority is
shared amongst the branches according to established, formal
commitments based on the nature of particular powers, the evidence seems
overwhelming that it is rarely that simple. For instance, the text does not
expressly allocate to the executive any power to detain prisoners seized on
the field of combat. Yet it is broadly agreed that the President must have
such power, at least to some extent, as part of any inherent or delegated
authority to wage war. As the Court put it recently in recognizing
presidential authority to detain individuals captured in a zone of military
combat: “[D]etention to prevent a combatant’s return to the battlefield is a
fundamental incident of waging war.”80 Why is detention a “fundamental
CATASTROPHE: REDUCING OUR VULNERABILITIES TO NATURAL, INDUSTRIAL, AND TERRORIST
DISASTERS (2007) (assessing mechanisms for improving disaster prevention); STEPHEN PETER ROSEN,
WINNING THE NEXT WAR: INNOVATION AND THE MODERN MILITARY (1994); see also NAT’L COMM’N
ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 393–95 (2004)
[hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] (detailing why review is worthwhile, and what lessons have
been gleaned). Does the possibility of evaluation of emergency responses mean that every emergencyrelated decision should be subject to searching judicial or other review, and tested against a measure of
best-possible-response? Not necessarily. But it does mean that one might doubt the validity of
rejecting all post hoc evaluation of emergency actions on the grounds that such evaluation is
categorically impossible.
79
See infra Part IV.
80
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004).
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incident”? Only functional analysis provides a complete answer. Indeed,
as should become clear in the discussion that follows, there is a strong
basis in history and precedent for accepting that functional interests are
part of the constitutional calculus.81
This is not to say that formal considerations are irrelevant. On the
contrary, the Court’s analysis invariably, and appropriately, integrates such
considerations.82 There are a number of reasons to reject the notion that
constitutional structures are so flexible that any particular Congress and
President may work out for themselves what power arrangement a given
threat demands. The powers vested in the branches by the Constitution are
limited by something more than circumstantial effectiveness. It is a core
constitutional principle that ours is by law a government of limited powers,
a principle crystallized in the textual insistence that “[t]he powers not
delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to
the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.”83
Accordingly, while the government as a whole may have all the power it
needs to ensure the defense of the nation,84 the power of the President
“must stem either from an act of Congress or from the Constitution
itself.”85 In part for this reason, the structural provisions of the
Constitution—“the architecture-defining, power-conferring provisions”
setting out the basic allocation of power among the branches—have been
appropriately interpreted in a less circumstantially dependent way than
provisions aimed at specified individual rights.86
81
See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1729–30 (1996) (“The Founders embraced separation of powers
to further several widely agreed-upon goals. Among these were certain ends or values that today are
commonly at the center of separation of powers debates, including balance among the branches,
responsibility or accountability to the electorate, and energetic, efficient government.”); see also
GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 1776–1787, at 354–553 (1998);
FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION
173–83 (1985) (on failures of Articles of Confederation); see also id. at 261–62 (describing framers’
discussion at Constitutional Convention of allocation of powers among branches and arguing that
“theory was even less relevant, and experience itself was inadequate: they could rely ultimately only on
common sense, their collective wisdom, and their willingness to compromise.”); see generally
HERBERT J. STORING, WHAT THE ANTI-FEDERALISTS WERE FOR 71 (1981) (explaining that
Constitution was created to ensure against “tyrannical government” and to protect liberty).
82
See Eskridge, supra note 8, at 22, 24 (explaining that Justices have relied upon both formalistic
and functional analysis in deciding cases).
83
U.S. CONST. amend. X; see also Tribe, supra note 68, at 1247–48 (“Those provisions of the
Constitution that are manifestly instrumental and means-oriented and that frame the architecture of the
government ought to be given as fixed and determinate a reading as possible—one whose meaning is
essentially frozen in time insofar as the shape, or topology, of the institutions created is concerned.”).
84
THE FEDERALIST Nos. 23, 28 (Alexander Hamilton).
85
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 585 (1952).
86
Tribe, supra note 68, at 1246–47. This, in contrast to, for example, the Fifth and Eighth
Amendments, where the Court has rarely engaged in foreign comparative analysis in cases involving
the structural provisions of the Constitution. See Steven G. Calabresi & Stephanie Dotson Zimdahl,
The Supreme Court and Foreign Sources of Law: Two Hundred Years of Practice and the Juvenile
Death Penalty Decision, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 743, 905–06 (2005) (“Many clauses of the
Constitution—for example, the Contracts Clause and the Vesting Clauses of Articles II and III—have
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What matters for interpretive purposes, then, is what the Constitution’s
functional interests are, how they should be weighted against formal
insights, and how to determine what allocation of powers best serves both.
This section recommends a functionalist approach that aims to address
gaps left by both the pure formalist and the new functionalist analyses. For
while opposed in many respects, the framers were united in identifying a
core set of purposes that separating powers among the branches should
achieve: (1) the protection of individual liberty through the constraint of
government power; (2) the preservation of democratic accountability; and
(3) the promotion of effectiveness—an idea that decision-making and
effectiveness could be enhanced if the branches develop a degree of
specialization and a level of competence lacking in the Confederation
government.87 In understanding what role functional analysis can play in
the national security context, it is worth briefly recalling each of these
interests.
1. The Protection of Individual Rights
It should be—but evidently is not88—beyond question that a core goal
of dividing roles among different branches is to limit power and thereby to
protect individual liberty. For the framers, “remembering the many
instances in which governments vested solely in one man, or one body of
men, had degenerated into tyrannies, they judged it most prudent that the
three great branches of power should be committed to different hands.”89
Hamilton himself was one of the key proponents of this view. As he put it:
“The true principle of government is this—make the system complete in its
structure, give a perfect proportion and balance to its parts, and the powers
you give it will never affect your security.”90 Hamilton thus championed
the centrality of the balance of constitutional powers to secure the
not proved to be as amenable to borrowing from foreign court decisions or legal rules as the ambiguous
and developing Eighth Amendment has proved to be. And, while a textbook on issues of criminal law
might be satiated with cases referring to foreign sources of law, a legal textbook on the jurisdiction of
the federal courts or on the federal government’s separation of powers would be quite lacking in such
references.”).
87
Other scholars have described a similar set of interests, using somewhat different terminology.
See, e.g., Ackerman, supra note 56, at 715–27 (2000) (identifying separation-of-powers goals as
protection of fundamental rights, democracy, and professional competence); Flaherty, supra note 8, at
1767 (identifying separation-of-powers goals of “balance,” “accountability,” and constraining
“governmental power”).
88
See Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2519–20 (identifying promotion of effectiveness and
political accountability—but not constraint of government authority or protection of individual rights—
as central concerns of separation-of-powers analysis).
89
WOOD, supra note 81, at 549 & n.42; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 47 (James Madison) (“The
accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a
few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the
definition of tyranny.”).
90
Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1802 (quoting 2 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS
ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 350 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1941)).
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protection of individual rights. While agreeing there were individual
human rights so fundamental that no government could legitimately
abridge them, Federalists Hamilton and Madison famously opposed adding
the Bill of Rights to the Constitution. A bill of rights was unnecessary in
their view because the checks and balances of the federal governmental
structure were themselves adequate to protect the people’s fundamental
rights.91 Thus, in attacking the constitutionality of the Alien and Sedition
Act of 1798 (passed during the quasi war with France, criminalizing
speech critical of the federal government), Madison’s first point of
contention was not that the provision violated the First Amendment right to
free speech, but rather that Congress lacked the structural authority to
regulate the press.92
It is thus unsurprising that the Supreme Court has regularly recognized
the protection of individual liberty as a core purpose of separated powers—
and that it has done so even in those cases often considered formalist in
approach.
For instance, in defending the formal requirement of
bicameralism from executive encroachment, the Chadha Court emphasized
the fear of tyranny that drove the framers to embrace it: “Despotism comes
on mankind in different shapes. Sometimes in an Executive, sometimes in
a military, one. Is there danger of Legislative despotism? Theory &
practice both proclaim it.”93 The same concern appeared with greater
emphasis in Buckley v. Valeo, finding a violation of the Appointments
Clause and separation-of-powers principles in an act reserving to Congress
the power to appoint members of the executive branch Federal Elections
Commission:
When the legislative and executive powers are united in the
same person or body . . . there can be no liberty, because
apprehensions may arise lest the same monarch or senate
should enact tyrannical laws to execute them in a tyrannical
manner. . . . Were the power of judging joined with the
legislative, the life and liberty of the subject would be
91
Charles J. Cooper, Limited Government and Individual Liberty: The Ninth Amendment’s
Forgotten Lessons, 4 J.L. & POL. 63, 68–69 (1987).
92
Id. at 74–75.
93
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 948–49 (1983) (quoting 1 MAX FARRAND, THE RECORDS OF THE
FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254 (1911)); see also id. at 949 (quoting Hamilton arguing against
adopting unicameral legislature on grounds that “we shall finally accumulate, in a single body, all the
most important prerogatives of sovereignty, and thus entail upon our posterity one of the most
execrable forms of government that human infatuation ever contrived. Thus we should create in reality
that very tyranny which the adversaries of the new Constitution either are, or affect to be, solicitous to
avert.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 135 (Alexander Hamilton) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed.,
1888)); id. at 950 (“In republican government, the legislative authority necessarily predominates. The
remedy for this inconveniency is to divide the legislature into different branches; and to render them,
by different modes of election and different principles of action, as little connected with each other as
the nature of their common functions and their common dependence on the society will admit.”)
(quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 324 (James Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)).
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exposed to arbitrary control, for the judge would then be the
legislator. Were it joined to the executive power, the judge
might behave with all the violence of an oppressor.94
Notably, the recognition that individual liberty is a fundamental
purpose of the separation of powers has appeared with at least as much
frequency in the Court’s separation-of-powers cases involving national
security concerns as in its traditional separation-of-powers cases.95
2. Political Accountability
While perhaps by comparison a marginal interest in the Court’s
94
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 120 (1976) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 302–03 (James
Madison) (Henry Cabot Lodge ed., 1888)) (emphasis omitted); see also Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and has reaffirmed, the central
judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of
governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.”) (citing
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 725 (1986)).
95
See Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 756 (1996) (“Even before the birth of this country,
separation of powers was known to be a defense against tyranny.”) (citing MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT
OF THE LAWS 151–52 (T. Nugent trans.1949)); 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 146–47, 269–70);
Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 23–24 (1957) (“The Founders envisioned the army as a necessary
institution, but one dangerous to liberty if not confined within its essential bounds.”); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring) (“While the
Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate
the dispersed powers into a workable government.”); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 322
(1946) (“Courts and their procedural safeguards are indispensable to our system of government. They
were set up by our founders to protect the liberties they valued.”) (citing Ex parte Quirin 317 U.S. 1, 19
(1942). The Court’s recent jurisprudence in this area has emphasized this point repeatedly:
[W]e necessarily reject the Government’s assertion that separation of powers
principles mandate a heavily circumscribed role for the courts in such
circumstances. Indeed, the position that the courts must forgo any examination of
the individual case and focus exclusively on the legality of the broader detention
scheme cannot be mandated by any reasonable view of separation of powers, as this
approach serves only to condense power into a single branch of government. . . .
Whatever power the United States Constitution envisions for the Executive in its
exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations in times of conflict, it
most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at
stake. . . . [I]t would turn our system of checks and balances on its head to suggest
that a citizen could not make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis
for his detention by his Government, simply because the Executive opposes making
available such a challenge.
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 535–37 (2004) (opinion of O’Connor, J.) (emphasis omitted)
(quoting Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“[I]t was ‘the central judgment of the
Framers of the Constitution that, within our political scheme, the separation of governmental powers
into three coordinate Branches is essential to the preservation of liberty.’”); Home Building & Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[T]he war power . . . . is a power to wage war
successfully, and thus it permits the harnessing of the entire energies of the people in a supreme
cooperative effort to preserve the nation. But even the war power does not remove constitutional
limitations safeguarding essential liberties.”)); see also Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2800
(2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“Trial by military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns
of the highest order. Located within a single branch, these courts carry the risk that offenses will be
defined, prosecuted, and adjudicated by executive officials without independent review. Concentration
of power puts personal liberty in peril of arbitrary action by officials, an incursion the Constitution’s
three-part system is designed to avoid. It is imperative, then, that when military tribunals are
established, full and proper authority exists for the Presidential directive.”).
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separation-of-powers jurisprudence, appearing in dissents more often than
in majorities,96 the idea that separating powers would serve to promote the
accountability of the government to the people is also a recognizable theme
in constitutional history and interpretation.97 As Hamilton put it in arguing
that the executive power should be vested in a single President, “[O]ne of
the weightiest objections to a plurality in the executive . . . is that it tends
to conceal faults and destroy responsibility. . . . [T]he multiplication of the
executive adds to the difficulty of detection . . . .”98 One can of course
debate whether the highly complex executive branch of the modern
administrative state is better or worse than the original Hamiltonian vision
in securing the kind of accountability Hamilton had in mind. But the basic
claim should remain valid: promoting political accountability is a purpose
of separated powers.
Indeed, ensuring that government functions remain adequately
accountable to the electorate has long been thought of as a proper judicial
concern, in the separation-of-powers context and out. As the Court put it
recently: “By allocating specific powers and responsibilities to a branch
fitted to the task, the Framers created a National Government that is both
effective and accountable.”99 Thus, in the administrative law context, the
political accountability of the executive forms a significant part of the
rationale supporting judicial deference to executive agency decisions based
on often broad congressional authorization.100 The particular ability of the
96
See, e.g., Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 393–94 (determining that Sentencing Commission “does not
exercise judicial power” and is sufficiently separate from judicial branch to maintain separation of
powers); id. at 421–22 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing against Congressional delegation of lawmaking
to commissions that are not accountable to political process); Morrison, 487 U.S. at 731 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (“[T]he difference is the difference that the Founders envisioned when they established a
single Chief Executive accountable to the people: the blame can be assigned to someone who can be
punished.”).
97
Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1767, 1785 (“As it promised balance, separation of powers also
reflected a reconceptualization of accountability. . . . No less important, the Constitution continued the
recent constitutional trend of harnessing separation of powers to joint accountability.”); see also Steven
G. Calabresi, Some Normative Arguments for the Unitary Executive, 48 ARK. L. REV. 23, 42 (1995)
(arguing that “key consideration” for unitary executive “was accountability to the electorate”);
Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 2–3
(1994) (rejecting strong “unitary executive” theory but noting the continued salience of “important
values of accountability, coordination, and uniformity in the execution of the laws”).
98
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
99
Loving, 517 U.S. at 757. Of course, it is not the President but Congress that is most commonly
thought of as the most politically accountable branch. Id. at 757–58 (“Article I’s precise rules of
representation, member qualifications, bicameralism, and voting procedure make Congress the branch
most capable of responsive and deliberative lawmaking. Ill suited to that task are the Presidency,
designed for the prompt and faithful execution of the laws and its own legitimate powers, and the
Judiciary, a branch with tenure and authority independent of direct electoral control. The clear
assignment of power to a branch, furthermore, allows the citizen to know who may be called to answer
for making, or not making, those delicate and necessary decisions essential to governance.”) (citation
omitted); see also Barkow, supra note 12, at 997 (noting process mechanisms designed to promote
public accountability of executive agencies).
100
See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865–66 (1984)
(“While agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely
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electorate to hold political actors accountable for bad (or even unlawful)
decision-making is likewise near the center of the political question
doctrine, which is based in part on a notion that the courts can and should
decline to exercise jurisdiction in the interest of allowing some uniquely
political questions to be settled by the voters.101 The importance of
political accountability has also appeared in converse, as the Supreme
Court has urged against constructions of criminal laws that would create a
constitutional question by allowing Congress (and potentially the
executive) to effectively reap the political benefit of appearing tough on
crime without bearing the political cost.102
It is thus perhaps ironic for the new functionalists that in the foreign
affairs context, political accountability has been at times antithetical to the
Court’s primary concerns. As the Court explained in Curtiss-Wright:
It is quite apparent that if, in the maintenance of our
international relations, embarrassment—perhaps serious
embarrassment—is to be avoided and success for our aims
achieved, congressional legislation which is to be made
effective through negotiation and inquiry within the
international field must often accord to the President a degree
of discretion and freedom from statutory restriction which
would not be admissible were domestic affairs alone
involved.103
Put differently, foreign affairs are complicated, and may at times require
more operational delicacy than that permitted by popular democracy fullbore.
Thus, even acknowledging the relevant, if indeterminate, effect of
political accountability, it is important to keep in mind some important
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the
competing interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities.”).
101
See Rachel E. Barkow, More Supreme Than Court? The Fall of the Political Question
Doctrine and the Rise of Judicial Supremacy, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 237, 323–30 (2002) (defending
some form of political question doctrine on grounds of promoting accountability).
102
For example, in requiring that the maximum sentence accompanying a given crime be
provided by the legislature and proven to a jury—rather than affording judges the discretion to exceed
the sentence provided by statutory law—the Court insisted that our democratic structures discourage
legislatures from saying one thing while enabling the courts to do another. Rather, a state is required
“to make its choices concerning the substantive content of its criminal laws with full awareness of the
consequences, unable to mask substantive policy choices” behind having adopted the underlying law in
the first place. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 n.16 (2000) (quoting Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197, 228–29 n.13 (1977) (Powell, J., dissenting)). In such a way, the Court noted,
“[t]he political check on potentially harsh legislative action is then more likely to operate.” Id. For a
discussion of this argument in the context of the enforcement of the Geneva Conventions following the
passage of the Military Commissions Act of 2006, see Deborah N. Pearlstein, Saying What the Law Is,
1 HARV. L. POL’Y REV. (Online), Nov. 6, 2006, http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/11/saying
_what_the_law_is.html.
103
United States v. Curtiss-Wright Exp. Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936).
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limits on its impact in separation-of-powers analyses. First, appropriate
government interests in secrecy surrounding certain aspects of national
security may make it impossible for political accountability checks to
function effectively. Where in other realms of administrative law it may
be plausible to argue that strong presidential engagement with agency
decision-making enhances transparency (and therefore accountability),104
just the opposite effect is more likely to be at work in the national security
context. That is, it is precisely because security sometimes requires
secrecy that the involvement of more than one branch may be required to
make popular accountability possible at all.105
Second, as classic republicanism teaches, the interest in political
accountability contemplated by the framers was something other than
ensuring governance by pure reflection of popular will. On the contrary,
the prevention of tyranny was regularly valued in the Constitution’s
structure over the idealization of direct democracy. Popular election of the
chief executive would be mediated by an electoral college; the risk of
legislative demagoguery would be limited by a presidential veto; both
“political” branches would be held in check by the judiciary’s
constitutional review, and so on.106 Bearing far greater emphasis was that
“[t]he true policy of the axiom [of separation of powers] is that legislative
usurpation and oppression may be obviated.”107 Under the circumstances
104
See Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV. 2245, 2331–32 (2001)
(“Presidential administration promotes accountability in two principal and related ways. First,
presidential leadership enhances transparency, enabling the public to comprehend more accurately the
sources and nature of bureaucratic power. Second, presidential leadership establishes an electoral link
between the public and the bureaucracy . . . .”).
105
This conclusion is the opposite of that reached by Yoo, who argues that executive discretion
to, for example, deploy military force without interbranch consultation, is adequately checked by
political accountability by the President to the electorate. Yoo, supra note 2, at 821; see also Nzelibe &
Yoo, supra note 42, at 2519–23. Yoo does not address the concern that public elections may be
ineffective in rejecting certain kinds of executive initiative if no information is publicly available about
the full scope and nature of executive activities.
106
See WOOD, supra, note 81, at 446–63; Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1784–85, 1804–05 (discussing
Founders’ concerns with legislative tyranny and in distributing political accountability among the
branches); Robert O. Keohane et al., Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism 8–10 (Inst. for Int’l Law
and Justice, Working Paper NO. 2007/4, 2007) (describing Constitution’s republican structures). On
the presidential veto power, see INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 947–48 (1983) (“The President’s role in
the lawmaking process also reflects the Framers’ careful efforts to check whatever propensity a
particular Congress might have to enact oppressive, improvident, or ill-considered measures.”). On
judicial review, see especially THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 438 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick
ed., 1987) (“The complete independence of the courts of justice is peculiarly essential in a limited
Constitution. By a limited Constitution, I understand one which contains certain specified exceptions
to the legislative authority; such, for instance, as that it shall pass no bills of attainder, no ex post facto
laws, and the like. Limitations of this kind can be preserved in practice no other way than through the
medium of courts of justice, whose duty it must be to declare all acts contrary to the manifest tenor of
the Constitution void. Without this, all the reservations of particular rights or privileges would amount
to nothing.”).
107
4 THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON: THE JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION
208 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1903); see also MCDONALD, supra note 81, at 150, 156, 165 (describing
framers’ reaction against state legislative tyranny of Articles of Confederation).
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then, it seems reasonable to consider political accountability as a factor in
purposive functionalism, but recognize that it is unlikely to be as salient—
or as clear in its consequences—as other purposive separation-of-powers
interests in the context of national security.
3. The Promotion of Effectiveness
In contrast, a third set of interests are indisputably at the core of both
historic and modern separation-of-powers debate, and are perhaps the most
central to the new functionalist mission. Here, purposive and effectiveness
species of functionalism commingle, the latter emerging as a separate but
integral part of the purposive analysis. That is, it is a core purpose of
separating powers to ensure that the specialization and competence of the
branches are used together in a way necessary to run an effective
government (role effectiveness), and to ensure that the division of power
leaves room for a good outcome as a matter of policy (raw effectiveness).
This section explains why these interests constitutionally matter. The
following Part considers how one might go about evaluating functional
effectiveness claims in matters of national security.
Here, it is first essential to understand what the framers’ discussions of
executive competence were not. There is little question, for example, that
Hamilton believed the Articles of Confederation government, lacking in
unitary executive control, was grossly unprepared to fight a war repelling
foreign attack.108 Indeed, Hamilton’s contention that national defense
“most peculiarly demands those qualities which distinguish the exercise of
power by a single hand,”109 was in large measure a response to the
particular war-related incompetence of the Articles of Confederation–
model government. From this historical motive, however, subsequent
assertions of the nature of Hamilton’s views of effective national security
mechanisms have elaborated rather broadly.110 Broadest of all are among
108
THE FEDERALIST NO. 15, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“Are we
in a condition to resent or to repel the aggression? We have neither troops, nor treasury, nor
government.”).
109
THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 422 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
110
See supra Part II.B (discussing recent scholarly accounts of executive competences). Notably,
there are only two occasions on which a Justice of the Supreme Court has quoted the famous passage
on secrecy and dispatch from Hamilton’s FEDERALIST NO. 70, and on both occasions it was Justice
Thomas in dissent. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 580–81 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting)
(alterations in original) (“The Founders intended that the President have primary responsibility—along
with the necessary power—to protect the national security and to conduct the Nation’s foreign
relations. They did so principally because the structural advantages of a unitary Executive are essential
in these domains. ‘Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.’
. . . The principle ‘ingredien[t]’ for ‘energy in the executive’ is ‘unity.’ This is because ‘[d]ecision,
activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterize the proceedings of one man, in a much more
eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater number.’”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at
471–72 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749,
2823 (2006) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 581 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
Thomas was the sole justice to find that the President had inherent authority not only to detain Hamdi,

1580

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

today’s new functionalists: “[A] unitary executive can evaluate threats,
consider policy choices, and mobilize national resources with a speed and
energy that is far superior to any other branch.”111 At least the former two
assertions find no support in Alexander Hamilton.
Rather, advocates like Hamilton of the so-called unitary executive
urged their case on the grounds, among others, that such a figure would
bring an “energy” that had been sorely missing in the Confederation
scheme.112 But the notion of “energy” in the executive was not energy in
the sense of speed, activism or power per se, but energy for the purpose of
ensuring effectiveness in government more generally. As Hamilton
explained:
Energy in the executive is a leading character in the
definition of good government. It is essential to the
protection of the community against foreign attacks; it is not
less essential to the steady administration of the laws; to the
protection of property against those irregular and highhanded combinations which sometimes interrupt the ordinary
course of justice; to the security of liberty against the
enterprises and assaults of ambition, of faction, and of
anarchy. . . . A feeble execution is but another phrase for a
bad execution . . . .113
Energy was a valued characteristic not solely (or even especially)
because it was understood to enhance the executive’s security-related
capabilities, but because it was essential to every governmental function
the executive was assigned, including the obligation to “take care” that the
laws are faithfully executed. Asserting that such “energy” is uniquely
important in national security misconstrues Hamilton; claiming “energy” in
but also to make “virtually conclusive factual findings” about his status, unchecked by the courts.
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 589.
111
Yoo, Constitutional Text, supra note 47, at 1676.
112
See Flaherty, supra note 8, at 1786 (“The advocates of [a unitary executive] prevailed over
noisy opposition—primarily with the argument that a single magistrate would give the most ‘energy’ . .
. .”) (citing 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 64–65 (Max Farrand ed., rev. ed.
1937)); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(“Energy in the executive is a leading character in the definition of good government.”); JOSEPH
STORY: COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 767, at 546–47 (Ronald D.
Rotunda & John E. Nowak eds., 1987) (“Of all the cases and concerns of government, the direction of
war most peculiarly demands those qualities, which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.
Unity of plan, promptitude, activity, and decision, are indispensable to success; and these can scarcely
exist, except when a single magistrate is entrusted exclusively with the power.”).
113
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 402 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis
added); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 243 (James Madison) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987)
(“Energy in government is essential to that security against external and internal danger and to that
prompt and salutary execution of the laws which enter into the very definition of good government.”);
THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, at 201 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“I believe it may
be laid down as a general rule, that [the people’s] confidence in and obedience to a government will
commonly be proportioned to the goodness or badness of its administration.”).
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the executive requires effectively unlimited power suggests far more about
the nature of American government than even the new functionalists would
likely claim.
Hamilton thus defined energy as requiring not only unity (with its
potential for dispatch), but also “duration [in office]; an adequate provision
for its support; and competent powers.”114 These characteristics of
“energy” were equally as important, and in key respects tended to balance
the idea that good executive policy was necessarily pursued swiftly and in
secret. For Hamilton, adequate time in office was necessary to ensure,
among other things, that there would be time both to plan initiatives and
time for the public to evaluate their effect.115 “[C]ompetent powers”
likewise referred to the presidential veto, designed to protect against undue
“haste, inadvertence, or design” in legislation—a failing in government
Hamilton was keen to guard against.116 In this context, decision, activity,
secrecy, and dispatch were not the mark of good security policy per se, but
were rather qualities—lacking in the Confederation government—that
could aid (or not) the competent execution of any sound policy. Either
way, the task of public administration was one that by definition engaged
all branches of government.117 Recognizing that different branches have
different institutional decision-making qualities—some can act faster than
others, for example—does not presume a conclusion about when or
whether these qualities are most effective in managing any particular kind
of policy. The new functionalists risk confusing institutional description
for policy prescription. Just because the executive can act faster than
Congress (or the courts) in some circumstances does not mean security
policy is always (or even generally) served by the deployment of such a
skill.
Properly understood as reflecting something other than the
constitutional endorsement of particular skills for particular problems, the
Hamiltonian interests in both raw effectiveness (good policy) and role
effectiveness (effective execution) emerge repeatedly in the Supreme
Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence. On the raw effectiveness side,
114
THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 403 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987); see also
WOOD, supra, note 81, at 350–52; 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 52 (Max
Farrand ed., 1911) (“We must either then renounce the blessings of the Union, or provide an Executive
with sufficient vigor to pervade every part of it.”); 9 DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION
OF THE CONSTITUTION 1097–98 (John P. Kaminski & Gaspare J. Saladino eds., 1990) (arguing for
unitary executive with four-year term).
115
Richard T. Green, Alexander Hamilton: Founder of the American Public Administration, 34
ADMIN. & SOC’Y 541, 545, 549 (noting Hamilton’s concept that executive “[e]nergy consisted of four
elements,” and that “[t]he second element is ‘duration,’ meaning long tenure in office”) (citation
omitted).
116
THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, at 418–19 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987).
117
THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 412 (Alexander Hamilton) (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (“The
Administration of government, in its largest sense, comprehends all the operations of the body politic,
whether legislative, executive, or judiciary . . . .”).
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it should be apparent that the Court has never been shy about considering
the policy efficacy of a given separation-of-powers outcome, whether in
the security context or out.118 For instance, in the course of explaining (in
an opinion of now questionable validity) why it was not within the judicial
function to entertain petitions for writs of habeas corpus from military
prisoners held overseas, the Court opined that such hearings “would
hamper the war effort and bring aid and comfort to the enemy [and] . . .
would diminish the prestige of our commanders, not only with enemies but
with wavering neutrals.”119 While the Eisentrager Court was obviously
concerned with the expenditure of resources (military and other) associated
with allowing judicial review, it is unclear what factual or strategic
analysis underpinned the Court’s conclusion that such review would, for
example, diminish the prestige of command. It is perhaps worth noting
that if the Court is willing to be swayed by arguments that judicial review
would aid the enemy, it should also logically be prepared to consider
arguments that some enemies are most aided by the absence of such
118
See, e.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 708 (1974) (“A President and those who assist
him must be free to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to
do so in a way many would be unwilling to express except privately. These are the considerations
justifying a presumptive privilege for Presidential communications. The privilege is fundamental to the
operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the Constitution.”).
Though Nixon may be perhaps more properly thought of as a formalist case—the Court’s opinion was
structured according to its interest in identifying, and protecting, the core or essential functions of each
branch—the case demonstrates how difficult it is to avoid the intrusion of raw effectiveness
functionalism, even in the context of an ostensibly formal analysis. Cf. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S.
306, 330–31 (2003) (quoting Brief for Julius W. Becton, Jr. et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondents, Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241, 02-516) (upholding affirmative
action policy in part on grounds that “high-ranking retired officers and civilian leaders” of the United
States military assert that, “[b]ased on [their] decades of experience, . . . a highly qualified, racially
diverse officer corps . . . is essential to the military’s ability to fulfill its principal mission to provide
national security’”).
119
Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 779 (1950); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct.
2229, 2261 (2008) (“The Government presents no credible arguments that the military mission at
Guantanamo would be compromised if habeas corpus courts had jurisdiction to hear the detainees’
claims.”); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 534 (2004) (“We think it unlikely that this basic process
will have the dire impact on the central functions of warmaking that the Government forecasts.”); id. at
535 (“What are the allowable limits of military discretion, and whether or not they have been
overstepped in a particular case, are judicial questions.”) (quoting Sterling v. Constantin, 287 U.S. 378,
401 (1932)); Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398, 426 (1934) (“[T]he war power “is a
power to wage war successfully . . . .”). While the Court’s rejection of the presidentially created
military commissions at Guantanamo Bay was in key respects driven by its interpretation of a statutory
command, see Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 126 S. Ct. 2749, 2790 (2006) (noting that Uniform Code of
Military Justice requires that “the rules applied to military commissions must be the same as those
applied to courts-martial unless such uniformity proves impracticable”), the extraordinarily detailed
attention the Court gave to evaluating the practical need for the commissions’ alternative trial
procedures should leave little question that the majority justices had constitutional separation-ofpowers concerns in mind, see Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800–01 (Breyer, J., concurring) (“Trial by
military commission raises separation-of-powers concerns of the highest order . . . . Insofar as the
‘[p]retrial, trial, and post-trial procedures’ for the military commissions at issue deviate from courtmartial practice, the deviations must be explained by some such practical need.”) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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120

review.
But either way, there can be little doubt that the raw
effectiveness of such a scheme—what it would mean for war fighting and
ultimate success against a defined enemy—was a factor at some level in
the Court’s rejection in that case of a greater judicial role.
Role effectiveness has been a more self-conscious feature of the
Court’s separation-of-powers jurisprudence. Often cited as expressing the
classic “flexible, pragmatic” version of executive power,121 Justice Jackson
in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. joined the Court in rejecting President
Truman’s seizure of private steel mills on the eve of a major labor strike as
beyond the President’s constitutional authority.122 Writing an opinion the
Court continues to recognize as having established the authoritative
framework for reviewing the scope of executive power under the
Constitution,123 Jackson was acutely attuned to the need for judges to
understand the separation of powers as, at least, a partial function of
pragmatic effectiveness:
Some clauses could be made almost unworkable, as well
as immutable, by refusal to indulge some latitude of
interpretation for changing times. I have heretofore, and do
now, give to the enumerated powers the scope and elasticity
afforded by what seem to be reasonable, practical
implications instead of the rigidity dictated by a doctrinaire
textualism.124
Accordingly, Jackson believed presidential powers should be understood
not as fixed, but as “fluctuat[ing],” depending on the activities of the other
120
See, e.g., Gerard P. Fogarty, Is Guantanamo Bay Undermining the Global War on Terror?,
PARAMETERS, Autumn 2005, at 54, 68, available at http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/
05autumn/fogarty.pdf (“In addition to undermining the rule of law, there have been other harmful
unintended consequences of the Administration’s policy in Guantanamo Bay: providing fuel to a rising
global anti-Americanism that weakens US influence and effectiveness . . . and denying the United
States the moral high ground it needs to promote international human rights in the future. It seems
clear that these costs have far outweighed the operational benefits that the detainee operations have
generated.”); Jessica Stern, Al Qaeda, American Style, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 2006, at A15, available at
LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (detailing Al Qaeda efforts to utilize the detainments at Guantanamo
as propaganda and recruitment tools); Matthew Waxman, The Smart Way to Shut Gitmo Down, WASH.
POST, Oct. 28, 2007, at B4, available at LEXIS, New Library, WPOST File (arguing that “[o]n
balance, [the use of the prison at Guantanamo Bay]—and the widespread perception that it exists
simply to keep detainees forever beyond the reach of the law—has become a drag on America’s moral
credibility and, more to the point, its global counterterrorism efforts,” and further proposing that
detentions “should include periodic reviews by an independent judge of the factual bases for a
detention, under clearly legislated standards, and meaningful chances to challenge those premises with
the assistance of lawyers”). This point is addressed further in Part IV, infra.
121
See Patricia L. Bellia, Executive Power in Youngstown’s Shadows, 19 CONST. COMMENT. 87,
106–09 (2002) (describing ways in which Court has invoked Youngstown).
122
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 655 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring).
123
See Hamdan, 126 S. Ct. at 2800 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“The proper framework for
assessing whether Executive actions are authorized is the three-part scheme used by Justice Jackson in
his opinion in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.”).
124
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 640 (Jackson, J., concurring).

1584

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

125

branches.
Jackson’s account is useful for present purposes in several respects,
beginning with his illumination of role effectiveness, as distinct from raw
effectiveness, concerns. Even as Jackson purported to reject pure formalist
separation-of-powers analysis, he also rejected the idea that raw
effectiveness against a particular enemy alone comprises the functional
inquiry.126 Thus in interpreting the scope of the Commander-in-Chief
Clause, Jackson did not squarely engage the government’s argument that
the seizure of property was “essential” to military objectives; his counter
was indirect, to the effect that even if such seizure were essential, formal
limitations on executive power—including the Constitution’s structural
certainty that the civilian power shall be superior to the military—
precluded the kind of broad reading required to find the seizure validated
by inherent authority alone.127
What “fluctuations” there were in the scope of executive power
depended on factors internal to U.S. constitutional democracy; presidential
power changed not depending solely upon some assessment of the security
imperatives presented by a particular external threat, but rather as a matter
of the activities of the other branches. The experience of other nations
might be helpful in evaluating “the wisdom of lodging emergency powers
somewhere in a modern government,” Jackson argued.128 But there was no
clear reason—beyond convenience—why such powers had to be the
executive’s alone.
In the practical working of our Government we already
have evolved a technique within the framework of the
Constitution by which normal executive powers may be
considerably expanded to meet an emergency. . . . In view of
the ease, expedition and safety with which Congress can
grant and has granted large emergency powers, certainly
ample to embrace this crisis, I am quite unimpressed with the
argument that we should affirm possession of them without
statute.129
125

Id. at 635 (emphasis added).
Compare id. at 634–35 (noting that “[t]he actual art of governing under our Constitution does
not and cannot conform to judicial definitions of the power of any of its branches based on isolated
clauses or even single Articles torn from context”), with id. at 635, 646 (rejecting notion that “power to
deal with a crisis or an emergency according to the necessities of the case [includes] the unarticulated
assumption . . . that necessity knows no law,” and cautioning that “[t]he opinions of judges, no less
than executives and publicists, often suffer the infirmity of confusing the issue of a power’s validity
with the cause it is invoked to promote” and that “[t]he tendency is strong to emphasize transient results
upon policies . . . and lose sight of enduring consequences upon the balanced power structure of our
Republic”).
127
Id. at 646.
128
Id. at 652.
129
Id. at 652–53.
126
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As a matter of interpretive approach, Jackson’s lesson was that the
legitimacy of power depends not as much on the competence of any one
branch, as on the comparison between a single branch’s competence and
the branches’ cumulative effectiveness.130
Finally, Jackson’s opinion also highlights another feature of
effectiveness functionalism that the new functionalists are too ready to
underestimate: that independent or unimpeded exercise of a disputed
power must be necessary to the achievement of an otherwise constitutional
goal.131 Thus, although Jackson essentially ceded the President’s argument
that maintaining steel supplies was essential to military operations, Jackson
directly considered (and rejected) the idea that exclusive presidential
power was the necessary structure for accomplishing that goal.132 Indeed,
judicial evaluation of whether a structure is necessary for the achievement
of asserted policy aims is at the heart of much of the Court’s separation-ofpowers jurisprudence.133 In the security law realm, this principle is central
130
Id. at 635 (“While the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also
contemplates that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government.”).
131
In separation-of-powers and non-delegation jurisprudence, the Court has emphasized that
while separation principles do not preclude one branch from “obtaining the assistance of its coordinate
Branches” for the fulfillment of its responsibilities, that assistance is limited to what “the inherent
necessities of the government co-ordination” require. Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372
(1989) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 (1928)) (emphasis
added). In the non-delegation context, this principle appears as the justification for requiring that
Congress provide an “intelligible principle” by which an agency may carry out congressional direction.
See Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 421 (1935) (“The Constitution has never been
regarded as denying to the Congress the necessary resources of flexibility and practicality, which will
enable it to perform its function . . . .”) (emphasis added). In the separation-of-powers case law, the
notion flows from the Madisonian command of flexibility amongst the branches. See Mistretta, 488
U.S. at 380–82 (discussing respective interdependence and independence of three branches of
American government); see also id. at 381 (“[T]he greatest security . . . . against a gradual
concentration of the several powers in the same department, consists in giving to those who administer
each department, the necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to resist encroachments of
others.”) (quoting THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961)
(emphasis added)); Nixon v. Adm’r of General Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“[T]he proper inquiry
focuses on the extent to which [the Act in question] prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing
its constitutionally assigned functions.”); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976) (upholding
congressional delegation of investigative powers to Federal Election Commission on grounds that such
power has long been “regarded and employed as a necessary and appropriate attribute of the power to
legislate—indeed, was treated as inhering in it”).
132
Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 645–46.
133
See, e.g., Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 855–56 (1986)
(finding “demonstrated need” for delegation of associated adjudicative powers to agency court and
cautioning that “the CFTC’s assertion of counterclaim jurisdiction is limited to that which is necessary
to make the reparations procedure workable”); see also Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 691–92
(1988) (finding that Court “simply [did] not see how the President’s need to control the exercise of [the
independent counsel’s] discretion is so central to the functioning of the Executive Branch as to require
as a matter of constitutional law that the counsel be terminable at will by the President”); Schor, 478
U.S. at 856 (“It was only to ensure the effectiveness of this [otherwise constitutional reparations]
scheme that Congress authorized the CFTC to assert jurisdiction over common law counterclaims.
Indeed, . . . absent the CFTC’s exercise of that authority, the purposes of the reparations procedure
would have been confounded.”); Nixon v. Adm’r of Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425, 443 (1977) (“Rather, in
determining whether the Act disrupts the proper balance between the coordinate branches, the proper
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in decisions such as Ex Parte Milligan and Duncan v. Kahanamoku, in
which the Court evaluated and rejected claims of military necessity for the
suspension of civilian judicial processes.134 Thus, contrary to the new
functionalist notion that government powers must be understood to permit
that “everything plausible” be done to prevent another attack,135
functionalist analysis would require (only) that the structural arrangement
be able to accomplish everything necessary for government to be effective.
*
*
*
The new functionalists make an important contribution by insisting
upon the constitutional relevance of the purpose and effect of distributing
power. But while functionalist concerns were indeed engrained in the
constitutional idea, so were the limits of this idea. The first limit is that
formal commitments matter. Accordingly, even legitimate functional
concerns must fail if they are demonstrably inconsistent with the
Constitution’s text. A second limit is the range of relevant functional
concerns—a defined set of interests in which the protection of liberty sits
at the top of a hierarchy, political accountability sits beneath, and the raw
and role effectiveness of single-branch action matter in defining the
margins of allocations of power among the branches. Finally, while
effectiveness in its various forms is an appropriate consideration in
separation-of-powers questions, nothing in the Hamiltonian vision per se
supports the new functionalist premise that the best response to any given
national security threat requires secrecy and dispatch, much less the notion
that particular initiatives like security detention are worthwhile. In the end,
history and precedent have helped define the scope of purposive
functionalism. But for the effectiveness inquiries, something more is
required.
III. REASSESSING EFFECTIVENESS
In the terms just described, there is nothing inherent in the nature of
functional analysis that should point in one direction or another in
resolving a separation-of-powers dispute, even in the national security
inquiry focuses on the extent to which it prevents the Executive Branch from accomplishing its
constitutionally assigned functions. Only where the potential for disruption is present must we then
determine whether that impact is justified by an overriding need to promote objectives within the
constitutional authority of Congress.”) (citation omitted); United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 712–13
(1974) (rejecting President’s separation-of-powers argument that judiciary lacks power to subpoena
tapes on grounds that such a restriction would “gravely impair” courts’ ability to do their jobs).
134
See Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2, 127 (1866) (“It is difficult to see how the safety of
the country required martial law in Indiana. If any of her citizens were plotting treason, the power of
arrest could secure them, until the government was prepared for their trial, when the courts were open
and ready to try them.”) (emphasis omitted); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 328–35
(1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) (reiterating assertions of Court that military trials are constitutionally
inappropriate under circumstances where civilian courts remain intact and open).
135
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 3.
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context. The protection of individual liberty is and has ever been at the
core of the judicial role. Ensuring the government remains adequately
accountable to the electorate is of course an important job of the political
branches, but has likewise long been thought of as a proper subject of
judicial policing and concern. Furthermore, while the Court might at times
demur about its interest in policy or institutional effectiveness, its
occasional bouts of modesty on such questions belie a long track record of
caring deeply. What Hamilton wanted—and what the Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence bears out—was a government whose cumulative skill set
makes effective governing possible. Yet while balancing purposive
interests, like protecting liberty and promoting political accountability, is
familiar terrain for legal scholars, it is perhaps less clear how government
should work to ensure that the division of power promotes good policy
(raw effectiveness), and carries out whatever policy it chooses effectively
(role effectiveness). How, then, can we determine what structural
arrangement is most effective for a particular security policy goal?
Here it becomes necessary to return the theoretical discussion back to
the present context. The new functionalists believe that the threat of
terrorism is best addressed by various measures geared toward expanding
executive power to exploit essential executive competencies of secrecy,
unity, speed, information and expertise in pursuing programs from security
detention to the use of military force. In particular, while it is now clear
that the modern threat of terrorism can take many forms—from car bombs
to airline hijackings to whatever imagination can conjure—the concern that
terrorists might successfully deploy a “weapon of mass destruction”
(WMD) on U.S. soil appears to be the new functionalists’ greatest
concern.136 While the new functionalist project has plain implications for
constitutional structures—and indeed would apply their constitutional
analysis—in a wide swath of “national security”-related matters arising in
circumstances far removed from (for example) the days surrounding a
successful nuclear attack, the new functionalists at times suggest they are
interested only in such immediate pre- and post-attack circumstances.137
As Ackerman contemplates: “Terrorist attacks may kill a hundred thousand
136
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 61; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42–43; Nzelibe &
Yoo, supra note 42, at 2535; see also Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Should Coercive
Interrogation Be Legal?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 671, 700, 707 (2006) (concluding that coercive
interrogation techniques, although morally reprehensible, are justified by their potential benefits in
preventing catastrophic terrorist attacks which are no longer trivial post–September 11th); A. John
Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227, 1230–31
(2006) (“Time [is] of the essence when weapons of mass destruction have proliferated beyond the
control of national governments.”).
137
Compare ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 1–6, 86–87 (focusing on structural demands in
immediate aftermath of terrorist attack), with POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42 (suggesting
entire “war on terror”—a term they do not define—is an emergency situation). Nzelibe and Yoo
suggest no such “emergency” limitation. Nzelibe & Yoo, supra note 42, at 2516–19.
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at a single blow, generating overwhelming grief and rippling panic . . . .”138
What kind of structure for, say, security detention would we want then?
Posing the question so specifically is not to say that these authors
necessarily exclude from their analysis the danger of more conventional
terrorist attacks. But there is some logical basis for treating the WMD
“emergency” threat separately (and not only to make the analytic task more
manageable).139 There is a relevant substantive distinction between
government responses to, for example, the threat of car bombings, and
responses geared toward preventing an attack that actually threatens
destruction on the scale Ackerman has in mind. Conventional car
bombings, while devastating for those involved, pose no existential threat
to American society. On the contrary, it would take a truly radical
escalation of the use of such devices—far beyond the numbers in Israel or
Northern Ireland at the height of those states’ bouts of high-level terrorist
activity—for their domestic use to begin to reach the number of annual
deaths domestically caused by, for example, alcohol-related car
accidents.140 But there is no serious discussion, for example, of
138
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 4; see also POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 64 (positing
that “[a]fter the terrorist attack or military intervention, [government officials’] complacency is
replaced by fear,” but that “fear-inspired decisions” are not necessarily bad); Nzelibe & Yoo, supra
note 42, at 2532–35 (suggesting that “new threats to American national security change the way we
think about the relationship between the process and substance of the warmaking system”).
139
Security scholars have been right to point out that the phrase “weapons of mass destruction” is
obfuscatory at best. E.g., Chistopher F Chyba, Toward Biological Security, 81 FOREIGN AFF. 122, 123
(May–June 2002). Nuclear, radiological, chemical, and biological weapons—the major categories
typically included as among “WMDs”—are all, of course, dangerous. But each such weapon poses a
very different kind of threat from the others—including differences in raw destructive capacity—
differences that can matter significantly in crafting effective defenses. Where policy priorities might be
sensibly set according to some calculation of risk—a function of destructive capacity and the
probability of a successful attack—lumping these diverse weapons together as WMDs can badly skew
the security priority setting. Thus, the security concerns surrounding a nuclear-armed Iraq, for
example, might be reasonably understood as of a different order than the security concerns posed by an
Iraq armed with chemical weapons alone. See JOSEPH CIRINCIONE ET AL., DEADLY ARSENALS:
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL, AND CHEMICAL THREATS 3 (2d ed. 2005) (“Chemical weapons are easy to
manufacture, but they inflict relatively limited damage over small areas and dissipate fairly quickly.”).
More to the point, lumping these threats together pretends that each demands more or less the same
kind of defense. This Article’s focus on the nuclear threat—certainly one of the truly “mass” threats
among WMD’s—avoids this complication. The “mass” destructive capacity inherent in a successful
nuclear detonation not only threatens a great loss of life, it may also pose a more existential threat to
society itself. The U.S. government will continue to function at some level if a car bomb goes off
outside the White House. Without significant advance planning, it is not clear that basic functions can
be maintained if the city of Washington, D.C., is lost. If ever a government were to be justified in
seeking extraordinary powers, it would be preventing just such destruction.
140
In Northern Ireland, approximately 61 people were killed as a result of car bombs at the height
of the conflict there in 1972. MALCOLM SUTTON, BEAR IN MIND THESE DEAD: AN INDEX OF DEATHS
FROM THE CONFLICT IN IRELAND 1969–1993 (1994). In Israel, approximately 249 people were injured
and 43 killed as a result of 22 car bomb incidents between 2001 and 2004. If one adds all suicide
attacks in Israel during that period (including attacks on buses, etc.), the numbers rise to 4551. ISRAELI
MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, SUICIDE AND OTHER BOMBING ATTACKS IN ISRAEL SINCE THE 1993
DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES, http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Terrorism-+Obstacle+to+Peace/Palestinian
+terror+since+2000/Victims+of+Palestinian+Violence+and+Terrorism+sinc.htm. By comparison, in
the United States in 2006, there were an estimated 17,602 alcohol-related traffic deaths, approximately
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indefinitely detaining “known” alcoholics or drug addicts who refuse to
seek treatment because of the high likelihood that they will kill innocents
once behind the wheel of a car. Indeed, such an approach would seem
unthinkably inconsistent with the idea of a free society. It is at least
somewhat more difficult to identify a rational distinction between
preventive detention geared toward suspected alcoholics, and a regime for
suspected car-bomb terrorists.
There are certainly disadvantages in considering such a specialized
case in the hope of better understanding structural effectiveness.
Government decision-making structures must obviously be able to operate
regularly and effectively against a range of threats, and a structure that may
offer significant benefits against a certain kind of threat may carry
significant burdens in response to another kind of threat. But that reality
should make the nuclear terrorism case a particularly tough and instructive
example. If the nuclear case doesn’t require more separation-of-powers
challenging structures than detention schemes designed for other kinds of
threats, then one might legitimately question what would.
The inquiry thus framed, this Part proceeds as follows. The first
section considers the new functionalists’ empirical effectiveness questions,
holding up new functionalist conclusions about raw and role effectiveness
against the empirical literature to test the plausibility of their assumptions
about the terrorist nuclear threat, and the government response necessary to
address it. In this way, we might take another cut at evaluating whether
their interpretive approach to effectiveness functionality has succeeded.
The second section then sketches a different approach to assessing what
structures might be best suited to govern detention operations in this
context. This section explores what there is to be learned from the work of
organization theorists, who have studied a range of government approaches
to the management of chronic and acute security threats, identifying both
organizational pathologies and strengths in such approaches that bear
directly on the kind of security detention operations often contemplated in
current debates. From these lessons, this Article proposes a set of
characteristics that a decision-making structure in this context would
ideally possess.
A. New Functionalist Effectiveness
Despite the authors’ self-effacing assertions of modest knowledge in
matters of security, raw effectiveness claims feature centrally in the new
functionalists’ constitutional analysis. For example: the threat of mass
forty-one percent of the 42,642 total traffic fatalities. NAT’L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., 2006
TRAFFIC SAFETY ANNUAL ASSESSMENT: A PREVIEW (2007), http://www-nrd.nhtsa.dot.gov/Pubs/
810791.PDF.
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casualty terrorism is best understood as an emergency or war; one can
expect that in the event of a major attack, the public will panic and need to
be reassured through visibly different security measures (such as
widespread detention); an initial terrorist strike greatly increases the
probability of a second, and inadequate detention (or excessive review)
gives “aid and comfort” to the enemy or more directly, allows a second
strike to happen; and the uncertainty created by review imposes a burden
on security efforts that necessarily exceeds any security benefit.141
Yet grounds for suspicion of such conclusions become apparent when
these core claims of “how things are” are held up against even a modest
review of the open security literature. In the first instance, for example, it
is not at all obvious that government decision makers should conceive of
the challenge of preventing nuclear terrorism as exclusively or even
primarily a subject of “emergency” powers or emergency decision-making.
National security scholars and policymakers have been occupied with the
possibility that non-state actors, including international terrorist
organizations, would seek to acquire and use a nuclear weapon against the
United States for more than thirty years. A 1977 report by the U.S. Office
of Technology Assessment commissioned by Congress on questions of
how “non-state groups [could] obtain nuclear weapons and the routes they
could follow in doing so” concluded that “there is a clear possibility that a
clever and competent group could design and construct a device which
would give a significant nuclear yield.”142 While the unclassified study
unearthed no evidence at the time that a non-state group had attempted to
acquire a nuclear weapon, analysts cautioned that “[t]he expansion of
nuclear power, the advent of plutonium recycle, and trends towards
increased violence could lead non-state adversaries to attempt large-scale
nuclear threats or violence.”143 Based on the growing prevalence of such
analyses in the mid-1970s, the United States established the federal
Nuclear Emergency Search Team—a professionally diverse body that still
exists today within the Department of Energy—to support the FBI in any
effort to locate and disable a terrorist nuclear device in the United States.144
141
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 46; POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 254–56; JOHN YOO,
WAR BY OTHER MEANS 128–29 (2006).
142
U.S. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION AND SAFEGUARDS, at iii, 30
(1977), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~ota/disk3/1977/7705/770501.PDF [hereinafter OTA
REPORT]; see also JOHN MCPHEE, THE CURVE OF BINDING ENERGY (1974) (detailing threat of nuclear
terrorism); Jeffrey T. Richelson, Defusing Nuclear Terror, BULL. ATOM. SCIENTISTS, Mar.–Apr. 2002,
at 38, 39–43 (citing 1963 national intelligence estimate called The Clandestine Introduction of
Weapons of Mass Destruction into the U.S. and describing series of meetings in 1972 hosted by then
Chair of U.S. Atomic Energy Commission regarding prospect of terrorist attempts to steal weaponsgrade material to make bomb for use against United States).
143
OTA REPORT, supra note 142, at 26; see also id. at 30 (describing methods terrorist group
could use to acquire fissile material, including theft and black market economy).
144
NAT’L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, NUCLEAR EMERGENCY SUPPORT
TEAM, available at http://www.nv.doe.gov/library/FactSheets/NEST.pdf. The Atomic Energy Act
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Such agencies have now existed with confirmation for more than a decade
that at least one terrorist group is interested in making just such an
attempt.145
There have indeed been developments that make some aspects of these
threats today arguably even easier to realize—the proliferation of weaponsgrade materials perhaps is first among them—but the danger of nuclear
terrorism is unquestionably a threat for which we have substantial strategic
warning. Given the amount of warning we have had to develop prevention
and crisis management plans, and the number of points in the process of
weapon acquisition and deployment at which intervention is possible,146 we
may fairly expect prevention efforts to be ongoing and indefinite. If a
nuclear bomb is delivered to the Port of Los Angeles, it may be preceded,
if we are fortunate in a way few security experts anticipate, by a short-lived
tactical crisis. But it will not be a strategic “surprise” (an aspect of most
new functionalists’ definitions of emergencies).147
In any case, disaster experience provides important reason to pause
before embracing the raw effectiveness expectation that a nuclear
“emergency”—the event of a successful terrorist attack—will produce the
public consequences they anticipate. There can be no question that such an
attack on an American city would be devastating in many ways and put
special strains on government abilities at every level. But contrary to
Ackerman’s central claim that an “emergency constitution” is necessary
because terrorist strikes generate “mass panic,” undermining “effective
sovereignty,” 148 the social science literature provides substantial evidence
charges the FBI with investigating illegal nuclear activities within the United States, 42 U.S.C. §§
2011, 2271(b) (2000), and recent Presidential Decision Directives designate the FBI as the lead federal
agency in charge of terrorist response inside the United States. See NAT’L NUCLEAR SEC. ADMIN.,
supra (“Under this national policy, the FBI is the Lead Federal Agency (LFA) for terrorism response
within the United States . . . .”).
145
Both the 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, and the later, officially sponsored report of the special
COMMISSION ON THE INTELLIGENCE CAPABILITIES OF THE UNITED STATES REGARDING WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION (the bipartisan Silberman–Robb Commission), describe in some detail U.S.
knowledge of Al Qaeda’s efforts to obtain a nuclear weapon. Osama bin Laden has called the pursuit
of a nuclear weapon a “religious obligation;” surveillance of Al Qaeda communications has revealed
references to bringing about a “Hiroshima” in the United States; and materials found on computers in
Al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan have contained extensive materials on nuclear weapons, including
rough sketches of bomb designs. 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380; Matthew Bunn &
Anthony Weir, The Seven Myths of Nuclear Terrorism, 104 CURRENT HIST. 153, 154 (2005) available
at http://belfercenter.ksg.harvard.edu/files/bunnwier.pdf. Today, there seems little dispute that Al
Qaeda has the motive to acquire such a weapon, and would deploy it if acquired. The latter conclusion,
however, leads most to believe that Al Qaeda and associated groups have not yet successfully acquired
a single nuclear weapon. COMMISSION ON INTELLEGENCE CAPABILITIES OF UNITED STATES
REGARDING WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION, REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT 272 (2005), available at
http://www.wmd.gov/report/wmd_report.pdf [hereinafter WMD COMMISSION REPORT].
146
See infra text accompanying note 162.
147
See, e.g., POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 42 (defining “full-blown” emergency as
typified by “[n]ovel threats, heightened public concern, and deaths arising from hostile attacks”)
(emphasis added).
148
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 41–45, 89.
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to support the opposite expectation: “widespread panic is not the pattern
following any type of disaster.”149 Moreover, as discussed below, to the
extent public uncertainty is a risk, the public may well be most reassured
by a visible government commitment, not to new and uncommon
emergency powers, but to familiar modes of operation (or as close to
familiar as possible) already widely accepted as legitimate.150 More simply
put, the impression and reality of control and normalcy may well be
helpful in mitigating the risk of panic.
An analogous set of real-world examples undermines a second core
aspect of the new functionalist effectiveness analysis: the “tradeoff
thesis”—so named by Posner and Vermeule, and assumed by other new
functionalists. This approach posits as the central concern of government
institutions engaged in counterterrorism the functional necessity of making
quick, zero-sum trade-offs between security and liberty.151 But it is not
hard to find an identifiable set of circumstances in which the performance
of this function is at best irrelevant and at worst, counterproductive, in
counterterrorism operations. For example, the principle recommendations
of the vast majority of reports in the security literature about how to
prevent or cope with a nuclear terrorist attack are uniform in proposing a
range of rights-neutral measures. There are many recommendations in
which executive-branch-only secrecy is not an option (for example,
because of the necessary cooperation of foreign civilian research reactor
personnel), and in which expertise beyond mere political judgment is
required (for instance, to evaluate the efficacy of fissile security
measures).152 Why such a broad area of rights-neutral consensus?
149
LEE CLARKE, MISSION IMPROBABLE 179 n.54 (1999) (“The pattern, in fact, is one of terror,
accompanied by a moment of stunned reflection, or even anomie, followed by fairly orderly response.
Even in the horrors chronicled by the [U.S.] Strategic Bombing Survey [established in 1944 to study
the effects on cities in World War II devastated by firestorms and, later, nuclear attacks], cities burn,
bodies explode, houses fall down and still people do not panic.”) (citations omitted); see also Lee
Clarke, Panic: Myth or Reality?, CONTEXTS, Fall 2002, at 21, 22 (“After five decades studying scores
of disasters . . . one of the strongest findings is that people rarely lose control.”); E.L. Quarantelli,
Sociology of Panic, in INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE SOCIAL & BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES
11020, 11021 (Neil J. Smelser & Paul B. Baltes eds., 2001) (some researchers believe that panic
behavior “is very meaningful and far from most conceptions of irrationality”); Kathleen Tierney,
Disaster Beliefs and Institutional Interests: Recycling Disaster Myths in the Aftermath of 9/11, in
TERRORISM AND DISASTER: NEW THREATS, NEW IDEAS, RESEARCH IN SOCIAL PROBLEMS AND PUBLIC
POLICY 33, 34 (Lee Clarke ed., 2003) (suggesting that notion of widespread panic after disaster is a
“myth”); see generally WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM (Alan O’Day ed., 2004).
150
See Caron Chess, Organizational Theory and the Stages of Risk Communication, 21 RISK
ANALYSIS, 179, 183 (2001) (discussing how social actors function better in predictable situations).
151
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 114–15 (assuming that emergency measures will curtail
fundamental rights); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 26–27 (presenting supply-demand graph
of “security-liberty frontier,” on which “any increase in security will require a decrease in liberty, and
vice versa”); see also id. at 21 & n.7 (labeling this concept “The Tradeoff Thesis”); Julian Ku & John
Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive
Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 218 (2006) (“In wartime the government may reduce the
individual liberties of even citizens in order to more effectively fight the war . . . ”).
152
See, e.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380–81 (recommending cooperative
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Here the analysis is usefully informed by a brief detour through some
highly public facts. The nuclear physics required to understand how to
build a crude nuclear bomb has been in the public sphere for decades.153
Experts thus agree that it is less the technical challenge of basic design and
more the mechanical task of obtaining enough nuclear material to fuel a
nuclear explosion that remains a critical hurdle for terrorist groups.154 The
simplest available bomb designs use “highly enriched uranium” (HEU) as
nuclear fuel.155 HEU is not generally available.156 Rather, there are three
commonly understood ways to get it: (1) subject naturally occurring
uranium to an industrial “enrichment” process that makes it suitable for
weapons use; (2) steal it from an existing warhead; or (3) obtain it by theft
or black market sale from an existing HEU stockpile (stockpiled either for
not-yet-built or decommissioned nuclear weapons, or to fuel research
nuclear reactors, or ship or submarine reactors).157 For various reasons,
terrorist groups seem rationally far less likely to pursue or succeed in

international measures); WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 527–32 (recommending
measures for several branches of government); GRAHAM ALLISON, NUCLEAR TERRORISM: THE
ULTIMATE PREVENTABLE CATASTROPHE 143–56 (2004) (recommending measures to prevent
availability of nuclear material to terrorists worldwide); MATTHEW BUNN & ANTHONY WEIR,
SECURING THE BOMB 2006, at 121–37 (2006), available at www.nti.org/securingthebomb
(recommending a collaborative global response to combat nuclear proliferation); Linton F. Brooks,
Toward an Integrative Approach to Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE
AFTER FIFTY YEARS? 104, 105–06 (Joseph F. Pilat ed., 2007) (emphasizing the importance of securing
nuclear materials against theft and sabotage, and enhancing export controls and treaty regimes);
Richard A. Falkenrath, Confronting Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Terrorism, SURVIVAL, Autumn
1998, reprinted in WEAPONS OF MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM 91, 106–09 (Alan O’Day ed.,
2004) (“[T]he single best possible insurance policy against the risk of nuclear terrorism is to ensure that
all stockpiles of fissile (especially HEU) and nuclear weapons themselves are properly accounted for
and guarded.”); Laura S.H. Holgate, Preventing Nuclear Terrorism, in ATOMS FOR PEACE: A FUTURE
AFTER FIFTY YEARS? 111, 111–12 (Joseph F. Pilat ed., 2007) (advocating a “global cooperative
effort”).
153
For instance, The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic Bomb,
based on the original lectures given by a chief U.S. nuclear weapons scientist to a team of U.S.
scientists working in top secret at Los Alamos National Laboratories during World War II, was
declassified in the 1960s. ROBERT SERBER, THE LOS ALAMOS PRIMER: THE FIRST LECTURES ON HOW
TO BUILD AN ATOMIC BOMB 25–28 (1992) (addressing, inter alia, how big bomb would need to be in
order to achieve critical mass); see also Andrew O’Neil, Terrorist Use of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: How Serious Is the Threat?, 57 AUSTL. J. INT’L AFF. 99 (2003), reprinted in WEAPONS OF
MASS DESTRUCTION AND TERRORISM 1, 3 (Alan O’Day ed., 2004) (“Those who maintain that nuclear
weapons are accessible for terrorist groups point out that knowledge on ‘how to build a bomb’ is now
freely available to anyone who has Internet access.”).
154
See, e.g., WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 517 (“The single greatest hurdle to a
terrorist’s fabrication of a nuclear device is the acquisition of weapons-usable nuclear material.”).
155
See RICHARD L. GARWIN & GEORGES CHARPAK, MEGAWATTS & MEGATONS: THE FUTURE OF
NUCLEAR POWER AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 313 (2001).
156
See id. at 313–14 (discussing challenges of HEU production).
157
See, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 152, 61–86 (2004) (discussing pathways for terrorists to acquire
nuclear weapons or fissile material); BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 3–5 (discussing paths by which
terrorists might acquire and use a nuclear weapon). These three pathways, still the predominant
understanding today, are essentially identical to those identified by OTA researchers in 1977. OTA
REPORT, supra note 142, at 30.

1594

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

158

options one or two.
On the other hand, the theft or illicit trafficking of
material from HEU stockpiles is a substantial risk. HEU (or weaponsusable plutonium) is known to exist in at least forty different countries
worldwide, in both government and civilian facilities with widely varying
security protocols to guard against both outside attack and insider
threats.159 Indeed, state-owned sites in the former Soviet Union have in the
past fifteen years experienced thefts of limited amounts of HEU from
nuclear weapons labs and reactor facilities; some of the thefts or planned
thefts have resulted in prosecutions, largely of weapons lab or military
insiders motivated by the prospect of profiting from the subsequent sale.160
Nuclear research reactors (roughly 135 locations worldwide—a number at
universities) are also thought to be prime targets, as many of these have
existed with little security for decades.161
In short, the threat of nuclear terrorism is in the first instance the threat
of illicit trafficking or theft from one of the known facilities capable of
producing such material, or stockpiles of such material. For this reason,
the wide assortment of official and expert recommendations regarding the
prevention of nuclear proliferation (unrelated to bureaucratic organization)
place top priority on urging greater international cooperative efforts to
inventory, secure, deter, and track the disposition of these materials.162
158

The facilities needed to manufacture HEU are large, expensive, technically challenging to
build, and harder to hide from existing means of state and international surveillance. Chyba, supra note
139, at 124–25. Likewise, state-owned nuclear weapons tend to be protected by more or less
sophisticated layers of defense. U.S. nuclear weapons, for example, cannot be detonated without codes
to so-called “permissive action links”—electronic locks requiring the correct entry of complex codes,
substantially inhibiting unauthorized use of the weapon. See, e.g., BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at
47 (describing various U.S. security measures); SCOTT D. SAGAN, THE LIMITS OF SAFETY:
ORGANIZATIONS, ACCIDENTS, AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS 106 & n.149 (1993). While the other nuclear
weapons states may have less effective methods of protecting existing warheads, less is known about
the scope of these security systems. BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 47. Despite this, as of 2005, the
best publicly available analysis found that there were “no credible reports” of weapons having been
stolen from “vulnerable” countries. WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 272. The
availability of such protections does not guarantee that terrorists will not attempt weapon theft, but they
do make this pathway less attractive than option three—theft or illicit purchase of HEU alone.
159
BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 19. Various governmental and non-governmental
organizations track worldwide inventories of HEU. See, e.g., id. at 19–20 nn.42–43.
160
Id. at 10.
161
Id. at 19–20 & n.43.
162
See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 380–81 (making three recommendations to
guard against WMD proliferation: “work with the international community to develop laws and an
international legal regime with universal jurisdiction to enable the capture, interdiction, and
prosecution” of nuclear smugglers; expand U.S. engagement with international partnerships using
military, economic and diplomatic tools to interdict shipments of concern, including expanding partners
to include Russia and China; expand 1991 Cooperative Threat Reduction Program and related efforts in
partnership with Russia to secure fissile and related materials in former Soviet Union); WMD
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 527 (recommending, inter alia, that United States pursue
“additional bilateral ship-boarding agreements” to help tag, track and locate vessels of proliferation
concern); see also, e.g., ALLISON, supra note 152, at 143 (emphasizing the importance of persuading
every nuclear weapons state to improve security of nuclear weapons and material); Linton F. Brooks,
supra note 152, at 104–07 (describing cooperation with Russia, inter alia, as a “first-order priority”);
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There may be many policy trade-offs associated with such an approach.
But a trade-off between individual rights and security is not one of them.
Consider another core raw effectiveness assertion: too much
independent review of executive detention will give aid and comfort to the
enemy, or otherwise increase security risk. The assumption that it would is
far from obvious. At least some case studies of law enforcement and
intelligence efforts in emergency settings tend to support the greater
effectiveness of retail, rather than wholesale (or dragnet-type) efforts, in
part because ordinary resources are so taxed already.163 And while review
of any given detention decision (at any stage) no doubt consumes some
resources, it has also become clear, for example, that the absence of
judicial review for terrorist suspects (in the individual case and in the
aggregate) may badly undermine the international support recognized as
essential to identify and track the source of a nuclear bomb.164 In this
BUNN & WEIR, supra note 152, at 121–37 (recommending various U.S. security measures). Congress
recently authorized substantial new expenditures for this purpose. 50 U.S.C. § 2921 (2008) (“It shall
be the policy of the United States . . . to eliminate any obstacles to timely obligating and executing the
full amount of any appropriated funds for threat reduction and nonproliferation programs in order to
accelerate and strengthen progress on preventing weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation
and terrorism. Such policy shall be implemented with concrete measures, such as those described in
this title . . . . As a result, Congress intends that any funds authorized to be appropriated to programs for
preventing WMD proliferation and terrorism under this subtitle will be executed in a timely manner.”).
163
See Arie Perliger & Ami Pedahzur, Coping with Suicide Attacks: Lessons from Israel, 26 PUB.
MONEY & MGMT. 281, 282 (2006) (emphasizing importance of “selective” prevention procedures).
Indeed, history provides at least several examples of wholesale emergency dragnets that create more
problems than they solve. See, e.g., David Cole, The Priority of Morality: The Emergency
Constitution’s Blind Spot, 113 YALE L.J. 1753, 1755 (2004) (describing why “there are no mass
preventive detention success stories in our history”). Notably, publicly available descriptions of the
FBI’s role in TOPOFF3—one in the U.S. Government’s series of comprehensive terrorism attack
simulations—suggest that the FBI had at least some (and perhaps complete) success in converting preattack intelligence into individual arrests, carried out by standard search warrants. See STATE OF
CONNECTICUT TOPOFF 3 AFTER-ACTION REPORT 8, available at http://www.ct.gov/demhs/lib/demhs/
publicinfo/cttopoff3_pub_after_action_report_summ.pdf.pdf (“Over a period of several weeks, the FBI,
as well as the State and Local Police Departments, were given some intelligence prior to TOPOFF 3, in
an effort to test intelligence sharing. It was clear that the information received by the respective
agencies was shared and notionally successful search warrants and arrests were made prior to TOPOFF
3.”); Department of Homeland Security, Transcript of Background Briefing with Senior DHS Officials
on TOPOFF 3, at 8–9 (April 8, 2005), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/press_
release_0656.shtm (“[W]e had lots of information that kind of highlighted the fact that we had some
numerous individuals of concern operating in different locations throughout the northeast United
States, and FBI, working in partnership with state and local law enforcement, were able to follow some
investigation—investigative leads where we were actually able to make some arrests of some
individuals that had information dealing with other plotlines . . . . So we were able to prevent, or able to
grab some people, able to grab some weapons, able to grab some information that we believe allowed
us to successfully thwart a couple of events during the week or two prior to the actual full-scale events
on Monday, and some actors that, of course, did not come up in the information surge associated with
those activities, so that we had to deliberately build those in so we could get first responder play during
the full-scale event . . . . In terms of activities in the United States, we believe that all individuals that
were associated with the plotlines that were able to follow through the buildup phase and then into the
boots on the ground phase of the exercise, we policed up the individuals, the sprayer devices, the
suspect vehicles in question. We were able to do that . . . .”).
164
A remarkable study by the Intelligence and Security Committee of the British Parliament
found widely reported U.S. practices of kidnapping and secretly imprisoning and torturing terrorist
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regard, ensuring one’s decision-making structure can evaluate, for
example, strategic/tactical trade-offs may be at least as important as
ensuring that the structure can evaluate liberty-security trade-offs.
None of this is to say that a trade-off between rights and security may
never be required. On the contrary, there remain examples of where just
such a trade-off may be necessary—in the bioterror context, for instance,
with the need for quarantine following the release of an identified
contagious pathogen.165 The foregoing is intended instead to illustrate
three points. First, even a modest engagement with the empirical literature
demonstrates that it is a raw effectiveness mistake to assume an absolute
correlation between rights and security, or that effectiveness in the task of
quickly balancing rights and security should take priority in structural
design. Any raw effectiveness approach then, at least at the level of
theory, would seem to require a more forthright engagement in what can be
known about the real-world effects on policy of a given distribution of
power. It may be that raw effectiveness in any given case is not salient for
purposes of judicial review because there is no generalizable answer, or
because other formal or functional interests are dispositive. But publicly
knowable facts may make it possible to conclude that some security
judgments with liberty implications are likely ineffective, or even
irrational.166 If confronted with factual uncertainty about whether a
particular decision-making structure will aid the enemy, it would be a
peculiar constitutional disservice to assume, purely on raw effectiveness
grounds, a singular conclusion nonetheless.
Second, as should be evident by, for example, the active debate
surrounding the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act (and its
peacetime passage by more than two dozen states),167 where security needs
can be anticipated even in broad contours, there is nothing inherent in the
suspects, which led the British to withdraw from previously planned covert operations with the CIA
after the United States failed to offer adequate assurances against inhumane treatment and rendition.
See Raymond Bonner & Jane Perlez, British Report Criticizes U.S. Treatment of Terror Suspects, N.Y.
TIMES, July 28, 2007, at A6, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (“Britain pulled out of some
planned covert operations with the Central Intelligence Agency, including a major one in 2005, when it
was unable to obtain assurances that the actions would not result in rendition and inhumane treatment,
the report said.”). The full report of the Committee is available at http://www.statewatch.org/news/
2007/jul/uk-intel-sec-cttee-rendition-gov-resp.pdf.
165
See Thomas May, Political Authority in a Bioterror Emergency, 32 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 159,
159 (2004) (discussing Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, designed to grant state officials
expansive authority to coordinate biological terror attack response).
166
Consider, for example, the First Amendment burden of a hypothetical law banning the sale of
Los Alamos physicists’ notes regarding the physics behind nuclear weapons design-notes published
long ago in Robert Serber’s The Los Alamos Primer: The First Lectures on How to Build an Atomic
Bomb.
167
See, e.g., Daniel S. Reich, Modernizing Local Responses to Public Health Emergencies:
Bioterrorism, Epidemics and the Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, 19 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH
L. & POL’Y 379, 382 n.11 (2003) (discussing Center for Law and the Public’s Health at Georgetown
and Johns Hopkins Universities, Model State Emergency Health Powers Act, Dec. 21, 2001).

2009]

THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION

1597

nature of making policy choices involving security-liberty trade-offs that
necessitate the general alteration of the structures of government power.
Even where the need for speed may eliminate the feasibility of certain
kinds of decision-making structures—including those involving multiple
layers of executive branch operations review—anticipatable categories of
operations (of which detention is surely one) leaves open the possibility of
designing ex ante controls and/or ex post checks that address interests of
legality and efficiency. Such decisions may indeed involve trade-offs
between interests. But given strategic warning, which we no doubt have
with respect to the threat of nuclear terrorism, it may be possible to decide
on and implement those trade-offs in advance of an attack and within the
structure of normal government processes.
Finally, while the raw effectiveness argument about the strategic costs
of scant judicial review in this context does not necessarily suggest that
there is always one right choice between tactical and strategic goals, it does
suggest that the most we might say about the raw effectiveness impact of
no-review detention is that it depends on the enemy. It also suggests that a
decision-making structure that invariably favors tactics over strategy (or
security over liberty), or systematically forecloses the consideration of
either tactical or strategic consequences, will fail to rationally evaluate
such trade-offs. As discussed below, an insistence on viewing all
operations connected with “WMDs” as tantamount to a constitutional
“emergency” seems liable to ensure against the regular evaluation of
strategic versus tactical responses to threats.
This brings us to the new functionalists’ role effectiveness approach.
For whatever one researcher (especially, the new functionalists would
suggest, legal researchers) might find in the empirical literature informing
the nature of security threats and emergency responses, the new
functionalists’ more forthright argument is that institutional competences
make the executive better positioned to consider this information and make
decisions accordingly. Indeed, in a linear comparison of institutional
competences, the differences among the branches that flow from
institutional structure are of course real. The judiciary, for example, can
only act in the event of a case or controversy. The administrative agency
and national security apparatus may put information, in the first instance,
in the hands of the executive rather than Congress or the courts. Moreover,
the new functionalists add, the judiciary lacks the expertise and the
procedural and evidentiary resources to make good judgments in an
emergency; judicial resources are too scarce to require individualized
determinations as to many hundreds or thousands of detainees it is
assumed, as a matter of raw effectiveness, it will be necessary to detain.
And given its own resource constraints and motives, the executive is
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unlikely to exaggerate the danger posed by an individual, or detain too
many people.168 Accordingly, the new functionalists tend to favor a
decision-making structure with loose (if any), emergency-driven
congressional engagement and deferential (if any) judicial review.
But such comparative competence accounts are misleading in several
ways. They ignore the complexity of current government decision-making
structures. The vast executive branch decision-making apparatus means
decisions rarely come down to the speed possible with one man acting
alone, and Congress and the courts have at their institutional disposal
multiple means to enable the sharing of information among the branches.
Such accounts also critically ignore the possibility of collective
organizational capacity, a notion Justice Jackson’s Youngstown
concurrence seemed squarely to contemplate.169 The executive acting
alone may be better than the courts acting alone in some circumstances, but
the executive plus the courts (or Congress) may be more effective than the
executive alone.
Perhaps most important, the new functionalist role effectiveness view
ignores the structural reality that national security policy (indeed all
government decision-making) is channeled through a set of existing
organizations, each with its own highly elaborated set of professional
norms and responsibilities, standard procedures and routines, identities and
culture, all of which constrain and guide behavior—often in ways that
centrally affect the organization’s ability to perform its functions.
Considering how such pathologies affect decision-making, one may find a
far more sophisticated—and more meaningful—set of comparisons
between decision-making structures than asking, for example, whether the
executive can make decisions faster than courts. The next section explores
a role effectiveness approach that could take this reality into account.
B.

An Organizational Effectiveness Approach: Managing High
Consequence Risk

Our understanding of organizational decision-making has developed
substantially since Hamilton, with a diverse range of disciplines engaging
questions of how organizations act and why.170 In the context of
168

YOO, supra note 141, at 129–30 (“Imagine the chaos if lawyers descended en masse,
demanding that evidence against enemy detainees be preserved under a rigorous chain of custody and
that officers and soldiers be cross-examined about their battlefield decisions.”); see also POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 256 (“There is no reason to think that the executive would benefit from an
excessive detention or conviction rate, or that political constraints would permit the executive to
implement such a preference in any event.”).
169
See supra text accompanying note 124 (suggesting that presidential power should fluctuate in
response to other branches).
170
See generally CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS (3d ed. 1986) (discussing growth
and evolution of organizational analysis over past twenty-five years).
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government decision-making, scholars have asked what capabilities and
constraints an agency has that produce the information from which
decisions are made, create options from which decisions are chosen, and
select actions the organization takes.171 In evaluating whether and to what
extent there should be multiple actors involved in a given decision, the
organization theorist can evaluate, for example, whether formal constraints
help or hinder decision-making;172 whether group decision-making is better
served by competitive or cooperative debate;173 or whether outcomes are
better or worse with independent or redundant checks.174 Particularly in
understanding organizations that manage complex and intrinsically
hazardous duties (like deciding whom to detain and for how long) that pose
a potentially high risk to public safety—from operating nuclear power
plants to aircraft carriers to the space shuttle—organization experts have
tested their theoretical predictions against real-world examples of
government decision-making performance.175
While a fully realized empirical study of detention structures is beyond
the scope of this Article, the raw effectiveness discussion above (arguing
that the threat of nuclear terrorism is both strategically predictable and
171

See, e.g., GRAHAM ALLISON & PHILIP ZELIKOW, ESSENCE OF DECISION: EXPLAINING THE
CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS 390–92 (2d ed. 1999) (listing model questions that include: “[w]hat capabilities
and constraints do these organizations’ existing SOPs create in generating the menu of options for
action?”).
172
See id. at 147–58 (outlining organizational model of government behavior); see also PATRICK
J. HANEY, ORGANIZING FOR FOREIGN POLICY CRISES: PRESIDENTS, ADVISERS, AND THE
MANAGEMENT OF DECISION MAKING (1997) (comparing presidential advising structures in managing
foreign policy crises from Truman to Bush I administrations); cf. ARTHUR L. STINCHCOMBE, WHEN
FORMALITY WORKS: AUTHORITY AND ABSTRACTION IN LAW AND ORGANIZATIONS 126–33 (2001)
(discussing how “[o]rganizational flexibility” depends on a “structure of rigidities” in budgeting
processes and the like).
173
See, e.g., IRVING L. JANIS, GROUPTHINK 142–58 (2d ed. 1982) (contrasting Cuban Missile
Crisis executive decisionmaking process with “groupthink” dynamics in which individual
decisionmakers conform to group norms, often compromising critical analysis); AMY B. ZEGART,
SPYING BLIND: THE CIA, THE FBI, AND THE ORIGINS OF 9/11, at 67–69 (2007) (reviewing cultural
pathologies undermining necessary cooperation in pre-September 11 counterterrorism efforts).
174
See, e.g., JONATHAN B. BENDOR, PARALLEL SYSTEMS: REDUNDANCY IN GOVERNMENT (1985)
(reviewing theories of bureaucratic competition).
175
See, e.g., SAGAN, supra note 158 (using organization theory to study decisions regarding
nuclear weapons safety); DIANE VAUGHAN, THE CHALLENGER LAUNCH DECISION 79–91 (1996)
(discussing organizational failures leading to Space Shuttle explosion); Todd R. LaPorte, High
Reliability Organizations: Unlikely, Demanding and At Risk, 4 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT.,
60, 60 (1996) (reviewing literature on crisis management and “high reliability organizations,” where
operating failures can produce catastrophic consequences); Karl E. Weick, Organizational Culture as a
Source of High Reliability, CAL. MGMT. REV., Winter 1987, at 112–27. Perhaps foremost in this
literature is Charles Perrow’s 1984 book, Normal Accidents: Living with High-Risk Technologies,
studying decision-making performance in organizations from nuclear power and petrochemical plants,
to air and spacecraft operation, to military performance, to the management of natural and biological
hazards. CHARLES PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHNOLOGIES 304–06
(1984). Since then, a range of scholars have sought systematically to identify what common
characteristics might be visible in organizations that are broadly effective in operating complex systems
and performing high-risk tasks with a significant degree of success. See, e.g., Gene I. Rochlin, Reliable
Organizations, 4 J. CONTINGENCIES & CRISIS MGMT. 55 (1996) (surveying evolution of scholarship).
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chronically present) suggests that in evaluating what structural
arrangement is most functionally effective for a detention regime to
prevent the realization of a nuclear terrorist attack, it may be helpful to
consider the existing literature analyzing similarly high-risk government
decision-making.176 First, what organizational structures have performed
reliably well “in the face of persistent high risks and fluctuating
conditions”?177 Political scientist Scott Sagan, for example, has explored
in depth how the military and related security organizations have
functioned in protecting existing nuclear weapons from accidental or
unauthorized detonation.178 While there are, of course, some important
differences between this task and the task of designing a detention regime
geared toward preventing a terrorist nuclear attack, there are also some
important similarities.
In both cases, critical operations in an
organization’s prevention apparatus are carried out by relatively low-level
officials.179 In both cases, an error by any one lower-level official can lead
to a strategically significant bad outcome—whether the risk is accidental
detonation, failure to detain or question an individual setting out to cause
imminent harm, or, in a different way, the wrongful treatment of an
innocent suspect that can lead to generations-long strategic obstacles in
gaining the trust of allies and winning the “hearts” of enemies. And while
the terrorism case necessarily involves individuals with malevolent intent
176
This Article’s focus principally on political science literature is not to suggest other
organization studies approaches are irrelevant. On the contrary, cognitive psychology and sociology,
among others, offer valuable insights into challenges of organizational decision-making. See generally,
Jules Lobel & George Loewenstein, Emote Control: The Substitution of Symbol for Substance in
Foreign Policy and International Law, 80 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1045 (2005) (studying affect of emotions
on political leaders’ decision-making); Jonathan H. Marks, 9/11 + 3/11 + 7/7 = ? What Counts in
Counterterrorism, 37 COLUM. HUM. RTS L. REV. 559 (2006) (discussing how emotional responses
generate bias in counterterrorism policy); Jeffrey J. Rachlinski & Cynthia R. Farina, Cognitive
Psychology and Optimal Government Design, 87 CORNELL L. REV. 549 (2002) (discussing
applicability of cognitive psychological theory of human decision-making to government decisionmaking); Cass Sunstein, Terrorism and Probability Neglect, 26 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 121 (2003)
(analyzing affect of public fear on citizens’ expectations of government).
177
KARL E. WEICK & KATHLEEN M. SUTCLIFFE, MANAGING THE UNEXPECTED: ASSURING HIGH
PERFORMANCE IN AN AGE OF COMPLEXITY 53 (2001).
178
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 8–9.
179
In the nuclear safety context: “Most of the critical decisions influencing the risk of accidental
war were made by lower-ranking officials, without the involvement or full awareness of political
authorities in Washington.” SAGAN, supra note 158, at 256. The same has been more than evident as
the United States has carried out the tasks of detaining and interrogating terrorist suspects—tasks
performed in the first instance by troops including a range of individuals, from highly trained law
enforcement officers to often far less skilled young troops in the field. See, e.g., INSPECTOR GEN.,
DEP’T OF THE ARMY, DETAINEE OPERATIONS INSPECTION 36 (2004) [hereinafter DAIG REPORT],
available
at
http://www4.army.mil/ocpa/reports/ArmyIGDetaineeAbuse/DAIG%20Detainee%20
Operations%20Inspection%20Report.pdf; Major General George R. Fay, AR 15-6 Investigation of the
Abu Ghraib Detention Facility and 205th Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF
INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 34, 49–52 (2004) [hereinafter Fay Report], available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf; FINAL REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT PANEL
TO REVIEW DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS 55 (2004) [hereinafter DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS
REPORT], available at http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Aug2004/d20040824finalreport.pdf.
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(whereas a nuclear weapons or other major disaster might occur without
anyone meaning to do harm), the tactical uncertainties about when, where,
and how a terrorist may exercise that intent leaves an organization seeking
to manage the risk each threat poses in a similar position. The causes of a
bad outcome may be multifarious and unknown, but the worst-case
foreseeable consequences of a bad outcome may be identified in advance
with some specificity.180
A second potentially relevant set of examples surrounds crisis
decision-making per se, based on the possibility that we may acquire preattack tactical information or need to maintain functional detention
operations in the immediate aftermath of a successful nuclear attack. Realworld examples like the 1995 sarin gas attack by terrorists in the Tokyo
subway system,181 responses to September 11th itself, and increasingly
elaborate government simulations of multi-city terrorist incidents involving
nuclear, chemical, and/or biological weapons—all have helped to test
theorists’ expectations against the actual performance of the organizations
likely to be involved in any detention scheme (the military, law
enforcement, civilian agencies and national security policy structures in the
executive branch – and the incentives that drive them).182 From these
examples, one might begin to test new functionalist preferences for
characteristics like flexibility, unity, secrecy, and dispatch. And one might
hope to extract a set of characteristics that detention decision-making
organizations in this context would ideally possess.
1. Flexibility and Formality
The new functionalists’ instinctive attraction to flexibility in decisionmaking rules or structures—and its corresponding possibilities of secrecy
180
While different response activities are of course contemplated depending on the nature of the
incident, there are important, recognized functional similarities between accidental and deliberate
incidents in structuring a coherent organizational response. Indeed, the U.S. National Response
Framework—the federal planning document setting forth how the government is expected to function
in significant emergency response situations—groups in a single annex the discussion of responses to
the accidental or terrorist-driven release of radioactive material that poses a threat to national security,
public health and safety. See NUCLEAR/RADIOLOGICAL INCIDENT ANNEX (2008), available at
http://www.fema.gov/pdf/about/divisions/thd/IncidentNucRad.pdf.
181
Robyn L. Pangi, Consequence Management in the 1995 Sarin Attacks on the Japanese Subway
System, in COUNTERING TERRORISM: DIMENSIONS OF PREPAREDNESS 371–410 (Arnold M. Howitt &
Robyn L. Pangi eds., 2003).
182
See, e.g., OFF. OF COUNTERTERRORISM, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, TOPOFF (TOP OFFICIALS)
(2002), http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/fs/2002/12129.htm (last visited Aug. 28, 2008) (explaining
TOPOFF, “a national-level domestic and international exercise series designed to produce a more
effective, coordinated, global response to WMD terrorism”); DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., THE TOPOFF
3 FULL-SCALE EXERCISE, http://www.dhs.gov/xprepresp/training/editorial_0594.shtm (last visited Aug.
28, 2008) (explaining TOPOFF 3 which “offered agencies and jurisdictions a way to exercise a
coordinated national and international response to a large-scale, multipoint terrorist attack”); Thomas
V. Inglesby et al., A Plague on Your City: Observations from TOPOFF, 32 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS
DISEASES 436 (2001) (noting “a number of medical and public health observations and lessons
discovered during the bioterrorism component of the [TOPOFF] exercise”).
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and dispatch—is not without foundation in organization theory.183
Flexibility ideally can make it possible for organizations to adapt and
respond quickly in circumstances of substantial strain or uncertainty, as
conditions change or knowledge improves, and to respond to events that
cannot be predicted in advance.184 In a crisis or emergency setting in
particular, one can of course imagine circumstances in which taking the
time to follow a series of structurally required decision-making steps
would vitiate the need for action altogether.185
What the new functionalists fail to engage, however, are flexibility’s
substantial costs, especially in grappling with an emergency. For example,
organizations that depend on decentralized decision-making but leave
subordinates too much flexibility can face substantial principal-agent
problems, resulting in effectively arbitrary decisions. The problem of
differences in motivation or understanding between organizational leaders
and frontline agents is a familiar one, a disjunction that can leave agents
poorly equipped to translate organizational priorities into priorityconsistent operational goals. As Sagan found in the context of U.S.
nuclear weapons safety, whatever level of importance organizational
leadership placed on safety, leaders and operatives would invariably have
conflicting priorities, making it likely that leaders would pay “only
arbitrary attention to the critical details of deciding among trade-offs”
faced by operatives in real time.186 One way of describing this
phenomenon is as “goal displacement”—a narrow interpretation of
operational goals by agents that obscures focus on overarching priorities.187
In the military context, units in the field may have different interests than
commanders in secure headquarters;188 prison guards have different

183
See supra text accompanying notes 41–46 (citing John Yoo, War, Responsibility, and the Age
of Terrorism, 57 STAN. L. REV. 793, 812–22 (2004); John Yoo, Transferring Terrorists, 79 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 1183, 1200 (2004); John Yoo, War and the Constitutional Text, 69 U. CHI. L. REV.
1639, 1642–43, 1676–77 (2002)).
184
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 120; see also STINCHCOMBE, supra note 172 (developing theory of
formalization, its anticipated effects and its pathologies); WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 68–
69 (examining strategies for management); ZEGART, supra note 173, at 15–42 (discussing U.S.
intelligence agencies’ failure to adapt to post-Cold War terrorist threat).
185
This is of course precisely the basis of exigent circumstances exceptions of many
constitutional mandates, such as the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement. See, e.g., Michigan v.
Tyler, 436 U.S. 499, 508 (1978) (fight a fire and investigate its cause); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 42–43 (1976) (“hot pursuit” of fleeing suspect); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 40–41 (1963)
(prevent imminent destruction of evidence); see also sources cited infra note 247.
186
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 255.
187
SCOTT D. SAGAN AND KENNETH N. WALTZ, THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS: A DEBATE
RENEWED 51 (2003).
188
See Donna Winslow, Misplaced Loyalties: The Role of Military Culture in the Breakdown of
Discipline in Two Peace Operations, J. MIL. & STRATEGIC STUD., Jan. 1999, at 3 (“Exaggerated loyalty
to the group can lead members to work at counter purposes to the overall goals of a mission or even of
the army . . . .”); Leonard Wong, Combat Motivation in Today’s Soldiers, 32 ARMED FORCES &
SOCIETY 659, 662 (2006) (discussing soldier motivation in combat).
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189

interests from prison administrators.
Emergencies exacerbate the risk of
such effectively arbitrary decisions.
Critical information may be
190
Short-term interests may seek to exploit
unavailable or inaccessible.
opportunities that run counter to desired long-term (or even near-term)
outcomes. 191 The distance between what a leader wants and what an agent
knows and does is thus likely even greater.
The Cuban Missile Crisis affords striking examples of such a problem.
When informed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the growing tensions with
the Soviet Union in late October 1962, NATO’s Supreme Allied
Commander in Europe, American General Lauris Norstad, ordered
subordinate commanders in Europe not to take any actions that the Soviets
might consider provocative.192 Putting forces on heightened alert status
was just the kind of potentially provocative move Norstad sought to
forestall. Indeed, when the Joint Chiefs of Staff ordered U.S. forces
globally to increase alert status in a directive leaving room for Norstad to
exercise his discretion in complying with the order, Norstad initially
decided not to put European-stationed forces on alert.193 Yet despite
Norstad’s no-provocation instruction, his subordinate General Truman
Landon, then Commander of U.S. Air Forces in Europe, increased the alert
level of nuclear-armed NATO aircraft in the region.194 In Sagan’s account,
General Landon’s first organizational priority—to maximize combat
potential—led him to undermine higher priority political interests in
avoiding potential provocations of the Soviets.195
It is in part for such reasons that studies of organizational performance
in crisis management have regularly found that “planning and effective
189

See, e.g., JOHN J. DIIULIO, JR., GOVERNING PRISONS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF
CORRECTIONAL MANAGEMENT (1987) (examining prison culture and management).
190
See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, A FAILURE OF INITIATIVE: THE FINAL REPORT OF THE
SELECT BIPARTISAN COMMITTEE TO INVESTIGATE THE PREPARATION FOR AND RESPONSE TO
HURRICANE KATRINA 163 (2006), http://katrina.house.gov/full_katrina_report.htm (last visited Aug.
28, 2008) [hereinafter KATRINA REPORT] (describing how massive communications failures hindered
governmental response after Hurricane Katrina); see also Rinaldo Campana, Responding to an Incident
Involving Weapons of Mass Destruction—An Overview, 9 WIDENER L. SYMP. J. 249, 254 (2003) (“In
this nuclear exercise scenario, the On-Scene-Commander received three dissimilar plume assessments
from EPA, DOE and the U.S. Army. The disparity in the plume assessment delayed the decisionmaking process, which in an actual incident could mean the loss of many lives. Sometimes too much
information becomes an impediment to rapid response decision.”); Michael May et al., Preparing for
the Worst, 443 NATURE 907, 908 (2006) (describing difficulty of tracing origin of stolen weapons grade
material used in nuclear device—information critical to mounting effective preventive and responsive
measures—and concluding that under ideal circumstances, nuclear forensics process is likely to take
one to two weeks).
191
See PERROW, supra note 78, at 44 (“Short-term interests seize on disasters as opportunities to
be exploited.”).
192
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 102.
193
Id. at 103.
194
Id. at 104–05.
195
Id. at 256; see also SAGAN, supra note 158, at 102–14 (detailing management of alert activities
in Europe surrounding Cuban Missile Crisis).
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196

response are causally connected.”
Clear, well-understood rules,
formalized training and planning can function to match cultural and
individual instincts that emerge in a crisis with commitments that flow
from standard operating procedures and professional norms.197 Indeed,
“the less an organization has to change its pre-disaster functions and roles
to perform in a disaster, the more effective is its disastetr [sic] response.”198
In this sense, a decisionmaker with absolute flexibility in an emergency—
unconstrained by protocols or plans—may be systematically more prone to
error than a decision-maker who is in some way compelled to follow
procedures and guidelines, which have incorporated professional expertise,
and which are set as effective constraints in advance.
Examples of excessive flexibility producing adverse consequences are
ample. Following Hurricane Katrina, one of the most important lessons
independent analysis drew from the government response was the extent to
which the disaster was made worse as a result of the lack of experience and
knowledge of crisis procedures among key officials, the absence of expert
advisors available to key officials (including the President), and the failure
to follow existing response plans or to draw from lessons learned from
simulations conducted before the fact. 199 Among the many consequences,
196
CLARKE, supra note 149, at 56; see, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
CATASTROPHIC DISASTERS: ENHANCED LEADERSHIP, CAPABILITIES, AND ACCOUNTABILITY
CONTROLS WILL IMPROVE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE NATION’S PREPAREDNESS, RESPONSE, AND
RECOVERY SYSTEM, GAO-06-618, at 99–100 (2006) [hereinafter CATASTROPHIC DISASTER REPORT]
(reporting to Congressional Committees and making recommendations in the wake of Hurricane
Katrina for executive action in regards to nation’s preparedness, response and recovery system); Dennis
S. Mileti & John H. Sorensen, Determinants of Organizational Effectiveness in Responding to Low
Probability Catastrophic Events, 22 COLUM. J. WORLD BUS. 13, 13–19 (1987) (synthesizing findings
of studies of effectiveness of organizations in coping with disasters and developing a theory of
organizational effectiveness in responding to low probability catastrophic events); see also U.S. ARMED
FORCES, JOINT PUBLICATION 3-40: JOINT DOCTRINE FOR COMBATING WEAPONS OF MASS
DESTRUCTION, at IV-9 (2004), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp3_40.pdf (“The overall
success of the response to a WMD attack is directly proportional to the prior planning. If the response
is properly planned, rehearsed, and executed, the actions will serve as a deterrent to future attacks.”).
197
See, e.g., SAGAN, supra, note 158, at 46 (noting positive effects of “[r]igorous exercises,
continual training, and realistic simulations”); BENDOR, supra note 174, at 24–60 (examining theory of
bureaucratic competition and redundancy); see also KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46
(concluding “senior [Department of Homeland Security] officials were “ill prepared due to their lack of
experience and knowledge of the required roles and responsibilities prescribed by [National Response
Plan]”); Caron Chess & Lee Clarke, Facilitation of Risk Communication During the Anthrax Attacks of
2001: The Organizational Backstory, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1578, 1578 (2007) (concluding that preexisting organizational and professional networks facilitated trust among decisionmakers, which
improved communication among agencies and risk communication with public); Pangi, supra note 181,
at 408–09 (emphasizing development of interagency and intergovernmental disaster management
relationships, training and routines “before a disaster occurs,” as “essential to planning for and
responding to a WMD attack”). Accord PERROW, supra note 78, at 51–52 (describing deleterious
effects of political cronyism at FEMA).
198
Mileti & Sorensen, supra note 196, at 14.
199
KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46.
Within the emergency management community, there are a handful of potential
catastrophes that keep disaster professionals awake at night. Perhaps the most
troubling of these has been a category 3 or larger storm striking New Orleans
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basic items like food, water, and medicines were in such short supply that
local law enforcement (instead of focusing on security issues) were
occupied, in part, with breaking into businesses and taking what residents
needed.200
Or consider the widespread abuse of prisoners at U.S. detention
facilities such as Abu Ghraib. Whatever the theoretical merits of applying
coercive interrogation in a carefully selected way against key intelligence
targets,201 the systemic torture and abuse of scores of detainees was an
outcome no one purported to seek. There is substantial agreement among
security analysts of both parties that the prisoner abuse scandals have
produced predominantly negative consequences for U.S. national
security.202 While there remain important questions about the extent to
which some of the abuses at Abu Ghraib were the result of civilian or
senior military command actions or omissions, one of the too often
overlooked findings of the government investigations of the incidents is the
unanimous agreement that the abuse was (at least in part) the result of
structural organization failures203—failures that one might expect to
because of its high likelihood of occurrence, the extreme vulnerability of the city to
long term flooding, and the difficulty of evacuating a large urban population over
limited evacuation routes. As a result, this scenario has been studied, planned, and
exercised perhaps more than any other potential catastrophic disaster in the country.
A senior disaster professional would be well aware of the consequences of such a
storm, recognize the challenges of responding to such a disaster, and appreciate the
need for timely and proactive federal assistance. Comments such as those the
President made about not expecting the levees to breach do not appear to be
consistent with the advice and counsel one would expect to have been provided by a
senior disaster professional.
Id. at 133.
200
Id. at 241.
201
POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 184–86.
202
See, e.g., Guantanamo’s Shadow, ATLANTIC, Oct. 2007, at 40 (polling a bipartisan group of
leading foreign policy experts and finding eighty-seven percent believed U.S. detention system had hurt
more than helped in fight against Al Qaeda).
Nothing has hurt America’s image and standing in the world—and nothing has
undermined the global effort to combat nihilistic terrorism—[more] than the brutal
torture and dehumanizing actions of Americans in Abu Ghraib and in other prisons
(secret or otherwise). America can win the fight against terrorism only if it acts in
ways consistent with the values for which it stands.
Id. (quoting an anonymous poll respondent). A separate concern stems from the severe strain these
practices have put on relationships with key counterterrorism allies. See INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY
COMMITTEE, RENDITION, REPORT, 2007, Cm. 7171, at 64–69, available at http://www.officialdocuments.gov.uk/document/cm71/7171/7171.pdf (discussing “serious implications for the working of
the relationship between the U.S. and UK intelligence and security agencies” of U.S. decisions
regarding prisoner treatment). Still other concerns are more immediately instrumental. As one U.S.
Army intelligence officer who served in Afghanistan put it in his subsequent book: “The more a
prisoner hates America, the harder he will be to break. The more a population hates America, the less
likely its citizens will be to lead us to a suspect.” CHRIS MACKEY & GREG MILLER, THE
INTERROGATORS: TASK FORCE 500 AND AMERICA’S SECRET WAR AGAINST AL QAEDA, at xxix (2004).
203
See, e.g., Fay Report, supra note 179, at 109–19 (finding lack of clear command and control of
detainee operations, inadequate training, non-observance of established procedures, lapses in
accountability, and similar failures surrounding intelligence operations at Abu Ghraib); DEP’T OF DEF.,
REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE INTERROGATION OPERATIONS 3 (2006), available at

1606

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

produce errors either to the benefit or detriment of security.
In particular, military investigators looking at the causes of Abu
Ghraib cited vague guidance, as well as inadequate training and planning
for detention and interrogation operations, as key factors leading to the
abuse. Remarkably, “pre-war planning [did] not include[] planning for
detainee operations” in Iraq.204 Moreover, investigators cited failures at the
policy level—decisions to lift existing detention and interrogation
strictures without replacing those rules with more than the most general
guidance about custodial intelligence collection.205 As one Army General
later investigating the abuses noted: “By October 2003, interrogation
policy in Iraq had changed three times in less than thirty days and it
became very confusing as to what techniques could be employed and at
what level non-doctrinal approaches had to be approved.”206 It was thus
unsurprising that detention and interrogation operations were assigned to
troops with grossly inadequate training in any rules that were still
recognized.207 The uncertain effect of broad, general guidance, coupled
http://www.defenselink.mil/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=2282 (follow “executive summary
of the results” hyperlink) [hereinafter DOD REVIEW] (finding, inter alia, “no evidence that specific
detention or interrogation lessons learned from previous conflicts . . . were incorporated into planning
for operations in support of the Global War on Terror, and no “evidence [of] any specific awareness of
the risk of detainee abuse - or any awareness that U.S. forces had confronted this problem before);
Lieutenant General Anthony R. Jones, AR 15-6 Investigation of the Abu Ghraib Prison and the 205th
Military Intelligence Brigade, in INVESTIGATION OF INTELLIGENCE ACTIVITIES AT ABU GHRAIB 4–15
(2004), available at http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/dod/fay82504rpt.pdf [hereinafter Jones
Report] (discussing how structural decisions, inter alia, “created conditions which allowed the abuses at
Abu Ghraib to occur”); DAIG REPORT, supra note 179; MAJOR GENERAL GEOFFREY D. MILLER,
ASSESSMENT OF DOD COUNTERTERRORISM INTERROGATION AND DETENTION OPERATIONS IN IRAQ 2
(2003), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/OathBetrayed/Taguba%20Annex%2020.pdf
(observing “that the Task Force did not have authorities and procedures in place to affect a unified
strategy to detain, interrogate, and report information from detainees/internees in Iraq”); ARTICLE 15-6
INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 36-44 (2004) [hereinafter TAGUBA
REPORT], available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (describing inadequate
training and oversight, inappropriate superior-subordinate relationships); DOD DETENTION
OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 179 (reviewing causes of detainee abuse in Department of Defense
detention operations).
204
Fay Report, supra note 179, at 57. Among the consequences of inadequate planning, the ratio
of detainees to military police at facilities like Abu Ghraib in June 2004 (during height of abuse) rose to
75:1 (about 7,000 prisoners to about 92 military police). DOD DETENTION OPERATIONS REPORT,
supra note 179, at 54, 60.
205
See Deborah N. Pearlstein, Finding Effective Constraints on Executive Power: Interrogation,
Detention and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1255, 1257–67 (2006) (reviewing Pentagon investigations into
causes of abuses at U.S. detention facilities).
206
Fay Report, supra note 179, at 61. It was during this period, as later became clear, that some
of the worst torture and abuse occurred.
207
The 372nd Military Police Company—the unit in charge of military police operations at Abu
Ghraib during the period when the worst abuses were taking place—was a combat support unit, with no
training in detainee operations. Summary of Interview by Taguba Panel with Sgt. First Class, 372nd
Military Police Company, in Abu Ghraib, Iraq (Feb. 9, 2004), available at
http://www.aclu.org/torturefoia/released/a85.pdf. A post–Abu Ghraib survey conducted by the Army
Inspector General found non-commissioned officers reporting that they had received little detention
operations training, and that training exercises had not involved instruction in how to process or assign
a legal status to detainees. DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 81; see also DOD REVIEW, supra note
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with the competing imperatives of guidelines that differed among theaters
of operation, agencies, and military units, caused serious confusion among
troops and led to decisionmaking that it is overly kind to call arbitrary.208
Would the new functionalists disagree with the importance of
government planning for detention operations in an emergency
surrounding a terrorist nuclear attack? Not necessarily. Can an
organization anticipate and plan for everything? Certainly not. But such
findings should at least call into question the inclination to simply
maximize flexibility and discretion in an emergency, without, for example,
structural incentives that might ensure the engagement of professional
expertise.209 Particularly if one embraces the view that the most potentially
damaging terrorist threats are nuclear and biological terrorism, involving
highly technical information about weapons acquisition and deployment, a
security policy structure based on nothing more than general popular
mandate and political instincts is unlikely to suffice; a structure that
systematically excludes knowledge of and training in emergency response
will almost certainly result in mismanagement.210 In this light, a general
take on role effectiveness might suggest favoring a structure in which the
engagement of relevant expertise in crisis management is required, leaders
have incentives to anticipate and plan in advance for trade-offs, and
203, at 19 (noting that few U.S. personnel “had received specific training relevant to detainee screening
and medical treatment”). Reservists in particular (many of whom did not know they would be
engaging in detention operations until after they were deployed) cited the confusing difference between
what training they had received on the Geneva Conventions, and the guidance they were receiving in
the field. DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 81, 83–84. At more senior levels, eighty-seven percent of
the units stationed in Afghanistan and Iraq inspected by the Army Inspector General post–Abu Ghraib
responded that the basic professional military education they had received lacked instruction on
conducting detainee operations. Id. The problem was particularly acute with inspected reservist units,
many members of which reported that they were not notified that they would be involved in detainee
operations until after their deployment overseas. Id. at 83.
208
See Fay Report, supra note 179, at 112–13, 118–19 (finding, inter alia, that “DoD’s
development of multiple policies on interrogation operations for use in different theaters or operations
confused Army and civilian Interrogators at Abu Ghraib”); Jones Report, supra note 203, at 5
(“Confusion about what interrogation techniques were authorized resulted from the proliferation of
guidance and information from other theaters of operation; individual interrogator experiences in other
theaters; and, the failure to distinguish between interrogation operations in other theaters and Iraq. This
confusion contributed to the occurrence of some of the non-violent and non-sexual abuses.”); DOD
DETENTION OPERATIONS REPORT, supra note 179, at 14, 33–38, 80–81 (finding “details of the current
[detainee] policy vague and lacking”); Frontline: The Torture Question (PBS television broadcast Oct.
18, 2005) (quoting Gen. Paul Kern) (“There was [also] some degree of confusion about how dogs could
be used. Dogs are a good thing to control detainees, they’re not a good thing to do interrogations. And
so people were using very liberal interpretations of what was on a piece of paper, inaccurately and
illegally.”), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/torture/etc/script.html.
209
Contra ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 109 (“Serious deliberation is simply incompatible with
the speedy response required in the aftermath of an attack.”); POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at
256 (arguing against due process-based constraints on executive detention decisions on the grounds that
there is no basis for doubting that the executive is best positioned to strike any relevant liberty-security
balance on its own).
210
See KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190 at 2 (“It does not appear the President received
adequate advice and counsel from a senior disaster professional.”).
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organizations are able to train subordinates to ensure that plans are adhered
to in emergencies. Such structural constraints could help increase the
likelihood that something more than arbitrary attention has been paid
before transcendent priorities are overridden.
2. Unity and Insularity
As the new functionalists correctly anticipate, organization theorists
have also recognized that strict bureaucratic control, intense socialization,
and a highly developed sense of organizational culture can not only make
rapid action possible, but also ensure adherence to an identified,
overarching priority. 211 Indeed, it follows from the prior section that if
formal rules and training are important, some significant level of control is
absolutely necessary lest one risk effective top-down compliance.
At the same time, however, institutions such as the military (and
arguably aspects of the intelligence community) that are defined by such
insular organizational cultures have some important disadvantages.212 The
exceptional degree of control such organizations exercise over their
members has been used both to advance an organization’s official goals,
and to pursue the more self-serving or alternative goals of its leaders.
Members’ intense organizational loyalty can foster excessive secrecy and
disdain for outside expertise, inhibiting the flow of information both within
and from outside the institution, and skewing attention to organizational
priorities.213 Especially when coupled with political incentives that impact
governmental organizations, such features can limit the institution’s ability
to take corrective action or learn from past organizational mistakes.214
The post–9/11 context is rife with examples of such pathologies in
organizations responsible for counterterrorism operations. Consider the
U.S. response to the anthrax mailings of late 2001, which came at a time of
already heightened vigilance against terrorist attack. After federal
211
See, e.g., John J. Dilulio Jr., Recovering the Public Management Variable: Lessons from
Schools, Prisons, and Armies, 49 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 127, 129–31 (1989) (surveying research on
organizational characteristics of effective prison management and combat units).
212
The military is particularly vulnerable to this phenomenon, as it is often considered a “total
institution” in the sense sociologists (among others) use the expression to capture organizations in
effectively complete control of the planning, management, and fulfillment of the needs of individuals
within it—control geared toward advancing the interests and goals of the institution. See ERVING
GOFFMAN, ASYLUMS: ESSAYS ON THE SOCIAL SITUATION OF MENTAL PATIENTS AND OTHER INMATES
4–6 (1961).
213
See, e.g., SAGAN, supra note 158, at 252–54 (discussing how desire to protect institutional
image may create incentive to cover up mistakes).
214
Id. at 257; ZEGART, supra note 173, at 112–13. Outside the military context, Diane Vaughan,
author of a much celebrated work on the organizational failings that led to the 1985 space shuttle
Challenger disaster, has described such organizational cultures as fostering the “normalization of
deviance”—a phenomenon that enables organizational agents to “carry on as if nothing was wrong”
despite being continually confronted with evidence that “something was wrong.” VAUGHAN, supra
note 175, at 62 (attributing phenomenon to “the production of a work group culture, the culture of
production, and structural secrecy”).
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investigators concluded that the anthrax attacks were most likely launched
by “U.S. nationals, almost certainly ones with experience in and access to
the U.S. biodefense program and its facilities,” and after they discovered
that major U.S. biodefense facilities had been working with anthrax
(including weapons-grade powder) for decades, military and intelligence
agencies continued to withhold critical information from other federal
agencies about the facilities and employees involved in such programs.
This hamstrung post-attack efforts to identify the likely source of the
attack, and therefore the likelihood of subsequent additional attacks from
the same source.215
Such behavior echoes that described by the 9/11 Commission
investigators studying the September 11th attacks themselves.216 Among
other things, investigators concluded that one of the key problems leading
to the failure to avert the attacks (despite increasingly alarming warnings)
was the dearth of information sharing inside the intelligence and security
communities.217 Information was overly compartmentalized, “stove-piped”
to too few decisionmakers, hidden by one executive agency from another
and by one branch of government from another, and limited in its
relevance and accuracy from an absence of oversight and competing
analysis.218 Such findings also emerge from studies of the generally
effective Japanese response to the sarin gas attacks on the Tokyo subway
system. Essential to the Japanese government’s response was “a
willingness to prioritize cooperation over interagency or intergovernment
competition.”219 In all of these cases, it may well be that such behavior
could be addressed by different incentive structures. But in the absence of
such guidance, it was the organizations instinctive (and structural)
insularity that prevailed.
The counterproductive effect of such pathologies can infect more than
just real-time responsiveness; it inhibits error correction over time—a
215
Milton Leitenberg, Biological Weapons and Bioterrorism in the First Years of the TwentyFirst Century, POL. & LIFE SCI., September 2002, at 3, 20.
216
9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 353.
217
Id. at 353–58.
218
Id. at 353–58, 403.
219
Pangi, supra note 181, at 371, 408–09. The sarin attacks were the work of Japanese doomsday
cult Aum Shinrikyo, which placed small containers of the chemical nerve agent sarin on trains running
on three major lines of the Tokyo subway system at the height of rush hour on March 20, 1995.
Thanks to several technical mistakes in disseminating the gas, the effects were not as bad as they might
have been. Nonetheless, twelve people died and fifty-five hundred were injured as commuters and
subway workers suffered severe fits of coughing, choking and vomiting. Senate Government Affairs
Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, Staff Statement Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction: A Case Study on the Aum Shinrikyo (October 31, 1995), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1995_rpt/aum/index.html. See 1996 Police White Paper 29 (National
Police Agency ed., Emiko Amaki & Robert Mauksch trans., 2002), (1996) available at
http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/eanp/wpap.pdf (praising modifications to police law that gave prefectural
police authority to work on their own outside of their jurisdictions to deal with “extensive organized
crime”).

1610

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

feature that theorists identify as central in explaining the success of those
organizations that have operated effectively in chronically unpredictable
environments.220 In the nuclear safety context, for example, Scott Sagan
showed that Americans had been at greater risk than once thought from
accidents involving the U.S. nuclear weapons arsenal—threats ranging
from pilot error, malfunctioning computer warnings, the miscalculation of
an individual officer, and a host of other seemingly inconceivable
mistakes221—in part because actors at every organizational level had
incentives to cover up safety problems, “in order to protect the reputation
of the institution.”222 While it was perhaps “not surprising that the military
commands that are responsible for controlling nuclear forces would create
a veil of safety to manage their image in front of the [P]resident, the
Congress, and the public,” Sagan found that concern for the effect of
revealing mistakes skewed assessments at all levels, “influenc[ing] the
reporting of near-accidents by operators, the beliefs of organizational
historians about what is acceptable to record, and the public interpretation
of events by senior authorities.”223 Particularly in operations where failure,
when it does occur, can come at an extraordinarily high price, there is a
premium on gaining (and implementing) as much insight as possible from
those failures that do occur.224
One finds a strikingly similar pattern in the conduct of organizations
responsible for the detentions at Abu Ghraib, where organizational loyalty
and a cultural disinclination to share negative information conspired to
prevent the correction of systemic error.225 In some cases, soldiers
reported direct pressure to withhold unfavorable information.226 More
generally, investigators found agreement among commanders and enlisted
personnel at Abu Ghraib that the early reports by outside monitors of
220

See, e.g., WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 54–59.
The prospect of such accidents was only recently confirmed with the inadvertent air transport
of a set of armed nuclear warheads across the continental United States. See Joby Warrick & Walter
Pincus, Missteps in the Bunker, WASH. POST, Sept. 23, 2007, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
WPOST File (“A former Air Force senior master sergeant wrote separately that ‘mistakes were made at
the lowest level of supervision and this snowballed into the [sic] one of the biggest mistakes in USAF
history. I am still scratching my head wondering how this could [have] happened.’”).
222
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 254.
223
Id. at 257; see also ELIOT A. COHEN & JOHN GOOCH, MILITARY MISFORTUNES: THE
ANATOMY OF FAILURE IN WAR 44 (1990) (“[B]ureaucratic self-protection by means of the creation of
spurious or misleading documents can be overwhelming.”).
224
See WEICK & SUTCLIFFE, supra note 177, at 56.
225
National Security Whistleblowers in the Post–September 11th Era: Lost in a Labyrinth and
Facing Subtle Retaliation: Hearing Before the H. Subcomm. On National Security, Emerging Threats,
and International Relations of the Comm. on Government Reform, 109th Cong. 108–13 (2006)
(prepared statement of Sgt. Samuel J. Provance).
226
Id. at 108 (“When I made clear to my superiors that I was troubled about what had happened, I
was told that the honor of my unit and the Army depended on either withholding the truth or outright
lies.”); see also Rick Scavetta, GI Flagged for Public Comments About His Abu Ghraib Experience,
STARS & STRIPES, May 28, 2004, http://www.estripes.com/article.asp?section=104&article=
21598&archive=true.
221
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serious abuses by soldiers at the facility were simply impossible to
believe.227 As General Fay’s later investigation found:
Within this investigation’s timeframe, . . . the
[independent International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC)] visited Abu Ghraib three times, notifying [the joint
task force in charge] twice of their visit results, describing
serious violations of international Humanitarian Law and of
the Geneva Conventions. In spite of the ICRC’s role as
independent observers, there seemed to be a consensus
among personnel at Abu Ghraib that the allegations were not
true. Neither the leadership, nor [the joint task force in
charge] made any attempt to verify the allegations.228
What if anything do such examples teach us about whether interbranch engagement is necessary to control such organizational tendencies?
After all, there is a host of organizations within the executive branch, many
with cultures significantly different from one another. If organizational
insularity is the problem, why is the solution not simply to redesign
internal incentive structures, as noted above, or open the insular
organization to review or monitoring by a culturally diverse agency within
the executive branch? Part IV below considers whether and to what extent
such a system might suffice in the detention context. For present purposes,
however, we might at least conclude that the detention system we want
would include some institutional mechanism designed to correct such
known organizational pathologies, a mechanism that (in keeping with the
conclusions of the previous section) would need to be modified only
modestly to function well in emergencies.
3. Redundancy and Review
The organization literature is rich in debates over the benefits and
burdens of redundant systems. In the commercial manufacturing and
safety contexts, it is easy to see how a simple argument plays out: a plane
with an extra engine weighs more, thus requiring more fuel (and more
money) to fly. But an airline may save significant costs (not to mention
glean other benefits over the long term) if the extra engine is occasionally
available as a backup if the main engine malfunctions in flight.229
Redundant equipment could, the argument goes, render the whole
227

Fay Report, supra note 179, at 99–100.
Id. at 152; see also ART. 15-6 INVESTIGATION OF THE 800TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE 38
(2004), available at http://www.npr.org/iraq/2004/prison_abuse_report.pdf (“[B]ecause of past
associations and familiarity of Soldiers within the Brigade, it appears that friendship often took
precedence over appropriate leader and subordinate relationships.”).
229
Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and Overseeing
Agencies in the Post–9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1683 (2006).
228
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apparatus effectively more reliable than its components.
In the context
of national security decision-making, theorists have offered parallel
assessments of the costs and benefits of redundancy.231 Redundant
decision-making systems not only increase serious costs of all sorts—
money, time, the risk (depending on the particular redundant design) that
certain kinds of errors will occur—they may create counterproductive
competition between groups, prompting a “race to the bottom” in
production, preventing cooperation essential to organizational
effectiveness, and compromising values, like accountability, by making it
harder for outsiders to determine which one individual or organizational
group is responsible when things go wrong.232
The new functionalists’ concerns about judicial review broadly import
the cost side of redundancy. Redundant decision-making structures are not
only prohibitively resource intensive (especially, it is assumed, in a heavyvolume business like detention), they slow down decision-making to the
point of ineffectiveness. And these costs inhere, it is said, even though
courts have no expertise in such matters of their own, and their inclusion
increases the risk that information important to keep secret might be
revealed.233
But in addition to glossing over the potential benefits of multiple
system checks (which is revisited below), such arguments mistakenly
imagine that a redundant system is effectively the same as a system of
review. In a redundant system, functions are simply duplicated. A system
including review works in series, with each structure performing different
functions to improve decision-making quality overall. Where redundant
structures create duplication that might produce, for example,
counterproductive competition between groups, review structures can serve
not simply to replicate first-order decision-making, but to apply a different
process altogether, including different sets of methodological tools and
decision-making criteria. Thus, in addition to preserving the possibility of
‘mere’ error correction, monitoring or review can “prevent organizational
blind spots from developing, . . . and reduce the temptation for
organizations to be guided by narrow conceptions of self-interest.”234 It
230

See BENDOR, supra note 174, at 24–28.
See, e.g., O’Connell, supra note 229, at 1675–76.
232
See id. at 1765–84 (summarizing arguments from redundancy literature). Indeed, in analyses
of the intelligence failures surrounding 9/11, structural duplication (and fragmentation) that could
ideally have helped avoid error in fact burdened intelligence collection and analysis pre–9/11: “[T]rails
would go cold, information would not be shared, and dots would not get connected because everyone
assumed that the responsibility for specific tasks rested, at least in part, someplace else.” ZEGART,
supra note 173, at 113.
233
See supra text accompanying notes 39–42 (recounting new functionalist arguments).
234
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 269; see also Malcolm M. Feeley & Roger A. Hanson, The Impact
of Judicial Intervention on Prisons and Jails: A Framework for Analysis and a Review of the
Literature, in COURTS, CORRECTIONS, AND THE CONSTITUTION 12, 25–28 (DiIulio, ed. 1990)
(describing role of court intervention and new regulatory framework in driving corrections
231
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can police incentive structures that promote accuracy-enhancing attention
to process and professionalism. It is for such reasons that theorists like
Sagan suggest that independent monitoring could help combat the
disadvantages that flow from the “unitary” institutional cultures discussed
above.235
The relevance of this distinction becomes apparent when held up
against the new functionalist arguments. For example, if a key function of
review is to police a professionalism-enhancing incentive structure, it is
possible to obtain the benefits of review without the potentially substantial
time burden of insisting upon real-time continuous monitoring of
operations, whether or not the situation at hand is an “emergency.”
Likewise, where the reviewer is not meant to replicate first-order decisionmaking but rather to apply a different metric and/or methodology to the
same problem, it may be necessary for the reviewing agent to have access
to the same decision-making information as the first-order actor, but not
necessarily the same type of decision-making expertise.236
Critical to the distinction between redundancy and review—and thus
central to the ability of any review mechanism to function usefully—are
several features that must be emphasized here. First, a review mechanism
must avoid the aptly named “problem of redundancy problem.” This is one
of the problems described as plaguing the intelligence community leading
up to the 9/11 attacks—“awareness of other redundant units can decrease
system reliability if it leads an individual or subunit to shirk off unpleasant
duties because it is assumed that someone else will take care of the
problem.”237 All actors in a redundant system may make decisions less
carefully because of their awareness of other actors working on the same
problem. The first actor assumes the second actor will catch any mistakes
he overlooks, and the second actor defers to the first actor on the
assumption that someone else has already thought about the problem
carefully.
professionalization, auditing, and other practices geared toward improved organizational performance);
KATRINA REPORT, supra note 190, at 131–46; Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Auditing Executive
Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227, 258–66 (2006) (discussing advantages of agency audits).
235
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 269; see also Todd R. La Porte, Challenges of Assuring High
Reliability When Facing Suicidal Terrorism, in SEEDS OF DISASTER, ROOTS OF RESPONSE: HOW
PRIVATE ACTION CAN REDUCE PUBLIC VULNERABILITY 99, 108–10 (Philip E. Auerswald et al. eds.,
2006) (noting that “external watchers” can increase attentiveness and reliability).
236
See Cuéllar, supra note 234, at 262 (“External review may elucidate things that people inside
the organization fail to appreciate. Outsiders may see things not despite, but precisely because of, the
absence of expertise.”); Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial
Review, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 754–56 (2006) (discussing rationale for hard look review).
237
Scott D. Sagan, The Problem of Redundancy Problem: Why More Nuclear Security Forces
May Produce Less Nuclear Security, 24 RISK ANALYSIS 935, 939 (emphasis added). In psychology,
the phenomenon has been called a state of “pluralistic ignorance.” See, e.g., John M. Darley et al., Do
Groups Always Inhibit Individuals’ Responses to Potential Emergencies, 26 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 395, 395–99 (“An individual who witnesses a potential emergency alone is more likely to
intervene than one who witnesses it as a member of a group.”).
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An independent review system can, at least in theory, avoid this
problem. To return to the airplane engine metaphor, the reviewer does not
take the same tools, instruction manual, and personnel and try to build a
duplicate engine; it looks at the engine and applies a different set of tools,
instructions, and personnel to evaluate its performance. Provided the
reviewer has access to the entire engine, and can force corrective action if,
for example, manufacturing flaws are evident, there should be little reason
to fear that the initial manufacturer will pass on engines missing key
component parts and expect the reviewer to install them. That said, a
review system that is given only a two-dimensional picture of the engine
and not the engine itself, and that fills in for any missing information by
assuming it can defer to the initial manufacturer, may be worse than no
review at all. The initial manufacturer may be slightly less careful in light
of his knowledge that someone else is checking his work, and the reviewer
will not in fact be able to determine whether or not all component parts
were actually included.
Second, in order to effectively transcend (and therefore have a chance
to correct for) the pathologies of a particular organization, a review
mechanism must be meaningfully independent. In the engineering context,
it is received wisdom that reliability increases only if systems do not rely
on shared components, teams that share information analysis capabilities,
and so forth.238 Insurance industry risk managers adopt a similar approach,
giving control over loss prevention strategies to independent inspectors or
third-party chaperones—that is, by separating the industry functions of
production and “risk management,” and by ensuring that risk management
inspectors have some meaningful power to enforce their conclusions.239
The logic holds in the policy-making context. One decisionmaker who
takes the same information, applies the same decision-making criteria, and
is in thrall of the same cultural organizational biases, is not like a back-up
engine; he is more like a separate cog in the same engine. The functional
effectiveness of both cogs is equally dependent on the overall health of the
single engine. If a single-engine plane loses its entire engine (or
experiences some other catastrophic, systemic failure), it will not matter
how well any one cog performs.240
These lessons are visible again in the example of Abu Ghraib. A
professionally diverse set of groups—uniformed military, intelligence
238

See BENDOR, supra note 174, at 44–45.
CAROL A. HEIMER, REACTIVE RISK AND RATIONAL ACTION: MANAGING MORAL HAZARD IN
INSURANCE CONTRACTS 206 (1985).
240
SAGAN, supra note 158, at 273 (“The final advice, following the logic of high reliability
theory, would recommend adding redundant safety devices and warning systems to those that already
exist in order to create a more reliable system out of unreliable parts.”). One of the reasons redundant
systems can produce a misleading sense of confidence is because systems are not independent
enough—and an error in one can precipitate an error in the next. Id. at 39.
239
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agency personnel, private contractors—all worked together under a unified
prison command organization to perform the same or overlapping tasks
involved with detaining and interrogating inmates.241 But rather than
improving accuracy and performance through constructive competition,
error correction or otherwise, there is evidence that the groups’
overlapping mandates created least-common-denominator competition and
across-the-board confusion, serving to lower performance and increase the
problem of shirking. In a number of instances, the bad behavior of one
group effectively convinced other groups to behave in similar ways. As
one Army investigation concluded: “The lack of [CIA] adherence to the
practices and procedures established for accounting for detainees eroded
the necessity in the minds of Soldiers and civilians for them to follow
Army rules.”242 While some soldiers tried to report misconduct they
observed by other actors, others believed it was not their place to report
misconduct to their own supervisors. One military intelligence soldier
described one abuse incident: “it was [a military police] matter and would
be handled by them.”243 Critically, such conditions were able to prevail in
an environment where, as the military’s later investigations concluded,
command exercised no regular oversight, routine inspections and
monitoring were absent, and no JAG officers (military lawyers charged
with monitoring operational legal compliance) appeared to have been
dedicated to interrogation operations per se—a set of circumstances
investigators described as a “contributing factor” to the many performance
problems observed.244
In contrast, consider the existing process of judicial review of police
applications for search warrants. The high rate at which search warrant
applications are approved has led many to criticize the review process as
too relaxed, not a meaningful check, and by extension unlikely to increase
the accuracy of search decisions.245 But, because statistics have shown that
warranted searches are almost always right—that is, the searches
ultimately reveal criminal evidence of the kind the warrant application
anticipated—a number of scholars have now embraced the view that the
high approval rate suggests, rather, that the application is almost always
241

Fay Report, supra note 179, at 77–78.
Id. Vaughan’s “normalization of deviance,” supra note 175, seems to capture this
phenomenon to a tee.
243
Fay Report, supra note 179, at 106 (emphasis added).
244
DAIG REPORT, supra note 179, at 15, 19; Fay Report, supra note 179, at 85. While independent
ICRC monitors were allowed into the facility, they were denied access to information about all
detainees. In any case, repeated failures to respond to ICRC recommendations carried no necessary
consequence for those being monitored. See, e.g., id. at 118–19 (describing inadequate oversight of
CIA interrogations in particular, unclear responsibility for follow up after ICRC visits, and lax
accountability for troops engaged in abuse ).
245
See, e.g., David A. Sklansky, Quasi-Affirmative Rights in Constitutional Criminal Procedure,
88 VA. L. REV. 1229, 1254 (2002) (arguing that many perceive the warrant requirement as useless).
242
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246

rightly sought.
Their argument is based on studies showing that police
officers view the process of preparing a warrant application as a significant
cost (in time, effort, research required, etc.). Given the weight of this
burden, officers have a significant incentive not to pursue a warrant unless
they are fairly certain to prevail.247
These data alone may not suffice to establish whether the current
review burden on search warrants is ideal (that is, whether it does not
discourage officers from seeking warrants when they otherwise should).
But, they do help demonstrate how a monitoring or review structure can
avoid the problems associated with redundant structures discussed above.
They are also consistent with the notion that the effective functioning of a
review scheme need not necessarily depend on the reviewer having the
same degree of expertise (including professional experience and judgment)
as the officer making the application. Rather, the review system works
because it is not functionally duplicative (the warrant judge herself is not
on the street doing the investigation) and avoids destructive competition; it
is organizationally independent (from the police department) and also
avoids replicating cultural pathologies that might have infected first-order
decision-making; and it wields a set of incentives that are capable of
altering first-order behavior in a measurable, and thus predictable, way.
What, then, might we conclude about the new functionalists’ suspicion
of extra-executive branch monitoring or review? After all, if as we saw
above, the raw effectiveness of a detention scheme in any given crisis
depends on a set of calculations about the likelihood of public panic, the
reaction of an enemy, the needs of sensitive international relationships, the
availability of a certain kind of evidence, and so forth—how could one
dispute that the executive is best positioned to make such an assessment?
The first answer is that for purposes of assessing the scope and propriety
of, say, judicial review, one need not dispute that whoever detains a
suspect is in the first instance best positioned to decide on at least a
temporary disposition. Judicial review, especially in crisis circumstances,
is by definition about the second instance; it comes after a reviewer has an
opportunity to receive information presented to it by outside parties.248
246

Donald Dripps, Living With Leon, 95 YALE L.J. 906, 925 (1986) (summarizing a major study
that measured the frequency with which warrant searches resulted in the seizure of evidence described
in the warrant, based on the number of returns filed, and noting that in six of seven cities studied, 74%
to 89% of searches resulted in the discovery of at least some of the evidence described in the warrant);
see also Stephenson, supra note 236, at 800 & n. 139 (noting arguments that high success rate for
search warrants may be explained by officers’ incentives to seek warrants only where they are likely to
prevail).
247
See Dripps, supra note 246, at 925 (“If the police view obtaining a warrant as a costly
proposition, a proposed search would have to promise very likely returns to justify the expenditure of
law-enforcement resources.”).
248
Much of existing constitutional and relevant national security law is filled with exceptions to
usual rules where exigent circumstances demand. See, e.g., County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S.
833 (1998) (holding that a death caused by a police officer driving recklessly in a high-speed car chase
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But those who favor limited judicial review of executive detention
must argue something more than the executive is most competent in the
first instance. Instead, they must argue that because the executive needs
flexibility to make detention decisions quickly, quietly, and with
specialized competence, second-instance examination (especially if less
than deferential) is always problematic.249 An organizational analysis calls
this conclusion into question. Beyond simple error correction, some form
of independent review or monitoring with full information and incentivecreating capacity could function to check an organization’s tendencies to
exclude relevant information in decision-making, help decisionmakers
avoid capture by narrow conceptions of self-interest, correct decisionmaking tendencies to miss the strategic forest for the tactical trees, and
afford opportunities for organizational learning over time.
While
redundant decision-making structures may slow down initial real-time
decision-making, review structures need not. And while secrecy may be
important in a given case, there is no structural reason why review or
monitoring cannot properly protect secret information through procedural
rules or other sub-structural, ‘soft’ forms of regulation.250
Finally, it is true that review structures (like redundant structures) are
does not violation the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); United States v. Santana, 427
U.S. 38, 41–43 (1976) (recognizing that police officer does not need search warrant during hot pursuit);
see also U.N. Charter art. 51 (“Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of
individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations,
until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.”);
50 U.S.C. § 1805(f) (2000) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, when the
Attorney General reasonably determines that—(1) an emergency situation exists with respect to the
employment of electronic surveillance to obtain foreign intelligence information before an order
authorizing such surveillance can with due diligence be obtained; and (2) the factual basis for issuance
of an order under this subchapter to approve such surveillance exists; he may authorize the emergency
employment of electronic surveillance if a judge having jurisdiction under section 1803 of this title is
informed by the Attorney General or his designee at the time of such authorization that the decision has
been made to employ emergency electronic surveillance and if an application in accordance with this
subchapter is made to that judge as soon as practicable, but not more than twenty-four hours after the
Attorney General authorizes such surveillance.”); LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 6–12
(2004) (noting uniform agreement on executive’s constitutional power to “repel sudden attacks”
without congressional authorization).
249
As Posner and Vermeule put it: “[T]here is no general reason to think that judges can do better
than [the executive branch] at balancing security and liberty during emergencies.” POSNER &
VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 31; see also id. at 256–57 (concluding that “judges can do no better than
the [executive] on average, and will probably do worse from lack of information and expertise”);
ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 101–02 (positing that any judicial effort to “second guess” political claims
to declare a state of emergency in the aftermath of an attack will “inevitably parody the judicial ideal”
and that “[t]here simply won’t be enough time for the dispassionate consideration of evidence and
reasoned elaboration of judgment”). But see ACKERMAN, supra note 2, at 106–08 (contemplating
“microadjudication” of individual rights claims six weeks following an attack).
250
Indeed, unless one is willing to claim that review is always more harm than help—a claim our
raw effectiveness analysis should call into doubt. See supra text accompanying notes 163–67. It
remains at least possible that role effectiveness is served less well generally by a rule of no review, and
better by a rule of, for example, traditional review so long as “the courts are open and their process
unobstructed.” Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866).
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inescapably more resource intensive. But, there are at least two reasons
why this calculation is more complex than the new functionalists credit.
One is the concern discussed above—that there may be strategic burdens
associated with erroneous decision-making that the new functionalists do
not take into account.251 Second, if one takes seriously the conclusion
above favoring the use of existing institutions, modified as little as possible
in times of extraordinary demand, it becomes clear that the vast bulk of the
costs associated with a review scheme are already sunk. There are two
other branches of government already doing a high-volume business
evaluating a host of executive branch behaviors. The marginal additional
resource cost of evaluating any one additional program is likely to be low
in proportion, and lower still the more one relies on systems whose rules
and structures are already in place.
IV. REVISITING THE HAMILTONIAN VIRTUES: FUNCTIONAL SECURITY
DETENTION
Before finally applying these lessons more directly to designing an
anti-terrorist detention scheme, it may be helpful to summarize what the
foregoing discussion concluded about the kind of organizational structure
likely to be most effective. First, the system we want would encourage
decisionmakers to anticipate and plan for trade-offs likely to be involved in
terrorism-related decisions, particularly ensuring that any emergency
decision-making takes into account relevant expertise, relying on personnel
trained to carry out as many possible functions that exist whether or not
conditions constitute an “emergency.” Second, the system would include
some mechanism to correct for the known pathologies of executive
organizations engaged in security functions, a mechanism that would again
need to be modified only modestly to function effectively in emergencies.
Finally, the system would include some form of monitoring or review not
only to create incentives that correct for existing organizational
pathologies, but also to enhance opportunities for organizational learning
over time. The review structure should do something more than simply
duplicate the decision-making process that went before. Instead, it should
be structurally and culturally independent of the organization it aims to
check, and it should include incentives likely to predictably impact firstdecider behavior.
These broad criteria offer a template against which one might begin to
test the effectiveness of various security detention systems—the topic of
much high-level federal engagement across branches in the post-September

251

See supra text accompanying notes 39–43.
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252

11th United States, including the Court’s 2008 decision in Boumediene
v. Bush.253 Beginning with habeas litigation surrounding the military
detention of U.S. citizen Jose Padilla in 2002, the courts have repeatedly
confronted separation-of-powers questions in this context, including the
questions whether the executive has the inherent authority to engage in
military detention,254 and whether it is within the authority of the courts to
consider the legality of executive military detention in a broadly conceived
“war on terror.”255 To date, the Supreme Court has managed to avoid
definitive resolution of the former question, ruling on venue grounds in its
2004 hearing of the case of Jose Padilla,256 and finding adequate authority
from congressional delegation in its 2004 ruling in the case of Yaser
Hamdi.257 On the latter question, Boumediene answered in the affirmative,
at least with respect to those currently held at Guantanamo Bay.258
Nonetheless, it remains unresolved whether the courts’ authority to
consider the legality of executive military detention extends to all detainees
held in U.S. custody overseas.259 It is in part for this reason that the latter
question of the courts’ role remains a central preoccupation of the new
functionalists (among others).260
252

See, e.g., Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004) (considering the “legality of the
Government’s detention of a United States citizen on United States soil as an ‘enemy combatant’”);
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (addressing whether United States courts have jurisdiction to
consider the legality of detentions at Guantanamo Bay); see also Military Commissions Act of 2006,
Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600, 2636–37 (2006) (attempting to clarify procedures for review of
detention decisions); Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739, 2739–44
(2005) (outlining prisoner treatment and detention protocol).
253
Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
254
Compare, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509 (finding statutory authority for detention in ongoing
military operations in Afghanistan), and Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 256 F. Supp. 2d 218, 221 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (holding that the President has constitutional authority to detain U.S. citizen in military custody),
with Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 352 F.3d 695, 712 (2d Cir. 2003) (concluding that “the President lacks
inherent constitutional authority as Commander-in-Chief to detain American citizens on American soil
outside a zone of combat.”), rev'd and remanded, 542 U.S. 426, 429 (2004), and Padilla v. Hanft, 389
F. Supp. 2d 678, 691 (D.S.C. 2005) (finding that the President lacks authority to detain U.S. citizen in
military custody).
255
See, e.g., Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (finding that the District Court has jurisdiction to consider
habeas challenges under 28 U.S.C. § 2241); Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (“Petitioners . . . are
entitled to the privilege of habeas corpus to challenge the legality of their detention.”).
256
Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. at 430.
257
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 509.
258
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (holding Guantanamo detainees have constitutional right to
seek writ of habeas corpus); see also Rasul, 542 U.S. at 484 (recognizing statutory availability of
habeas writs for detainees held at Guantanamo Bay).
259
Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2259–60 (holding extraterritorial reach of Suspension Clause
depends on functional analysis of circumstances of detention).
260
See Kenneth Anderson, U.S. Counterterrorism Policy and Superpower Compliance with
International Human Rights Norms, Remarks to the New York University Law School International
Human Rights Colloquium (March 5, 2007), in 30 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 455, 476–81 (2007)
(discussing challenges posed by contemporary counterterrorism and the potential role for judicial
decision-making); Robert M. Chesney & Jack L. Goldsmith, Terrorism and the Convergence of
Criminal and Military Detention Models, 60 STAN. L. REV. 1079 (2008) (evaluating challenges of
security-related detention programs); A. John Radsan, A Better Model for Interrogating High-Level

1620

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1549

This Part takes a first cut at applying the foregoing organizational
criteria to three of the detention schemes most often discussed by the new
functionalists and in current debates: (1) a unitary executive regime, in
which detention authority flows from Article II alone and decisional
review, if any, is also within Article II; (2) a statutorily authorized
detention scheme, in which broad congressional authority to engage in
detention is subject to rigorous reporting and oversight requirements by
key committees; and (3) a statutorily authorized detention scheme with ex
post, de novo review of detention decisions by an independent tribunal.
A. Unitary Executive Detention
In theory, a detention scheme involving only the executive branch in
set-up and function might be able to operate quickly and in secret.261 But it
raises a range of concerns against the functional effectiveness criteria
proposed here. For example, it is theoretically possible that the executive
would design and operate a detention scheme to function principally in
non-war or emergency settings and that could remain functional with
minimal adjustments during emergencies. Indeed, the well-developed
military justice system does just that. But the military justice system that
exists is of course the product of an elaborate statutory scheme, designed
to perform a chronic function of military governance. It is hard to
conceive of an organizational or political incentive that would drive an
individual, term-limited executive to bear the political burden of setting up
and running a new detention scheme, with no certainty or expectation that
it would continue beyond that administration, other than an acute shortterm need.262 Likewise, an executive-driven detention initiative need not
(and for similar reasons is unlikely to) incorporate planning incentives or
Terrorists, 79 TEMP. L. REV. 1227, 1242–52 (2006) (proposing a novel approach to including judicial
oversight in terrorist interrogation and detention).
261
It is at least noteworthy, however, that the post-9/11 CIA prison scheme, for example, has done
neither. See Neil A. Lewis & Mark Mazzetti, Lawyers Weighing Suits Over C.I.A.’s Secret Jails, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2006, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library, NYT File (reporting on “secret” CIA
detention program); Mark Mazzetti, Questions Raised About Bush’s Primary Claims in Defense of
Secret Detention System, N.Y. TIMES, September 8, 2008, at A1, available at LEXIS, News Library,
NYT File (noting reports of detainee and prisoner treatment despite clandestine nature of operations);
Dana Priest, CIA Holds Terror Suspects in Secret Prisons: Debate Is Growing Within Agency About
Legality and Morality of Overseas System Set Up After 9/11, WASH. POST, November 2, 2005, at A1,
available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File (reporting disclosure of detainee treatment procedures
by Congressional and Public Interest sources).
262
See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 57 (“[P]residents are especially reluctant to push for agency
reforms in the absence of a crisis or in the presence of anticipated resistance. . . . Although dozens of
investigations, commissions, and experts identified shortcomings in the U.S. Intelligence Community
between 1947, when the CIA was created, and the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks, no president
attempted major intelligence reform. Rational self-interest explains why.”). Zegart offers a useful
account based on organization theory and political science (rational choice theory) as to why the
President and executive agencies find it so difficult to engage in adaptation or reform absent a crisis or
other external force. See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 50–60.
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other mechanisms that help to mitigate errors associated with “emergency”
decision-making.
Is an executive-only system capable of correcting for the decisionmaking pathologies of involved decision-making organizations? After all,
some executive agency internal review systems have functioned well.263
Here, however, there is reason to be skeptical that a review process internal
to the executive branch could exercise enough independence to overcome
organizational barriers. The concern is particularly acute for review fully
within the military, where the habit of secrecy is readily accommodated,
and organizational loyalties may create incentives for decisionmakers to
cover mistakes, incentives at times compounded by public political
demands.264 Given the likelihood that a non-statutory military detention
system has been created in and for a special circumstance, there is a
heightened risk that the system will lack standard operating procedures,
professionally developed norms, or other features that can combat the
Would an executive-only
organizational tendencies of concern.265
detention system fair better if operated by a civilian organization like the
CIA or the FBI (setting aside for the moment other likely constitutional
concerns with such programs)? It is unclear. Both organizations have
shown themselves in the past to have fierce inter- and intra-organizational
loyalties that have restricted information sharing, arbitrarily limited the
information and expertise available to aid intra-agency decision-making,
In the detention context
and inhibited organizational learning.266
specifically, the problem of a lack of standard operating procedures or
professionally developed norms has seemed worse for the CIA, which had
no formal tradition or practice of detention operations,267 than for the
military, which at least has a strong tradition of certain kinds of
adjudicatory functions.268
263
See Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, Auditing Executive Discretion, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 227,
253–54 (2006) (elaborating on efficiency of internal auditing programs).
264
See MARK DENBEAUX & JOSHUA W. DENBEAUX, REPORT ON GUANTANAMO DETAINEES: A
PROFILE OF 517 DETAINEES THROUGH ANALYSIS OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE DATA (2006),
available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=885659 (reviewing accuracy of detention decisions); SAGAN,
supra note 158, at 252–59; see also supra text accompanying notes 212–14.
265
This was certainly the case with the specially created Guantanamo Bay military commissions,
created by presidential order in November 2001. See, e.g., Human Rights First, Observations of
Military Commission Trial Monitors (2004-07), available at http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/
us_law/detainees/military_commission_diary.htm (describing inadequacies of initial military review of
detention issues in Guantanamo).
266
See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 77, at 407–19 (2004) (discussing communication
inadequacies in the intelligence community and the need for enhanced agency collaboration); ZEGART,
supra note 173, at 38, 52 (detailing results of eighteen major classified and unclassified reports,
prepared between 1991–2001, on U.S. government intelligence reform).
267
For more information, see interviews on record with author.
268
See David Glazier, Precedents Lost: The Neglected History of the Military Commission, 46
VA. J. INT'L L. 5, 31–56 (2005) (detailing the evolution of military commissions throughout early
American history). One might here fairly ask about the effectiveness of an existing, quasi-judicial
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Finally, contrary to the new functionalist claims that the executive is
unlikely to exaggerate the danger posed by an individual or detain too
many people,269 organization analysis suggests a host of reasons why an
organization (especially an effectively insular one) acting alone will not be
effective in evaluating just the kind of cost-benefit trade-offs an individual
detention decision requires. Even beyond concerns about organizational
loyalty and agency problems, the incentives of a political branch actor
alone in any given case seems likely to guarantee a skewed evaluation of
trade-offs; the potential short-term tactical advantage of detaining an
individual will seemingly always outweigh strategic goals (particularly
goals whose realization may be beyond the political event horizon).270
Whatever executive branch actors may enjoy in the way of expert
judgment, and whether or not the engagement of other branches could
overcome this problem, it is difficult to imagine any executive agency
wholly immune from such an imperative.
B. Administrative Detention
Next, consider a version of a statutorily authorized security detention
scheme, with some form of executive agency review of individual cases
and congressional supervision of the entire apparatus. Given the flexibility
of legislative design, one could imagine, in theory, a detention structure
designed to function in normal and in emergency circumstances that
incorporated requirements or incentives to help ensure that emergency
functions, when deployed, would function smoothly and swiftly in the face
of a variety of exigencies or contingencies. Procedural safeguards could
likewise be constructed to ensure secrecy where necessary. With a
statutory requirement of an adversarial (or even inquisitorial) informationgathering process that insists upon the disgorgement of all relevant
organ of the executive branch, like the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (the “FISC”). As the
FISC is staffed with Article III judges, surely such actors are free or could be free from the “total
institution” pathologies of concern. Yet while the FISC is aided significantly by its Article III
composition (indeed, it is doubtful one can appropriately consider the FISC an “executive” court), the
FISC by design forecloses information and expertise critical to detention decision-making by
conducting only ex parte proceedings. In this regard, the information on which it can base its decision
is unlikely able to overcome whatever information failings the executive organizations that appear
before it suffer.
269
See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 2, at 164 (discussing arguments regarding the potential
for executive overreaching in the context of counterterrorism strategy).
270
See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 103–04 (attributing CIA’s failure in 2000 to track known Al
Qaeda operatives from Malaysia to Thailand in part to short-term needs crowding out even slightly
longer term requirements) (“Without strong incentives to reward analysts for peering over the horizon,
following cases over time, and developing strategic intelligence, the urgent crowded out the
important.”); see also WMD COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 145, at 4–5 (“Across the board, the
Intelligence Community knows disturbingly little about the nuclear programs of many of the world’s
most dangerous actors. In some cases, it knows less now than it did five or ten years ago . . . . The
Intelligence Community we have today is buried beneath an avalanche for demands for ‘current
intelligence . . . .”).
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information from all available sources for individual cases, as well as
system-wide oversight by Congress to assess global trade-offs (like
tactical/strategic) not always discernable in a single case, such a system
could theoretically avoid some of the important disadvantages of an
executive-only system.
Nonetheless, such a system would still encounter a cluster of
organizational hurdles. First, as with the executive branch, Congress is
structured to respond first and foremost to political incentives—incentives
that provide modest reason to act in the absence of an immediate crisis.
While emergency decision-making pitfalls could be avoided, they may not
be.271 Second, even a legislatively crafted system of executive review is
unlikely to avoid all of the “total institution” problems that plagued the
unitary executive review processes discussed above. Even if it avoids the
difficulties of emergency-exclusive design and operating procedures, the
same organizational and political loyalties (if not lack of professional
commitments) that created incentives for decisionmakers to cover mistakes
in the executive-only system are likely to be at play here. Both the initial
agency decisionmaker and the agency reviewer respond to the same
political imperatives of the executive administration.272 Further, a system
of ostensibly, but not actually, independent agency reviewers, chosen
presumably because of an expectation of their particular expertise, exposes
decision-making from the beginning to a serious “problem of
redundancy”—everyone may be less careful because of their belief that
someone at some other point in the line will correct any mistakes.
Finally, while the prospect of some level of congressional monitoring
may help to avoid some of the arbitrary evaluation of trade-offs found in
an executive-only decision-making regime, congressional oversight itself
has significant limitations. The relevant committee staffs are structurally
overwhelmed, stymied by secrecy requirements,273 engaged by political
loyalties, and may be incapable during a period of single-party government
control of overcoming executive stonewalling in accessing necessary
information.274 The efficacy of congressional monitoring may also be
271
See ZEGART, supra note 173, at 57–58, 154–55 (contending that fragmented committee
oversight system and electorial incentives compromised congressional success in intelligence reform).
272
See Kagan, supra note 104, at 2331–32 (discussing the accountability advantages of executive
administration decision-making).
273
See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 78, at 420 (2004) (finding that House and Senate
intelligence committees “lack the power, influence, and sustained capability” to meet the challenges
facing the nation’s intelligence agencies); see also FREDERICK M. KAISER, A JOINT COMMITTEE ON
INTELLIGENCE: PROPOSALS AND OPTIONS FROM THE 9/11 COMMISSION AND OTHERS (2004), available
at http://www.fas.org/irp/crs/RL32525.pdf (reviewing proposals to revise congressional oversight
structures to solve current failings); Suzanne E. Spaulding, Power Play; Did Bush Roll Past the Legal
Stop Signs?, WASH. POST, Dec. 25, 2005, at B1, available at LEXIS, News Library, WPOST File
(arguing that secret briefings to intelligence committee leaders alone—without staff input or possibility
for analysis—leaves little chance for meaningful congressional oversight).
274
See Neil Kinkopf, The Statutory Commander in Chief, 81 IND. L.J. 1169, 1195–97 (2006)
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hamstrung by duplicative or competing jurisdictions among relevant
oversight committees, duplication that may make agency reporting
demands more burdensome than necessary.275 Moreover, while general
congressional oversight may be especially effective at evaluating systemic
trade-offs (whether the system inflames more than incapacitates our
enemies, for example), Congress is not designed to make—indeed, is
generally constitutionally foreclosed from making—decisions about
individual cases. So while congressional engagement and oversight can
certainly improve in some respects over an executive-only regime, it seems
unable to overcome all organizational deficits.
C. Standard Detention
Finally, consider a federal regime featuring general ex ante statutory
authorization of detention, coupled with non-deferential ex post judicial
review. There can be little question that a standard, habeas-like review of
federal detention functions today primarily in non-emergency settings.
Constitutional rules have also arguably anticipated and answered the
question of how review operates in an emergency: when Congress wants to
suspend it, it can;276 and when it absolutely cannot operate, it does not until
it can again.277 Such extant rules, aided by the highly decentralized nature
of the federal judiciary (when one court is incapacitated, others can and do
still function) and life-tenure protection of federal judges, arguably
overcome concerns about speed (when review allows detention first,
questions only after the fact, and only as soon as practicable) and political
skewing.
Structurally speaking, the prospect of genuinely independent, nondeferential review of individual detention decisions could also create
incentives for executive detaining authorities to plan for detention
operations for a variety of emergency contingencies. This could include
standard emergency operating procedures and training for agents to ensure
appropriate consideration of key trade-offs.278 Additionally, rule-based
(noting Congress’ inability to engage in meaningful oversight of executive detention programs after
September 11).
275
See Dara Kay Cohen et al., Crisis Bureaucracy: Homeland Security and the Political Design
of Legal Mandates, 59 STAN. L. REV. 673, 704–07 (2006) (discussing this and related problems
associated with congressional oversight structures).
276
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2.
277
Ex Parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, 121 (1866); see also Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304,
323–24 (1946) (interpreting Hawaiian Organic Act to permit military trials of civilians only in event of
“actual or threatened rebellion or invasion”).
278
Cf. Myron W. Orfield, Jr., Comment, The Exclusionary Rule and Deterrence: An Empirical
Study of Chicago Narcotics Officers, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1016, 1030–51 (1987) (describing the
beneficial impact of the exclusionary rule in deterring police corruption); Myron W. Orfield, Jr.,
Deterrence, Perjury, and the Heater Factor: An Exclusionary Rule in the Chicago Criminal Courts, 63
U. COLO. L. REV. 75, 123–32 (1992) (outlining the deterrent effect of the exclusionary rule on police
perjury).
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evaluations—what a court does when it applies a statutory standard to an
individual case—can also be effective in enforcing attention to preestablished emergency priorities, potentially correcting or deterring goal
displacement by organizational agents. Indeed, a record of regular
individualized review, accompanied by reasons, might provide an excellent
method of recording the information necessary to enable organizational
learning over time.
How would judicial review serve to address the tendency of key
executive agencies to disdain outside expertise, or even to foreclose
competing views within the organization? Unlike a reviewing body
internal to the executive branch, even an expert judge cannot properly
bring his own independent knowledge to bear on an evaluation. Even if a
court can force the disgorgement of relevant information from the
detaining agency, we tend to think of expertise as comprising something
more than just information; it carries some implication of experience and
fluency in a professionally recognized methodology as well.279 A
generalist court arguably has neither when it comes to security detainees.
But just as with “hard look” review in the standard administrative law
context—reviewing not the substance of the agency decision per se, but
whether the agency had rational factual and logical reasons for deciding as
it did—there is reason to doubt that expertise in the reviewer is necessary
for the purpose of policing the cultural and arbitrariness concerns
highlighted by organization analysis. If the problem is that decisionmakers
did not consider outside information or expertise, then that omission is
likely to manifest itself in evident ways other than in decisions the rational
expert would find “bad.” Binding review by an independent body can
drive an incentive structure that forces the anticipation of and planning for
key threats that, whenever possible, favors the internal consideration of
competing information and expertise.280
Even with those advantages, however, at least some concerns remain.
For instance, while a court may be well positioned to consider trade-offs at
stake in an individual case (particularly when such trade-offs are addressed
in a well-formed statutory scheme), it is less clear that individualized
review could address overarching trade-offs of a detention system (again,
for example, whether the detention approach to detention alienates more
enemies than it deters). Here, it seems something additional is required,
such as a body based in the legislative branch insulated from the structural
279
See Daubert v. Merrill Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 593–95 (1993) (noting the essential factors
to be considered when determining the sufficiency of proffered expert testimony).
280
This is precisely what happened as police agencies developed internal mechanisms for
preparing search warrant applications, mechanisms that appear to serve as an additional check against
erroneous applications. See Dripps, supra note 246, at 930 (describing internal review process in law
enforcement bureaucracy in which line officer must present warrant application first to organizational
superior).
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and political weaknesses of the committee process, but free of the
institutional loyalties of executive branch agencies, and capable of
evaluating bigger picture trade-offs of any detention scheme. Finally, of
course, there are arguments of institutional habit. Will courts ever treat
security cases the way they treat, say, securities cases? It is uncertain. But
we will certainly not be able to answer such empirical questions without
conducting the experiment in practice.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article began by posing two questions raised by new functionalist
claims in favor of broad executive authority in matters of national security:
(1) Should functional interests matter in resolving constitutional
separation-of-powers disputes? (2) If so, how should a decisionmaker
evaluate whether a particular distribution of power among the branches is
functionally effective? The answer to the first question is an unmodified
yes; while formal dictates must always play a central role in constitutional
decision-making, history, logic, and the reality of constitutional
governance insist that at least some identified functional interests factor
into our understanding of the separation of powers. The answer to the
second question is a more cautious blend of interpretive do’s and don’ts.
Courts and policy-makers must recognize and distinguish raw effectiveness
claims when they see them, and avoid the temptation to accept such
arguments at face value especially when they claim to resolve the role of
decision-making structures. We should not assume national securityrelated questions are any less susceptible of rational evaluation than any
other category of decision. And we should avoid easy reliance on
historical assumptions of “institutional competence,” in favor of more
realistic considerations of organizational character.
The separation-of-powers issues presented by various security
detention schemes remain especially useful examples to test, not only
because of their continued salience as a policy matter, but also because
formal analysis has proven frustratingly unable to resolve the question to
what extent the courts have the authority to conduct, for example, “[a]ny
evaluation of the accuracy of the executive branch’s determination that a
person is an enemy combatant.”281 At the highest level of generality, the
Constitution’s text provides no reason for doubting that it falls within the
judiciary’s general federal question jurisdiction to determine whether an
individual’s detention is in violation of the Constitution.282 Nor is there
textual basis for doubting that war-related detention falls within this power.
On the contrary, the federal courts are given jurisdiction over criminal
281
282

Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 474 (4th Cir. 2003), rev’d 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
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treason cases, defined as “levying war” against the United States.
It is
difficult to imagine how such cases would arise except following the
detention of an individual accused by the executive of just such conduct. It
is likewise difficult to imagine that the courts would not then be expected
to determine whether the alleged conduct amounted to the levying of
war.284 While the act of detention may be executive in nature, one could
equally say, as a formal matter, that grants of authority to detain are
legislative in nature,285 and that determining the propriety of a deprivation
of liberty is judicial in nature.286 To the extent one accepts that judicial
review is a core function of the judiciary at all, formal analysis gives one
every reason to think review of executive detention is within the courts’
authority here.287 And if one accepts that the exercise of habeas corpus
jurisdiction in particular is at the core of judicial power, then the exercise
of full judicial review of executive detention is not only permissible but
required.288
Despite all this, both the prisoner-of-war scheme contemplated by
modern international humanitarian law289 and some of the Court’s own
case law 290 seem satisfied, at least in the first instance, with nothing more
than internal executive branch review of the propriety of executive
283

U.S. CONST., art. III, § 3, cl. 1.
Indeed, the federal courts have been faced with treason-related cases more than once in the
past two centuries of jurisprudence. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 559–61 (2004) (Scalia, J., dissenting)
(citing cases).
285
Understood as an issue of whether the detention power is one that has “the purpose and effect
of altering the legal rights, duties, and relations of persons,” the argument becomes strong that
detention authority is legislative by its nature. INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983); cf. also
Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000) (limiting a judge’s ability to impose a prison sentence
greater than the maximum determined by the legislature).
286
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706–07 (1974) (rejecting President’s separation-ofpowers argument that judiciary lacks power to subpoena tapes on the grounds that such a restriction
would “gravely impair” the courts’ ability to do justice in criminal prosecutions).
287
Id.
288
See James S. Liebman & William F. Ryan, “Some Effectual Power”: The Quantity and
Quality of Decisionmaking that Article III and the Supremacy Clause Demand of the Federal Courts,
98 COLUM. L. REV. 696, 884 (1998) (concluding that Article III “judicial power” must include, inter
alia, the capacity of a federal court to conduct an independent determination of “every—and the
entire—question affecting the normative scope of supreme law,” and the capacity “to effectuate the
court's judgment in the case and in precedentially controlled cases”).
289
See Geneva Convention [III] Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, available at http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/91.htm (outlining international mandates that
pertain to POW treatment and detention); Geneva Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of
Civilian
Persons
in
Time
of
War
of
August
12,
1949,
available
at
http://www.unhchr.ch/html/menu3/b/92.htm (detailing international expectations of enemy conduct
when detaining civilian populations); DEP’T OF THE ARMY, ARMY REGULATION 190-8 ENEMY
PRISONERS OF WAR, RETAINED PERSONNEL, CIVILIAN INTERNEES AND OTHER DETAINEES (1997),
available at http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/law/ar190-8.pdf (outlining proper administration and
operation of enemy prisoner of war detention facilities).
290
See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 538 (2004) (leaving open possibility that executive
agency review of military detention could satisfy due process standards); Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339
U.S. 763, 774–75 (1950) (“Executive power over enemy aliens, undelayed and unhampered by
litigation, has been deemed, throughout our history, essential to war-time security.”).
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detention. The reasons invariably given in support of less-than-normal
judicial review relate centrally to raw and role effectiveness concerns. As
Justice O’Connor put it in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld: “[T]he full protections that
accompany challenges to detentions in other settings may prove
unworkable and inappropriate in the enemy-combatant setting.”291 It has
proven necessary to consider the purposive separation-of-powers interests
of liberty and political accountability, as well as the more complex
effectiveness interests just discussed.
As a matter of purposive impact, it should come as little surprise that
separation-of-powers liberty interests favor some independent review.292
At the same time, one could reasonably argue that political accountability
is best served, in contrast, by leaving such judgments in the hands of the
elected leaders. Even assuming a context in which Congress has not
addressed the propriety of security detention, if the executive repeatedly
fails to take relevant information into account in detention decisions, the
“consequences” he faces are, properly, electoral, not legal. But in addition
to obvious concerns about how the rights of insular minorities would fare
in such a scheme, the key problem with this argument is that it proves far
too much. Judicial review raises counter-majoritarian concerns in every
setting, not just in matters of security. Unless there is some reason for
291
Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 535. Indeed Justice O’Connor’s analysis is an efficient blend of purposive,
role, and raw effectiveness functionalism:
Without doubt, our Constitution recognizes that core strategic matters of warmaking belong in the hands of those who are best positioned and most politically
accountable for making them. The Government also argues at some length that its
interests in reducing the process available to alleged enemy combatants are
heightened by the practical difficulties that would accompany a system of trial-like
process. In its view, military officers who are engaged in the serious work of waging
battle would be unnecessarily and dangerously distracted by litigation half a world
away, and discovery into military operations would both intrude on the sensitive
secrets of national defense and result in a futile search for evidence buried under the
rubble of war. To the extent that these burdens are triggered by heightened
procedures, they are properly taken into account in our due process analysis.
Id. at 531–32 (internal citations omitted); see also Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778–79 (1950)
(“To grant the writ to these prisoners might mean that our army must transport them across the seas for
hearing. This would require allocation of shipping space, guarding personnel, billeting and rations. It
might also require transportation for whatever witnesses the prisoners desired to call as well as
transportation for those necessary to defend legality of the sentence . . . . It would be difficult to devise
more effective fettering of a field commander than to allow the very enemies he is ordered to reduce to
submission to call him to account in his own civil courts and divert his efforts and attention from the
military offensive abroad to the legal defensive at home. Nor is it unlikely that the result of such
enemy litigiousness would be a conflict between judicial and military opinion highly comforting to
enemies of the United States.”).
292
See, e.g., Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 540–41 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“At
the argument of this case, in fact, the Government . . . suggested that as long as a prisoner could
challenge his enemy combatant designation when responding to interrogation during incommunicado
detention he was accorded sufficient process to support his designation as an enemy combatant. See
Tr. of Oral Arg. 40; id. at 42 (“[H]e has an opportunity to explain it in his own words” “[d]uring
interrogation”). Since on either view judicial enquiry so limited would be virtually worthless as a way
to contest detention, the Government's concession of jurisdiction to hear Hamdi's habeas claim is more
theoretical than practical, leaving the assertion of Executive authority close to unconditional.”).
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assuming the counter-majoritarian problem is greater in the security
setting—or that security decisions are some how more appropriately
political than, say, health policy decisions—the accountability claim seems
no more salient here than in any situation involving ex post judicial review.
Moreover, if our functional effectiveness discussion above suggests
anything, it is that key aspects of security decision-making (at the very
least in the nuclear terrorism context) are intensely fact-based, aided more
by professional expertise than by popular judgment. Given that some
security risks may attend both under-detention and under-review,293
political accountability concerns are at best a wash, and at worst
counterproductive (if responsive to irrational pressures) when it comes to
crisis-driven detention.294
The new functionalists thus do a service by considering effectiveness
arguments here. But their raw effectiveness claims flounder on the facts,
and a more thorough review of policy empirics may lead at best to
different answers depending on the circumstances. For policy-makers and
policy evaluators, the question of how one assesses role effectiveness
interests thus weighs heavily. The insights of organization analysis paint a
complex but striking picture of how our national security organizations
may be expected to handle a security detention regime—a picture, this
Article suggests, that reveals a more competent security detention scheme
as one that engages all three branches of government in design, review and
monitoring functions. There is no doubt more to be done in exploring this
application.
In the meantime, there remains a clear lesson for
constitutional interpretation: Hamilton only begins the conversation about
functional constitutional power.
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See supra text accompanying notes 163–64 regarding the risks of under-review.
See Cohen et al., supra note 275, at 702–14 (discussing arguments supporting questionable
accountability gains).
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